Abstract
I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one hand, if our epistemic situation is characterized phenomenally, then Chalmers’ demand that PCS should explain our epistemic situation is misplaced. PCS can explain our epistemic situation only if there is a reductive explanation of consciousness. But according to PCS, no reductive explanation of consciousness can be given. On the other hand, if our epistemic situation is characterized topic-neutrally, then PCS is not only physically explicable, but it also explains our epistemic situation. Either way, PCS is safe.
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Notes
For my formulation of this conditional, I rely on Chalmers and Jackson (2001)
Presumably, what Chalmers means here is not that an explanation of our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness consists of, and is entirely exhausted by, an explanation of why we face certain epistemic gaps. Rather, I take Chalmers to mean that an explanation of our epistemic situation explains, among other things, why we face those epistemic gaps. I address this issue in subsection ‘A Difference in Epistemic Situation?’.
As far as I know, no other paper addresses Chalmers’ most recent formulation of his objection to the phenomenal concept strategy (see Chalmers 2010). There, Chalmers revisits his 2006 objection to PCS and responds to Papineau (2006), Balog (2012) and Diaz-Leon (2010). In what follows, I consider Chalmers’ responses to the aforesaid papers and show that they are unsuccessful.
Suppose that the neural realizers of phenomenal concepts are directly connected to the neural realizers of phenomenal experiences. In turn, suppose that the neural realizers of physical or functional concepts are directly connected to the neural realizers of theoretical thinking, reasoning, or verbal processing. If it turns out that the neural realizers of phenomenal concepts are not connected in any direct fashion to the neural realizers of physical or functional concepts then this would explain the conceptual isolation of the two types of concepts. When we subsume a phenomenal experience under a phenomenal concept, we deploy a certain kind of concept. In so doing, we activate a certain neurological structure—one which is not connected in any direct way to the neurological structure of the mechanism(s) responsible for the deployment of physical or functional concepts. (Similar claims can be made about the reference-fixing mechanisms of the two types of concepts: they are isolated insofar as there are no direct connections between the neural realizers of those mechanisms.)
Perhaps, Chalmers would argue that it is not enough for PCS to demonstrate that conceptual independence between physical truths and phenomenal truths is compatible with physicalism. What PCS needs to demonstrate in addition is that the truth-and-knowledge involving epistemic gaps (and not just conceptual independence) is compatible with physicalism. My response to this objection amounts to a re-iteration of the dilemma that Chalmers’ position faces. Conceptual independence between physical and phenomenal truths is not enough to respond to antiphysicalist arguments only if (i) a response to those arguments requires proponents of physicalism to show that PIT a priori entails those truth-and-knowledge involving epistemic gaps and (ii) those truth-and-knowledge involving epistemic gaps are given in phenomenal terms. But as I have argued, an acceptance of (ii) amounts to an acceptance of the claim that E—the description of our epistemic position—should be given in phenomenal terms. Once we accept that our epistemic situation must be given a phenomenal description, then it is illegitimate to demand from PCS to explain those gaps. An explanation of those gaps would be possible only under the assumption that consciousness is reductively explained. But in this context, Chalmers cannot demand that consciousness must be reductively explained. Such a demand is tantamount to the rejection of PCS. Chalmers’ objection is supposed to show why PCS does not work, not assume its falsity from the very beginning. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.
I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to address this objection.
The main argument in favor of physicalism is the so-called “causal argument,” which holds (roughly) that all physical effects have physical causes and thus everything that has physical effects (including experiences) must be physical. For more on this argument, see Papineau (2001) and (2002); Yablo (1992); Sturgeon (2000); Stoljar (2010); Tye (2009, chapter 2).
I am not convinced by Chalmers’ argument. The conceivability claim under question—i.e., the claim that it is conceivable that zombies lack introspective knowledge even if they have C—can lead to the conclusion that zombies do not share our epistemic situation only if the following two claims are granted: (a) we have introspective knowledge of the sort that zombies lack; and (b) such introspective knowledge cannot be captured in topic-neutral terms. Given, however, that in this section of the paper we are assuming that our epistemic situation, E, can be adequately characterized in topic-neutral terms, then we should expect that such introspective knowledge can be captured in topic-neutral terms. In other words, the assumption that E can be adequately characterized in topic-neutral terms furnishes us with reasons to deny (b). Consequently, we should deny Chalmers’ claim that zombies do not share our epistemic situation. For more on this issue, see note 10.
I was asked whether Chalmers can hold that zombies do not share our epistemic situation and at the same time maintain that our epistemic situation can be adequately described in topic-neutral terms. I do not see how. The only difference between zombies and us is the fact that zombies lack consciousness. But if that is the only difference, then our epistemic situation can differ from that of zombies only if an adequate characterization of our epistemic situation makes reference to phenomenal states. By assumption, however, our epistemic situation is given in topic-neutral terms. As a result, there cannot be any difference between our epistemic situation and that of zombies. As long as Chalmers admits that our epistemic situation can be characterized topic-neutrally, then I do not see how he can also maintain that zombies do not share our epistemic situation.
As a last resort, Chalmers might cite the content of certain utterances that zombies can make and argue that those utterances somehow demonstrate that zombies do not share our epistemic situation (See Chalmers 2010, p. 317ff.). For instance, he can argue that when a zombie utters, ‘I am phenomenally conscious,’ the zombie asserts something false. Yet, when we utter the same sentence we say something true. Therefore, we do not share zombies’ epistemic situation. There are at least two problems with this argument. First, it is notoriously difficult to delineate the contents of zombies’ utterances or beliefs. This difficulty is something to which Chalmers himself admits (ibid., p.317). In fact, it is precisely this difficulty that forces Chalmers to provide an additional argument in support of the claim that zombies do not share our epistemic situation. Therefore, if Chalmers’ objection against PCS stands on contentious claims about the contents of zombie’s beliefs, then his objection rests on rather shaky grounds. Furthermore, there are authors who argue against Chalmers’ claim that zombies utter something false, when they utter ‘I am phenomenally conscious’ (see Balog 1999).
But there is a more serious issue here. What is at stake is whether the epistemic situation of zombies differs from our epistemic situation. In order for Chalmers’ argument to show that, we must assume that the false sentence, ‘I am phenomenally conscious,’ uttered by a zombie, and the true sentence, ‘I am phenomenally conscious,’ uttered by us, are descriptions of both zombies’ and our epistemic situations. It is only by demonstrating that there is a difference in the truth-values of those two utterances that Chalmers can maintain that we do not share the epistemic situation of zombies. For argument’s sake, let us assume that Chalmers is right when he claims that the zombie utterance ‘I am phenomenally conscious’ is false. Now, if the false utterance (or belief) ‘I am phenomenally conscious’ is a description (be it a partial and incomplete one) of zombie’s epistemic situation, then it cannot be a description of their epistemic situation that is given in topic-neutral terms. If it were, then we would have no reason to think that they have uttered something false. Hence, in order to conclude that a zombie utters something false when he or she utters ‘I am phenomenally conscious’ we must read that utterance in a phenomenal and not in a topic-neutral manner. But by doing so, we are assuming that our epistemic situation must be given in phenomenal terms: the zombie utterance ‘I am phenomenally conscious’ turns out to be false only if the term ‘phenomenal consciousness’ is not a topic-neutral term—i.e., it does not refer to a state that admits of a topic-neutral characterization.
Consequently, considerations of zombie utterances cannot show that their epistemic situation differs from ours, if we have already assumed that our epistemic situation can be adequately characterized in topic-neutral terms. In order to show that the two epistemic situations differ, we must assume a phenomenal description of our epistemic situation. But in this part of the essay, we have been assuming that our epistemic situation can be captured in topic-neutral terms. So Chalmers cannot use zombies’ utterances to argue that the epistemic situation of zombies differs from our epistemic situation and that our epistemic situation can be adequately characterized in topic-neutral terms. (To be clear, I am not arguing that our epistemic situation can be adequately characterized in topic-neutral terms. My claim is a conditional one: if our epistemic situation can be captured in topic-neutral terms, then, pace Chalmers, zombies share our epistemic situation.)
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Elpidorou, A. Having it Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly. Philosophia 41, 1181–1203 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9455-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9455-0