Abstract
This paper extends the endogenous growth agent-based model in Fagiolo and Dosi (Struct Change Econ Dyn 14(3):237–273, 2003) to study the finance–growth nexus. We explore industries where firms produce a homogeneous good using existing technologies, perform R&D activities to introduce new techniques, and imitate the most productive practices. Unlike the original model, we assume that both exploration and imitation require resources provided by banks, which pool agent savings and finance new projects via loans. We find that banking activity has a positive impact on growth. However, excessive financialization can hamper growth. Indeed, we find a significant and robust inverted U-shaped relation between financial depth and growth. Overall, our results stress the fundamental (and still poorly understood) role played by innovation in the finance–growth nexus.
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Notes
We do not attach any meaning to the x and y dimensions. A 2-dimensional lattice is chosen only for descriptive reasons.
In the first period, agents allocate a fraction \(\gamma _2\) of their savings to create the initial equity of the bank.
Nonetheless, in Sect. 4.4 we test the consequences of different returns to scale regimes.
This assumption is made for consistency with the original FDM. In reality, firms do not stop production while performing R&D and we tested the consequences of production during sailing in “Appendix A.” Overall our results are not qualitatively affected.
Here one can imagine that more “risk averse” explorers would like to have larger savings, or borrow more resources, than the expected exploration cost. That is, they could apply a sort of safety buffer. We test the consequences of this assumption in “Appendix A.” Our results are not significantly affected by such refinement. Notice also that such dependence of exploration upon savings, combined with the way in which banks provide loans (see Sect. 3.5), makes the probability that a firm starts exploring increasing in the amount of savings.
The same happens if the explorer arrives, by chance, to an already known island.
One could relax such an assumption allowing firms to move only in the directions where the productivity of the new technologies should be higher than the one they currently master. We will consider this setting in future versions of the model.
One could imagine that bankrupt explorers should be more penalized, e.g., letting them go back to the origin or introducing some form of bankruptcy cost they should pay when restarting production. However, the cumulation of knowledge and the dynamic increasing returns which are generated while the explorer was sailing let the bankrupt agent fall behind with respect to the technological frontier. This constitutes already a fairly large penalization.
The probability of such an outcome is negligible, as the productivity of a newly discovered island is linked to the last production carried out by the explorer. For this reason, we make this assumption for keeping the setting as simple as possible. However, in future versions of the model we will consider a more sophisticated setting in which an explorer can continue to sail when she arrives on an already known island with lower productivity, or she can come back to her initial island.
In the case of multiple maxima, miner i chooses one of them at random.
Also in this case we assume that imitators do not produce during sailing for consistency with the FDM. An analysis of the consequences of production during sailing can be found in “Appendix A.” See also footnote 5.
One can also assume that adoption should be further favored by reducing the time and hence the cost, it takes to be performed. We analyze such scenario in “Appendix A.” Our results are robust to lower time for adoption.
We assume that the per-period share of production c consumed for imitation equals that for exploration.
Since “asymmetric information is a defining characteristic of credit markets” (Dell’Ariccia 2001, see also Bhattacharya and Thakor 1993; Van Damme 1994), this is the only viable way to introduce it in the model. Indeed, given our simple setting, if banks were able to distinguish between explorers and imitators, their information would be perfect. Nonetheless, we investigate the role of information asymmetry in Sect. 4.4.
Since a bankrupt agent may hold bank equity shares, we assume for simplicity that in such a case the shares are redistributed to the other shareholders proportionally to their positions. Investigating the effects of bank ownership structure goes beyond the objectives of the present analysis.
We define net position as the difference between agent’s deposit and outstanding loan. If liquidity is not enough to satisfy depositors, then it is distributed proportionally to net positions. A firm with negative net position does not receive anything.
The source code of the model, written in C++, is available upon request.
All our results do not significantly change if one increases Monte Carlo sample sizes. Extensive tests show that the MC distributions of the statistics of interest are sufficiently symmetric and unimodal. Thus, we can use MC sample averages to get meaningful synthetic indicators.
The Basel II capital requirement is 8%, while in our baseline parametrization we fix it to 10%. Our choice captures the additional capital buffer that risk averse banks hold in order to reduce their solvability risk.
For a critical discussion of empirical validation of agent-based models, see Fagiolo et al. (2017).
See Fagiolo and Dosi (2003) for more details.
We thank an anonymous referee for having pointed out this.
Such an exercise can also be considered as a preliminary—and admittedly very partial—sensitivity analysis of the model. Indeed, we test the robustness of our findings when the value of one or two parameters is changed keeping all the other parameters as in the baseline parameterization in Table 1.
We further tested the effect of lower levels of innovation cumulativeness; overall the results are consistent with the intuition provided here. This analysis can be found in “Appendix A.”
Notice also how, from Eq. (1), individual production decreases with the number of miners when \(\alpha <1\).
We also tested how the economy reacts to changes in bank setup costs and in the number of banks. Overall, our results are robust and consistent with the effect of credit on the exploration–exploitation trade-off. For this reason, we do not report such analyses, which are nevertheless available from the authors upon request.
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G.F., D.G. and A.R. gratefully acknowledge support by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under Grant Agreement No. 640772-DOLFINS. G.F. and A.R. gratefully acknowledge support by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program under Grant Agreement No. 649186-ISIGrowth. Thanks to Marina Mastrorillo, Tommaso Ferraresi, and Delio Panaro for their contribution to the development of the ideas behind this version of the model. We also thank two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.
Additional analyses
Additional analyses
In Appendix, we collect some additional analyses we made to check the robustness of our results.
First we investigate what happens when more “risk averse” explorers are considered. To do that, we assume that the amount of resources necessary to start an exploration is
with \(\theta \ge 0\) representing a safety buffer. That is, for precautionary motives an explorer requests more resources than those she expects to consume during the travel.
Figure 17 shows the results with different values of \(\theta \). As one can notice, no significant difference emerges from the introduction of such safety mechanisms. This is due to the fact that the positive effect of lowering the risk of bankruptcy is counterbalanced by the negative effect of committing more resources to fewer explorations. This is confirmed by the expansion of financial depth. Indeed, banks end up financing less (but larger) projects; thus, when an innovative project fails, it has more severe consequences on the economy.
Next, we consider the case in which production is possible also during imitation and exploration. To do that, we assume that in each period of sailing an agent is able to generate the amount of GDP she was producing during her last period as miner on the island she left. Figure 18 shows the comparison between our baseline setting and this new scenario. As expected production during navigation has a positive effect on growth, which becomes even more evident when a banking sector is present. Indeed, in this setting the imitation and exploration boosting provided by credit does not correspond anymore to a lack of accumulation. The relation between financial depth and growth is still inverted U shaped, and it is interesting to notice how the financial sectors shrink. Moreover, an expansion of finance produces a negative effect on growth relatively earlier. These are the consequences of larger accumulation of resources, which dynamically increases the risk of over-exploration.
In the previous setting, however, production during navigation implies that exploration and imitation activities are basically costless. In the baseline setting, instead, moving in the technological space entails two costs. Indeed, foregone production (an opportunity cost) should be added to the explicit cost of foregone consumption described in Sects. 3.3 and 3.4. Hence, we explore now some intermediate cases. Figure 19 compares the results obtained under the baseline setting with those one gets when firms are allowed to generate a share of their last production as miners to finance explicit exploration and imitation costs. More specifically, we assume that production during sailing finances half of the explicit navigation cost and we investigate what happens when such cost increases by 50% (mid panels) or remains as in the baseline (right panels). Thus, in the first case the total cost of sailing decreases by 25% of the baseline explicit cost in terms of foregone consumption, while in the second case the total cost decreases by 50% of the baseline explicit cost. As one can notice, our results are overall robust to these different specifications. Since in both cases the total cost is significantly reduced, exploration and imitation become cheaper than in the baseline and this has a positive effect on long-run growth. Moreover, in those cases firms need to borrow less resources and the financial sector shrinks. Thus, the negative effect of a large financial sector is reduced and the risk of observing credit fueled over-exploration decreases.
Now we explore how our results change when the strength of cumulativeness in technical change weakens. As in the original FDM, cumulativeness plays an important role since it is at the core of the dynamic increasing returns process that drives self-sustained exponential growth. Indeed, as one can notice in Fig. 20, with lower values of \(\phi \) growth declines and such reduction is more evident when a financial sector is active. This follows from the fact that, in this scenario, discovering a new technology is less rewarding and agents take more time to pay back their loans. The inverted U-shaped relation between finance and growth is robust to lower values of \(\phi \), even if the negative effect of large financial depth seems to weaken. This is because larger exploration is needed when new technologies are only marginally more productive than old ones; thus, over-exploration becomes less likely.
Then, we analyze how our results change when imitators move faster in the technological space. Thus, adopting an already existing technology, as well as having the relevant advantages of being deterministic and moving through the shortest path, has also the advantage of a reduced time for implementation and hence a lower cost. As one can notice in Fig. 21, favoring imitation implies higher growth and such effect becomes even stronger when a financial sector is active. This follows from a mitigation of the incidence of over-exploration: faster and cheaper adoption implies that, on average, firms devote more resources to imitation than to exploration, equilibrating the trade-off. This is confirmed by the form of the inverted U-shaped relation between financial depth and growth, whose maximum shifts to the right.
In the end, we complement the analyses in Figs. 11 and 12 observing how our results vary when large values of minimum capital requirement are considered. As one can notice in Fig. 22, when \(\chi \) increases too much growth is negatively affected. This is because, when banks have to restrain credit because of a large capital requirement, the economy suffers of a lack of imitation and exploration, especially in the first phases of development. This is also confirmed by the fact that the relation between financial depth and growth becomes increasingly positive and steep, while over-exploration is a very rare event.
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Fagiolo, G., Giachini, D. & Roventini, A. Innovation, finance, and economic growth: an agent-based approach. J Econ Interact Coord 15, 703–736 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-019-00258-1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11403-019-00258-1
Keywords
- Agent-based models
- Innovation
- Exploration versus exploitation
- Endogenous growth
- Banking sector
- Finance–growth nexus