Abstract
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
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Notes
Metz (2000)
Montague (2002)
Metz (2009)
This is precisely the claim that Metz makes about “desert theory”—i.e., that it entails The Intuition without plausibly explaining it. Metz’s criticism of desert theory will be discussed below.
I take it that the following statement is a slip on Metz’s part: “I continue to submit that... [societal-defense] does much worse than censure theory at entailing that, and explaining why, there is always some moral reason for the state to proportionately punish those guilty of having broken a just law.” (120) Nowhere does he argue that censure theory explains The Intuition better than societal-defense does.
References
Metz, T. (2000). Censure theory and intuitions about punishment. Law and Philosophy, 19, 491–512.
Metz, T. (2009). Censure theory still best accounts for punishment of the guilty: Reply to Montague. Philosophia, 37(1), 113–123.
Montague, P. (2002). Recent approaches to justifying punishment. Philosophia, 29, 1–34.
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Montague, P. Revisiting the Censure Theory of Punishment. Philosophia 37, 125–131 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9161-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-008-9161-5