Abstract
Heidegger’s treatment of self-sacrifice has suffered neglect. In this paper, it is critically analysed and found wanting, and it is argued that for a proper understanding its historical location must be taken into account. The way he treats self-sacrifice presents a particular instance of many recurrent features in his thinking. Some of these can be better understood by reference to the kinship with certain forms of religious thought. In particular, the absence of a moral dimension has a counterpart in certain familiar forms of religiosity.
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Notes
Lewis (2005) p. 115.
One of the few exceptions is Julian Young (1997) mainly pp. 166–169. An essay prize competition on the topic “Is a significant role assigned to sacrifice already in Sein und Zeit?” has been announced by Teylers godgeleerd genotschap (Teyler’s Theological Society) in Haarlem, with 1 May 2010 as the last submission date. The Society’s explanation of the topic centres on Abraham’s sacrifice of Isaac (which is not a self-sacrifice), but does also mention the 1943 Postscript.
“Nachwort zu ‘Was ist Metaphysik?’” (re-published in: Wegmarken (= GA vol. 9, 1976) pp. 303–312). This text is in the following referred to with page-numbers only. Two translations into English have come to my notice. One is by Hull and Crick, in Heidegger (1949), pp. 380–392 (below abbreviated “1949”), reprinted in Kaufmann (ed.) (1975) pp. 257–264, and the other by McNeill in Heidegger (1998) pp. 231–238 (below abbreviated “1998”). These two abbreviations will be used in the footnotes that follow.
For the record, it is only after Carnap’s paper had appeared that Heidegger began to argue that metaphysics had to be overcome, and adopted in some writings the expression “Überwindung der Metaphysik” to indicate his own standpoint. There is nothing of that in the inaugural lecture or in the comprehensive lecture series Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik given 1929–1930 (GA vol. 29/30, 1983; transl. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1995). Of course, his own view of metaphysics had never anything in common with Carnap’s.
“Heidegger did not reply to contemporary critics” (Poul Lübcke (ed.) (1982)) p. 121. Not quite: Carnap was obviously the target, and was mentioned by name in an unpublished draft for a lecture in 1935. For fascinating details, see Friedman (2000) ch. 2. There is a German web-version “Überwindung der Metaphysik: Carnap und Heidegger” (2004) at http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/archive00000944/01/MF-ueberwindung.pdf.
Die Philosophie aber muss sich hüten, erbaulich sein zu wollen. Phänomenologie des Geistes, Vorrede §9.
Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (see note 5) p. 535.
Das Sein jedoch ist keine seiende Beschaffenheit des Seienden (p. 306).
“Einleitung zu ‘Was ist Metaphysik?’” (Introduction to “What is Metaphysics?” (1949), in Wegmarken (see note 4), p. 370.
Beiträge zur Philosophie. GA vol. 65, 1989, p. 144, p. 423; p. 78. Cf the Greek \(\sigma \iota \gamma \hat \alpha \nu\) to be silent.
p. 306, footnotes 2 and 3. An attempt to explain how the discrepancy arose is made in Inwood (1999) p. 73.
Alles Widerlegen im Felde des wesentlichen Denkens ist töricht. It is foolish to attempt refutations in the field of essential thinking. “Brief über den Humanismus” (Letter on Humanism) in: Wegmarken (see note 4), p. 336.
Logic itself is suspect, and this can be clearly seen as it degenerates into Logistik [i.e. formal logic of the kind represented by Frege, Russell, Carnap, et al.] (p. 308).
Could this explain why multiplication tables frighten many school children?
[das Unberechenbare] das sich und seine Unheimlichkeit den Griffen der Rechnung entzieht (p. 309).
p. 305–306. Was heisst Denken? (lectures 1951/52), GA vol. 8, 1954 (re-issued 2002), p. 23.
Die Wissenschaft denkt nicht, ibid. p. 9. The same statement was also made in a broadcast in May 1952, published as an article “Was heisst Denken?” in the monthly magazine Merkur in that year, and reprinted in GA vol. 7, 2000, p. 133. — Robinson (1963) p. 25 writes that “Modern science [...] has, in the pregnant sense intended by Heidegger, ceased to think.” But “ceased” implies that science once did but does not any more. It is doubtful whether that is Heidegger’s view.—An impartial reader may find Heidegger’s definition of “thinking” unpersuasive. It would mean that even if Rodin’s Thinker spent all his time working on Fermat’s last theorem he would still be misnamed.
The German noun Not signifies a condition of distress which calls for some kind of rescue, salvation, help, and the like. Here, Not signifies a pressing need.
Dieses Denken antwortet dem Anspruch des Seins, indem der Mensch sein geschichtliches Wesen dem Einfachen der einzigen Notwendigkeit überantwortet, die nicht nötigt, indem sie zwingt, sondern die Not schafft, die sich in der Freiheit des Opfers erfüllt (p. 309).
(1949, p. 389) This thinking answers to the demands [sic] of Being in that man surrenders his historical being to the simple, sole necessity whose constraints do not so much necessitate as create the need (Not) which is consummated in the freedom of sacrifice.
(1998, p. 236) Such thinking responds to the claim of being, through the human being letting his historical essence be responsible to the simplicity of a singular necessity, one that does not necessitate by way of compulsion, but creates the need that fulfils itself in the freedom of sacrifice.
Commonly, only beliefs, statements and propositions are taken to be truth-apt, but Heidegger’s usage is different.
Die Not ist, dass die Wahrheit des Seins gewahrt wird, was immer auch dem Menschen und allem Seienden zufallen möge (p. 309–310).
(1998, p. 236) The need is for the truth of being to be preserved, whatever may happen to human beings and to all beings.
Cf Luke 10:42, One thing is needful.
Compare fiat justitia, et pereat mundus (let justice be done, even if the world should perish). Here we have servetur veritas essendi, et pereat mundus.
Das Opfer ist die allem Zwang enthobene, weil aus dem Abgrund der Freiheit entstehende Verschwendung des Menschenwesens in die Wahrung der Wahrheit des Seins für das Seiende (p. 310). Note that “Menschenwesen” should not be translated “human essence”. It is not the humanness, the character of being human, that is surrendered.
(1949, p. 389) Freed from all constraint, because born of the abyss of freedom, this sacrifice is the expense of our human being for the preservation of the truth of Being in respect of what-is.
(1998, p. 236) The sacrifice is that of the human essence expending itself—in a manner removed from all compulsion, because it arises from the abyss of freedom—for the preservation of the truth of being for beings.
damit dieser in dem Bezug zum Sein die Wächterschaft des Seins übernehme (p. 310).
The notion of man being responsible for guarding the truth of being occurs already in manuscripts from the late 1930s. Beiträge zur Philosophie (GA vol. 65, 1989). See e.g. p. 490. What is new is the link to self-sacrifice. There is, however, a hint in this direction in “Ein Brief an einzelne Krieger” (A letter to individual soldiers), GA vol. 90, 2004, where he writes (p. 275) that death is part of the guardianship of the truth of Being (mit in der Wächterschaft der Wahrheit des Seyns gehört).. The letter is dated 26 November 1939. At that time, Poland had been devastated.
Im Opfer ereignet sich der verborgene Dank, der einzig die Huld würdigt, als welche das Sein sich dem Wesen des Menschen im Denken übereignet hat, damit dieser in dem Bezug zum Sein die Wächterschaft des Seins übernehme (p. 310). The English “as which” is baffling, but so is “als welche”.
(1949, p. 388f.) In sacrifice there is expressed that hidden thanking which alone does homage to the grace wherewith Being has endowed the nature of man, in order that he may take over in his relationship to Being the guardianship of Being.
(1998, p. 236) In sacrifice there occurs (ereignet sich) the concealed thanks that alone pays homage to the grace that being has bestowed upon the human essence in thinking, so that human beings may, in their relation to being, assume the guardianship of being.
The connection is discussed in Was heisst Denken? (see note 17), pp. 143ff.
Passim, e.g. “Brief über den Humanismus” (Letter on humanism) (1946), in Wegmarken (see note 4), pp. 335–337.
A critic has suggested that it is not the guardianship that calls for gratitude, but the gift of human existence—Dasein. It is doubtful whether the text can support such an interpretation, but even if it does, it remains unclear why gratitude should be called for.
Not because it “miscalculates”: translators have mistranslated “verrechnen”. Heidegger’s point is that calculation gets us on the wrong track, not that it gets its sums wrong.
Transcending egoistic calculation can be noble, as Julian Young (1997) p. 167 observes in his comments on the passages here being considered. Is that so? Vengefulness is perfectly selfless, but is it noble?Young’s interpretation (pp. 166–169) finds in Heidegger a “meditation on a fine death” a death that can have a nobility in itself even if it is in a senseless, evil cause (p. 168).
Die Sucht nach Zwecken verwirrt die Klarheit des angstbereiten Scheu des Opfermutes, der sich die Nachbarschaft zum Unzerstörbaren zugemutet hat (p. 311). The obsessive search for purposes disturbs the clarity of the reverence—a reverence ready to turn into angst—to be found in the spirit of sacrifice which lays claim to being in the proximity of the indestructible.
(1949, p. 390) The search for a purpose dulls the clarity of the awe, the spirit of sacrifice ready prepared for dread, which takes upon itself kinship with the imperishable.
(1998, p. 237) The obsession with ends confuses the clarity of the awe, ready for anxiety, that belongs to the courage of sacrifice which has taken upon itself the neighborhood of the indestructible.
Universally, according to many writers. “The desire of immortality […] is natural unto all men.” Discourse of Justification &c. (1612), in: The Ecclesiastical Polity and Other Works of Richard Hooker, vol. 3, London, 1830, p. 398. But there are dissenting opinions.
The guardianship theme reappears, e.g. in “Brief über den Humanismus” (Letter on Humanism) in: Wegmarken (see note 4), p. 345, but not the linking to self-sacrifice.
“Evans sees 1943 as the turning point for German morale in the war. Whereas Kershaw has emphasised the defeat at Stalingrad, however, Evans focuses on the British and American air raids on German cities as the key to alienating Germans from the Nazi regime and convincing them that the war was lost. Stargardt (2008) p. 9, col. 2.
Die höchste Gestalt des Schmerzens aber ist das Sterben des Todes, der das Menschsein opfert für die Wahrung der Wahrheit des Seins. Dieses Opfer ist die reinste Erfahrung der Stimme des Seins. Wie aber, wenn dasjenige geschichtliche Menschentum, das gleich den Griechen zum Dichten und Denken berufen ist, das deutsche, wie aber, wenn dieses zuerst die Stimme des Seins vernehmen muss! Müssen dann nicht hier die Opfer sein, gleichviel, durch welche Ursachen im nächsten sie ausgelöst werden, da das Opfer in sich sein eigenes Wesen hat und keiner Ziele un keines Nutzens bedarf! Wie also, wenn in unserer geschichtlichen Bestimmung die Stimme des Anfangs sich ankündigte? GA vol. 54, 1982, p. 249f.
But the highest form of pain is to suffer death, which human nature offers as a sacrifice for the sake of preserving the truth of Being. This sacrifice is the purest experience of the voice of Being. But what if the Germans, that historical part of mankind which like the Greeks has the vocation to be poets and thinkers, [now] have become that part of mankind which must be the first to hear the voice of Being! Is it not then here that the sacrifices must occur, no matter what proximate causes may have brought it on, since a sacrifice has in itself its own nature and requires no purposes and no usefulness. What, then, if in our historical calling the voice of the Beginning is making itself heard?
Emphasis supplied. To be noted in passing, the statements discussed here contain neither an implicit pro-nazi message, nor any discreet expression of anti-nazi sentiments. The italicised words above suggest that questions of responsibility be left aside. Also, solace is not sought in ideas about blood and race. Moreover, whatever justified complaints may be raised about Heidegger’s prose, it is not LTI. (See Klemperer (1946)).
“Brief über den Humanismus” p. 339; cf “Einleitung zu ‘Was ist Metaphysik?’”, p. 371, p. 378., both in Wegmarken (see note 4).
Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (see note 5) p. 52.
op. cit. p. 87.
In Zur Sache des Denkens, Tübingen: Niemeyer 1969, p. 2; GA vol. 14, p. 6. This is reminiscent of Wittgenstein’s thoughts on ineffability, which provoked Frank Ramsey’s comment that if you can’t say it then you can’t whistle it either.
These are two “ideal types” of non-moral religiosity. They are both concerned with the soul. There are other, more materialistic types, represented, e.g., by American televangelists and by cargo cults in Papua-New Guinea.
“Heidegger’s philosophy is from beginning to end morally and politically neutral”, and he thought philosophy cannot and ought not to be otherwise (Lübcke (1982) p. 119; emphasis supplied).
With apologies to Oscar Wilde (A Woman of No Importance).
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In this paper, “GA” is short for Gesamtausgabe, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann
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Mautner, T. Self-sacrifice in Heidegger. Philosophia 38, 385–398 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9211-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-009-9211-7