Abstract
I first distinguish several notions that have traditionally been conflated (or otherwise neglected) in discussions of the metaphysics of time. Thus, for example, I distinguish between the passage of time and temporal becoming. The former is, I maintain, a confused notion that does not represent a feature of the world; whereas a proper understanding of the latter provides the key for a plausible and comprehensive account of the nature of temporal reality. There are two general classes of views of the nature of temporal reality; proponents of particular views in both classes attempt to account for the phenomenon of temporal becoming in terms of qualitative change. I argue that any such account – in terms of change – is irredeemably problematic. And so I propound a different account of temporal becoming, based on the notion that temporal reality is transient, which provides the means to characterize intuitively and vividly the significant effects of time on the metaphysical nature of the world.
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Notes
Note that the independence of these issues from a theory of time does not arise merely as a result of the minimal theory that I propose. Suppose one does not take time to be the feature of reality that renders change possible, but rather, as the relationalist does, the network of temporal order relations between events. Given this theory of time itself, one still needs an account of temporal reality, for one needs to resolve the issue of how extensive this network is – whether it is growing or is complete. If one accepts, as part of relationalism, that the network is complete, one still needs to resolve the issue of whether there are events in the network that are past, present or future or whether the network consists only of events later (earlier) than one another.
One exception to this is perhaps Clifford Williams. In Williams (1992), he purports to give an account of one’s awareness of temporal becoming in so-called B-terms, that is, in a way that does not make recourse to qualitative change. Williams’ position, however, is difficult to evaluate, for the following reasons. Although he claims to be a proponent of the B-theory, a specific theory among the class that posits the homogeneity of temporal reality, he explicitly rejects the stasis, permanence and tenseless existence of all events in time that are essential to this view (Williams 1992: 125.). He also asserts that a certain inexorability, the capacity to sweep one along against one’s will, is of the very nature of B-time [Page 128] and that the movement of time is compatible with the B-theory [Page 131] without any explanation whatsoever of how these things could be so. Furthermore, at several points in his discussion, Williams draws on the putative analogy between time and space to illustrate or support claims he makes for his version of the B-theory. Yet he explicitly acknowledges that time and space are intrinsically different and that one should expect asymmetry in one’s experiences of them [Page 130]. Therefore, Williams seems to have both an idiosyncratic understanding of the B-theory and to address inadequately temporal becoming, the bone of contention.
This is a concession that I believe should be made.
There may be other, more subtle, problems for these subjective accounts of temporal becoming – regarding one’s continuous awareness of his mental states from moment to moment and also one’s ability to act (and, hence, use language) – if the homogeneity of temporal reality entails that no ordinary individual exists in time entirely at a single moment. And I argue below that this account of temporal reality does indeed entail this.
Many philosophers interested in causation are reluctant to make this stipulation. For the reasons of one influential theorist, see Lewis (1973).
These verbs must be interpreted as tenseless, if one is even to make sense of the claim. By ‘tenseless,’ I mean without tense, that is, making no distinction between past, present and future. I am explicit here, for some philosophers take ‘tenseless’ to mean disjunctively-tensed, that is, indicating a disjunction of the past, present and future tenses. (Thus, an object is real tenselessly, in this latter sense, if it has been real, is real or will be real.) This later usage is not only misleading, but also, in many contexts, raises significant problems (one need only look to the text above for an example of such a context). Throughout this paper, verbs in ALL CAPS are to be read as tenseless – in the sense of without tense. In some contexts, for ease of legibility, I indicate that the verbs should be read as tenseless only by putting the initial verb(s) in ALL CAPS.
This is because one accepts that there are propositions that will be true or have been true although there is nothing – where this last ‘is’ can be construed as either present tense or tenseless – that grounds the truth of these propositions. One can see clear examples of philosophers who adopt this unsatisfying position in Broad (1938: 316); Prior (1962: 11); Salmon (1987: 91); Cargile (1989: 162); Hinchliff (1996: 126); and Craig (1997: 29).
This discussion occurs in Time and Reality (under review). For another recent discussion that draws some similar conclusions, see Markosian (1993).
Carter and Hestevold assert that temporal becoming in terms of qualitative change (what they call Transient Time) is incompatible with the ontological homogeneity of temporal reality (a view that is more general than, but essentially similar to, their notion of Temporal Parity). This, however, is false – if one accepts the principle that in order for an entity to bear any property whatsoever, that entity must exist. For given this principle, the passage model of temporal becoming entails the ontological homogeneity of temporal reality. See Carter and Hestevold (1994: 270).
In Sider (2001), Sider maintains that the ontological homogeneity of temporal reality (what he calls eternalism) is compatible with the view that temporal entities endure. For a response – and, hence, a defense of the claim made above – see my “Temporary Intrinsics and Relativization” (under review).
Although their terminology differs from mine, the same conclusion is reached in Carter and Hestevold (1994) and Merricks (1995). Their reasons for concluding that the ontological homogeneity of temporal reality is incompatible with the thesis that persisting objects endure are essentially the same as those presented in the text. At this point, I should register my disagreement with Carter and Hestevold’s claim that the passage model of temporal becoming (what they call Transient Time) requires the view that objects endure. As I argue in the text, given that the passage model (in conjunction with the proposed metaphysical axiom) entails the ontological homogeneity of temporal reality, this model requires that persisting objects perdure.
Incidentally, the metaphysical position presented by D.H. Mellor in Mellor (1981), one that conjoins the homogeneity of temporal reality with endurance theory, viz. the claim that entities are wholly present whenever they exist, (and a natural notion of properties) seems, for the reasons described in the text, incoherent.
I discuss this problem, which originates with considerations presented by Aristotle, in much detail in “The Problem of Fixity” (under review), and so forgo discussion here.
Theodore Sider defends his temporal parts theory against the objection that temporal parts “do not exist long enough to have many of the properties we attribute to continuants” by suggesting that such attributions can be analyzed in terms of complex relations holding among the temporal parts of an individual. See Sider (2001: 197–198). I do not find such a response satisfactory for it does seem that deliberation requires a single – numerically identical-entity to weigh options involving it itself (that numerically identical entity) and that an intention is most plausibly construed as a mental state that promotes the plans of the very same – numerically identical-entity that bears it. Both views are incompatible with Sider’s suggestion. I do realize this is the assertion of intuition (regarding the natures of deliberation and intention) against a developed view; however, the problems for temporal parts theory and free action do not arise merely because temporal parts do not exist long enough to act, but also because temporal parts theory entails the thesis of ontological homogeneity. It is the combination of these problems that underlie my confidence in the intuitions I assert.
This is an assumption being made at this point. It is this assumption, one will recall, that enables the proponent of the view that time passes to avoid the difficulties, for such an account of temporal becoming, that arise from the proposed metaphysical axiom that an entity must exist if it is to bear any property whatsoever.
The ultimate reasons why the ontological homogeneity of temporal reality places such strict modal constraints on the future are discussed in “The Problem of Fixity” (under review).
Facts are here construed as basic, simple (i.e. non-structured) entities.
Although it is, admittedly, tempting to think of the past growing and, hence, changing, I think this thought should be abjured, for the past, as a body of facts, is indefinitely large to begin with – it gets no larger. This temptation comes, I suspect, from speaking of the past. The use here of the definite article is misleading (as it is when one speaks of the present) for there is not one body of facts that is the past, but rather a new one continuously (just as there is, continuously, a novel present moment).
Whereas I take pure becoming to underlie the transience of temporal reality and, thus, to be the fundamental notion in a comprehensive account of the metaphysics of time, it does not play such a role in Broad’s philosophy of time.
The notion is discussed in Savitt (2002). Savitt and I interpret Broad very differently. On his interpretation, Broad’s notion of absolute becoming is simply the view that temporal reality is ontologically homogeneous. This interpretation overlooks the ontological spontaneity – the continuous coming to be and ceasing to be of a moment – embodied in the notion Broad characterizes; it is precisely this aspect of the notion that I believe makes it important and insightful. I disagree, for the reasons elaborated in this paper, with Savitt’s contention that temporal becoming can be accounted for simply in terms of the ontological homogeneity of temporal reality. Moreover, as should be clear from the foregoing discussion, Savitt’s claim that his construal of absolute becoming (viz., the thesis of ontological homogeneity) is neutral in regards to questions about human freedom is incorrect.
I disagree, then, with D.C. Williams’ claim that “the most laborious effort cannot construct an intelligible theory which admits of the literal truth” of what has been regarded as the intuition of passage (Williams 1951: 104, page number refers to the reprinting). I develop an intelligible and, I hope, compelling theory, based on the ideas developed in the present paper, in Time and Reality (under review).
I am very grateful to C. Anthony Anderson, Anthony Brueckner, Kevin Falvey, R.M. Sainsbury and Nathan Salmon for comments on drafts of this paper and for helpful discussion.
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Fiocco, M.O. Passage, Becoming and the Nature of Temporal Reality. Philosophia 35, 1–21 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9052-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-007-9052-1