Abstract
After the Trump administration tossed aside the nuclear deal in May 2018, many Chinese businesses had to reconsider their policy of technology transfer to Iran pretty similar to the way that technological relationship involving the Middle Eastern country and its major Western and Eastern partners underwent significant changes upon the comeback of the crippling regime of international sanctions against Tehran. Unlike their more sophisticated and resourceful rivals that almost terminated their teetering technological connections with the Iranians, however, the Chinese experienced a new situation concerning the nature and size of their transfer of technology to the Persian Gulf country after the Americans shunned away from the landmark nuclear deal. On one side, a lot of Chinese companies also abandoned their ongoing or prospective business projects in Iran, refusing to share their technology and technical knowhow with Iran in direct and formal ways. On the other side, a number of important economic sectors in Iran became increasingly dependent on Chinese technology, and the whole process brought some unprecedented dynamics to the Mideast country’s indirect and informal patterns of technological partnership with the East Asian power. The present study tries to shed some light on such critical developments involving China and Iran in the wake of Washington’s unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear agreement.
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Azad, S. Cutting Both Ways: The Transfer of Chinese Technology to Iran in the Post-JCPOA Headwind. East Asia 41, 91–107 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-023-09419-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-023-09419-3