Abstract
In this paper, I will trace a distinction between two different ways of thinking about doxastic conflicts. The first way emphasises what is going on at the level of semantics, when two subjects disagree by uttering certain sentences or accepting certain contents. The second way emphasises some aspects that are epistemic in kind, which concern what subjects are rationally required to do whenever they disagree with someone. The semantics-oriented and epistemically-oriented notions will serve for the purpose of assessing some aspects of the debate that revolves around the notions of disagreement on matters of inclination. These aspects include: (i) the idea that disagreements in areas of inclination are somehow defective (Egan 2010); (ii) the idea that Relativism makes disagreement epistemically insignificant (Carter 2013); (iii) the idea that there can be faultless disagreements in which faultlessness is epistemic in kind (Schafer 2011).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
This characterisation doesn’t intend to state necessary and sufficient conditions for defining what a dispute is in general. I take it that, in the ordinary run of cases, we call “disputes” interactions that lack at least one of the (i)-(iii) features. For example, we call “dispute” an interaction in which two subjects argue but their claims are not backed by appropriate reasons; or they aren’t able to articulate them because, say, emotional factors interfere. This list just sets some characteristic features of a notion that—as far as I understand it—approximates to what we would ideally think of as a dispute where all the subjects involved are epistemically beyond reproach (they have their beliefs backed by appropriate reasons) and they are fully able to support their claims by using language and by devising adequate argumentative and dialectical strategies.
Indifference may not be the sole cause of a dispute being defective. Think for example of a dispute in which it is mutually clear to the parties that each has some preconceptions, bias or background theory that will affect the way in which evidence will be assessed. In such situations, if each party is confident enough that articulating one’s reasons will not bring the opponent to abandon her preconceptions, a dispute would be presumably idle. In other cases, evidence might be so weak that a dispute might be out of place (think for instance of two scientists who illustrate their respective theories concerning the origin of the universe. Though they might have a dispute concerning the epistemic virtues of their own theory—e.g. elegance, parsimony—a dispute that included an articulation of their non-meta-theoretical reasons could hardly be in place). Or think of cases in which each party has an opinion, but matters are such that he or she might very easily have had a different opinion given the same evidence: borderline cases (of redness, baldness, etc.) seem to elicit such modal instability of responses. In these cases as well, it would seem not advisable to engage in a dispute either. My focus here is specifically on indifference because the defectiveness of taste disputes may be attributed to their futility, which may make them seem uninteresting. My aim is to make sure that it’s not indifference that makes taste disputes defective, but rather something deeper.
I take this sketchy view to be compatible with the insight that much of our pleasure/displeasure responses are guided by sociological factors (cf. the case of aesthetic snobbery scrutinised by Kieran 2010). Though I’m happy to accept this, I maintain that pleasurable or non-pleasurable responses seem to be the heart of a taste or aesthetic experience and I take it is these responses that justify our taste (or aesthetic) judgements. Another matter is how these responses have been induced and whether they have been encouraged by social customs. That a certain pleasure reaction is owed to the way social norms shape our sensibility seems to play no (immediate) role of epistemic support.
Of course, the disputant might acquire some evidence from the fact itself that a disagreement is going on, or she might be presented with other kinds of reasons for or against her views (in the form of propositions, inferences, etc.): for instance, suppose A asserts, on the basis of a pleasure response, that caramel-flavoured ice cream is tasty, but also asserts, on the basis of a displeasure response, that crème brulée ice cream is not tasty. B replies that crème brulée ice cream is tasty (based on her pleasure response) and that, moreover, A should find it tasty too, since the caramel and crème brulée flavours are really made with the same ingredients. It seems that A has acquired some evidence against her belief that crème brulée is not tasty in the form of propositions arranged in an inference; however, if by tasting crème brulée she continues to get a displeasure response, it would be unreasonable for her to change her mind on the basis of having endorsed the above inference. Also, if A had no views about the crème brulée flavour and acquired a belief that it is tasty based on endorsement of B’s reasoning, if she tasted the flavour and had a displeasure response, it seems that this would “trump” her previous motivations and justify her change of heart concerning crème brulée. In other words, it seems that pleasure/displeasure enjoy a priority role in justifying our taste beliefs.
For the time being, I’ll set aside skeptical threats to our knowledge of the external world through perception.
References
Baker, C. (2012). Indexical contextualism and the challenges from disagreement. Philosophical Studies, 157, 107–123.
Blackburn, S. (1998). Ruling Passions. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Carter, A.J. (2013). Disagreement, Relativism and Doxastic Revision, Erkenntnis (Published Online).
Christensen, D. (2007). Epistemology of Disagreement: the Good News. The Philosophical Review, 116, 187–217.
Dreier, J. (1999). Transforming Expressivism. Noûs, 33(4), 558–572.
Dreier, J. (2009). Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement. Philosophical Perspectives, 23, 79–110.
Egan, A. (2010). Disputing About Taste. In Ted Warfield & Richard Feldman (eds.), Disagreement. OUP.
Elga, A. (2007). Reflection and Disagreement. Noûs, 41, 478–502.
Feldman, T. (2006). ‘Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement’, in Hetherington (ed.) (2006: 216–37).
Feldman, T. (2007). Reasonable religious disagreements. In Antony, L. (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular. OUP.
Huvenes, T. (2012). Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste in. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 90, 167–181.
Huvenes, T. (2013). Disagreement without Error. Erkenntnis (Published Online).
Kelly, T. (2005). The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement. In T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kieran, M. (2010). The Vice of Snobbery: Aesthetic Knowledge, Justification and Virtue in Art Appreciation. The Philosophical Quarterly, 60, 239.
Kölbel, M. (2003). Faultless Disagreement. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 104, 53–73.
Lasersohn, P. (2005). Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste. Linguistics and Philosophy, 28(4), 643–686.
Lopez De Sa, D. (2008). Presuppositions of Commonality in M. García-Carpintero & M. Kölbel (eds.), Relative Truth, OUP: 297–310;
MacFarlane, J. (2005). Making Sense of Relative Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105, 321–339.
MacFarlane, J. (2007). Relativism and Disagreement. Philosophical Studies, 132, 17–31.
Marques, T. (2013). Doxastic Disagreement. Erkenntnis (Published Online).
Rieppel, M. (2011). Stoic Disagreement and Belief Retention. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 92(2), 243–262.
Rosen, G. (2001). Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism. Philosophical Perspectives, 15, 60–91.
Schafer, K. (2011). Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82(2), 265–286.
Sosa, E. (2010). The Epistemology of Disagreement. In Haddock, A., Millar, A., Pritchard, A. Social Epistemology. OUP.
Stevenson, C. L. (1944). Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Stevenson, C. L. (1963). The Nature of Ethical Disagreement. In Facts and Values (pp. 1–9). New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sundell, T. (2011). Disagreements about taste. Philosophical Studies, 155(2), 267–288.
van Inwagen, P. (1996). It Is Wrong Everywhere, Always, and for Anyone to Believe Anything on Insufficient Evidence. In J. Jordan & D. Howard-Snyder (Eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today (pp. 137–153). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Van Inwagen, P. (2010). We're Right, They're Wrong. In R. Feldman & T. A. Warfield (Eds.), Disagreement (pp. 10–28). New York: Oxford University Press.
Wedgwood, R. (2007). The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, C. (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Harvard University Press.
Wright, C. (2001). On Being in a Quandary: Relativism, Vagueness, Logical Revisionism. Mind, 110, 45–98.
Wright, C. (2006). Intuitionism, Realism, Relativism and Rhubarb. In Patrick Greenough & Michael Lynch (eds.), Truth and Relativism. Clarendon Press.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to a referee for helpful comments on the paper. I had the opportunity to work and write on these topics while benefiting of a Visiting Fellowship at the Northern Institute of Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen. I am grateful to the Institute and to all the members with whom I discussed these issues during my stay.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Belleri, D. Disagreement and Dispute. Philosophia 42, 289–307 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9498-2
Received:
Revised:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9498-2