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Steering a Developmental Party-State: Why Has China Chosen Centralization of Power to Fight Corruption?

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Abstract

Anti-corruption and centralization of power have defined China’s political changes since October 2012. This article attempts to explain why China has chosen the centralization of power to fight corruption in light of the developmental state literature. Drawing on David Kang’s model of corruption in developmental states, this article proposes a theoretical framework that explains how the government–business relationship and the dynamic of the party-state can combine to affect the level of corruption, and then it explores the relationship between China’s anti-corruption efforts and its centralization of power. It argues that the balance of power between China’s role as a party-state and its role as a developmental state has important impacts on the relationship between officials and the business sector and, in turn, on the level of corruption. The theoretical and empirical analyses in this article demonstrate that China’s government–business relationship from the early 2000s to October 2012 was the rent-seeking type and has been transformed into the mutual hostages type since then. Based on the analyses, this article further explains why China’s centralization of power to fight corruption has been a reasonable choice. The author argues that, by making this choice, China has essentially been steering a developmental party-state to rebalance itself.

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Data Source: PRC National Bureau of Statistics, National Data, at https://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01 [February 1, 2023]

Fig. 4

Data Source: PRC National Bureau of Statistics, National Data, at https://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=C01 [June 14, 2023]

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Notes

  1. See p. 52 of Duverger [8] and p. 108 of Janda [21].

  2. See p. 608 of Yang [78].

  3. See p. 11 and pp. 122–123 of Kang [25].

  4. See p. 564 of Tanzi [50].

  5. Shambaugh, China’s Future, Fig. 3.3 [44].

  6. For more information on intensive growth and extensive growth, see J. Wilczynski [62] and A. Iremen [20].

  7. See pp. 267–268 of Zengke He [17] and p. 200–201 of Li Li [31].

  8. See p. 65 of Thornton [55].

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Acknowledgements

Earlier drafts of this article have been presented at conferences at Fudan University, Renmin University of China, and Zhejiang University. The author is grateful to Xi Chen, Kent Freeze, Xuecun Liang, Xiao Ma, Cai Zuo, and the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments and invaluable suggestions. The author also would like to thank Scott Nelson for fruitful exchanges of ideas and Yumeng Wu for her excellent research assistance. This article is based on an academic research project (2018–2019) sponsored by the Dr. Seaker Chan Center for Comparative Political Development Studies, Fudan University.

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Wu, C. Steering a Developmental Party-State: Why Has China Chosen Centralization of Power to Fight Corruption?. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-023-09870-2

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