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Political Incentives, Bureaucratic Behaviors and Political Budget Cycles in China

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Abstract

In the context of China’s central government’s promotion of local officials’ performance evaluation for environmental protection and the division of responsibilities between the party and the government, this study investigated China’s political budget cycles and conducted empirical tests using data obtained from 2007 to 2020 for provincial officials. It was found that in the middle of their tenure, provincial governors tend to expand expenditures for economic development and environmental protection, while provincial party secretaries only expand expenditures for economic development. This finding reveals three important logics running through the operations of China’s political budget cycles, namely, top-down logic, timing logic, and division of labor logic. These results are validated through various robustness tests. Further analysis found no significant correlation between provincial officials’ years in office and expanded expenditures on economic development and environmental protection. Moreover, the fiscal strategy of expanding expenditures in the middle of their tenure showed no significant positive influence on their promotion. The aforementioned findings provide new evidence and insights for a deeper understanding of the influence of political factors on the cyclical fluctuations of China’s local fiscal policies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, Shanghai, China

    Jiapeng Li

  2. Fudan Institute for Advanced Study in Social Sciences, Fudan University, Shanghai, China

    Sujian Guo

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  1. Jiapeng Li
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Li, J., Guo, S. Political Incentives, Bureaucratic Behaviors and Political Budget Cycles in China. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-023-09872-0

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