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U.S.-China Technology Competition and the Emergence of Techno-Economic Statecraft in East Asia: High Technology and Economic-Security Nexus

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Abstract

This study posits that U.S.-China technology competition has promoted the spread of techno-economic statecraft in East Asia. The emergence of techno-economic statecraft in East Asia requires systematic analysis because it affects not only the dynamics of U.S.-China technology competition but also the restructuring of the regional order. Since both the United States and China do not have complete self-sufficiency in the high-tech innovation ecosystem, it has become an urgent task for them to reduce their vulnerability to winning technological competition. Against this backdrop, East Asian countries have emerged as actors playing an important role in technological competition. Since East Asian countries are key players in the supply chain of high-tech industries, cooperation with East Asian countries has emerged as a factor that can influence the landscape of U.S.-China technology competition. Based on these observations, this study aims to explain the following four phenomena: First, it explains the process by which the United States and China seek to securitize high technology as a means of reducing their own structural vulnerabilities while redrawing new boundaries for cooperation with East Asian countries. Second, I argue that U.S.-China technology competition has accelerated the rise of techno-economic statecraft in East Asia. Third, I assert that there are significant differences in the techno-economic statecraft pursued by East Asian countries in the U.S.-China technology competition. Fourth, the divergence of techno-economic statecraft in East Asian countries has created systemic effects in the regional order.

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Acknowledgements

This work was supported by the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and the National Research Foundation of Korea [NRF-2020S1A3A2A01095177].

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    Seungjoo Lee

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Lee, S. U.S.-China Technology Competition and the Emergence of Techno-Economic Statecraft in East Asia: High Technology and Economic-Security Nexus. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-023-09878-8

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