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The US–China Chip War, Economy–Security Nexus, and Asia

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Abstract

In few industries does the transfer of industrial leadership play a more significant role in the hegemonic competition between superpowers than in the semiconductor industry. As shown in the case of the United States (US)–Japan semiconductor conflict in the 1980s, who takes the lead will be critical in determining the future trajectory of the hegemonic competition between the US and China. This study examines how economic–security linkages and chip-related factors jointly affect the US–China Chip War and the evolving dynamics in Asia at the regional level. The economy–security nexus responds sensitively to the geopolitical structure and degree of economic dependence. Changes in the geopolitical structure create variations in which the economic–security nexus is sometimes either integrated or separated. Chips are currently the world’s most critical technology, evolving quickly to create technological regimes and path dependence. Among the diverse technological features of semiconductors, this study focuses on the industrial position of an individual economy’s specialization in the chip value chain. Individual states devise statecraft strategies to maximize their economic security gains and minimize risks. In the semiconductor sector, the joint effects of the economic–security nexus and chip-related factors shape each involved economy’s statecraft strategy. This study theoretically reveals the concrete mechanisms through which the changing economic–security nexus shapes the economic statecraft of individual economies in the semiconductor value chain. The study also explores how East Asian economies adopt their own strategies along the spectrum of balancing, hedging, and bandwagoning in the context of competition between superpowers.

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Notes

  1. Integrated circuits (ICs) can be divided into general-purpose products, such as central processing units and memory chips, and application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) products. The general purpose of the IC product market is relatively large and mainly serviced by integrated device manufacturers (IDMs), which have vertically integrated the production of IC design and IC manufacturing. ASIC products are designed by a fabless company specializing in IC design and manufactured by foundry firms 69. In this paper, the terms semiconductors, chips, and IC are used interchangeably, unless there is a special reason to differentiate.

  2. Brandt and Thun metaphorically express the competition for this key position of being at the forefront of innovation [9, 10].

  3. Multipolar structures provide incentives for integration because, in such cases, great powers rely heavily on their allies for security, and allies have significant leeway to defect. Unipolar structures also provide incentives for integration because, in such cases, the dominant state wants to preserve its privileged position and “that effort, in turn, requires its international economic strategy to line up behind and reinforce its national security strategy in relations with potential challengers” [53]. Only bipolar structures provide incentives to separate the economy and security because, in such cases, great powers rely less on allies, whose chances of defection are low.

  4. As the US–China rivalry intensifies, research on the countries or economies involved in the rivalry has surged, and with many different terms to refer to these concepts. Lin and Meng [46] and Christie et al. [16] have used the term “secondary countries,” while Hu [35] used the term “third party.” Turscasanyi [83] studied Central and Eastern European countries in the context of US–China competition without specifically referring to “other countries.” Shah [74] also studies BRI member countries in the context of US–China competition.

  5. Kuik [41] explains the hedging as follows: “The hedging is not only a ‘middle position’ between balancing and bandwagoning, but also an opposite position. That is hedger adopts two sets of mutually counteracting policies, namely the ‘returns-maximizing’ and ‘risk-contingency’ options.”.

  6. Yin explains that “the case study is preferred in examining contemporary events, when the relevant behaviours cannot be manipulated” [95].

  7. Blinken’s statement defines the rule-based international order as “the system of laws, agreements, principles, and institutions that the world came together to build after two world wars to manage relations between states, to prevent conflict, to uphold the rights of all people.” [36]

  8. The Deputy Chief of the People’s Liberation Army General State Admiral Sun Jianguo outlined these points in the Party journal Qiushi (Seeking Truth) [79].

  9. In 2021, Bloomberg reported how dependent the world is on Taiwan, especially TSMC's foundry, and how Taiwan's position in the global chip supply chain has "huge strategic value" [18].

  10. Singapore supplies 30% of its domestic water needs with deionized water (water that is highly purified by removing minerals, particulates, bacteria, microorganisms, and dissolved gases) through reprocessing, and aims to increase this to 50% by 2060.

  11. AMD chairman and CEO Jerry Sanders summarized the situation as “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”.

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Funding

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2020S1A3A2A01095177).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of China Studies, Inha University, 5S269, 100 Inha-Ro, Michuhol-Gu, Incheon, 22212, South Korea

    Yongshin Kim

  2. Chinese Trade and Commerce Major, Division of International Studies, Sejong University, Jiphyeongwan 411, 209 Neungdong-Ro, Gwangjin-Gu, Seoul, South Korea

    Sungho Rho

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  1. Yongshin Kim
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  2. Sungho Rho
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Correspondence to Sungho Rho.

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Kim, Y., Rho, S. The US–China Chip War, Economy–Security Nexus, and Asia. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-024-09881-7

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