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Pacifism and Punishment

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Abstract

This article seeks to expose some of the implications of certain versions of pacifism for matters of criminal punishment, arguing that the plausibility of these versions of pacifism depend on the extent to which their implicit denials of certain central punishment-related concepts are themselves reasonable.

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Notes

  1. Narveson (1984). Emphasis added.

  2. While the focus of this paper is on the particular conceptions of the nature of pacifism found in Narveson and May, respectively, a comprehensive account of pacifism and punishment would require a treatment of a variety of other conceptions of pacifism and their implications for the punishment-related concepts in question. There are a host of conceptions of pacifism in the philosophical literature. More recent accounts include those found in Holmes (1999; 1989); Regan (1972); and Ryan (1983, 2009).

  3. Feinberg (1970). Feinberg believes that the hard treatment and reprobatory aspects of criminal punishment must be part of the definition of “punishment.”

  4. Narveson, “Pacifism: A Philosophical Analysis,” p. 87.

  5. Rawls (1999, Chapter 2).

  6. A view such as this is also found in Reiman (1998).

  7. May (2008, p. 34).

  8. May (2008, pp. 39-40).

  9. For an argument for this position, see Corlett (2010).

  10. Rawls (1999, Chapter 2).

  11. Reiman (1998, p. 67).

  12. Reiman (1998, p. 68).

  13. Reiman (1998, p. 68).

  14. Corlett (2013, Chapter 8).

  15. Reiman’s does not because it makes deterrence a central justificatory component of capital punishment. While most retributivists follow Immanuel Kant in holding that desert is always the primary justification of punishment, they can and often do admit that social utility considerations such as deterrence can be justified only in a secondary sense (See Corlett 2013, Chapter 4).

  16. This notion of retributivism is articulated and defended in Corlett (2013, Chapter 5); Corlett (2001, 2003).

  17. Alarcón and Mitchell (2011, 2012).

  18. Many thanks to the referees of Philosophia and to Asa Kasher for their excellent comments on an earlier draft of this paper which was presented at the conference on pacifism at Belgrade University, Belgrade, Serbia, June 2012.

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  1. Philosophy Department, San Diego State University, San Diego, CA, USA

    J. Angelo Corlett

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  1. J. Angelo Corlett
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Correspondence to J. Angelo Corlett.

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Corlett, J.A. Pacifism and Punishment. Philosophia 41, 945–958 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9468-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9468-8

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