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China’s Quest for Global Economic Governance Reform

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Abstract

This paper attempts to characterize China’s approach to global economic governance during the Xi Jinping era, and to provide details on how it is playing out. One finding is that China has moved away from the period of “hiding one’s strength and biding one’s time” and is now acting in a more norm-making and agenda-setting role in which it is seeking largely incremental change. Another finding is that China is doing these things through a variety of global governance forms such as inter-governmental organizations with a fairly highly degree of formality, looser international organizations that have weaker implementation capacity and unilateral initiatives which put China very much in a leadership position. Findings are based on an examination of major activities of the Xi period, including hosting the G20 leaders’ summit in Hangzhou, China, joint creation of new multilateral development banks, and the Belt and Road Initiative. The paper also touches on motives for China’s activities, including hedging against adverse developments in the international system, greater wealth, and a global power vacuum that has arisen with the rise of nativist and populist movements in the West, and possible constraints to the realization of China’s objectives such as slowing domestic economic growth and a backlash against China’s globalization, which could intensify.

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Notes

  1. By “disruptive innovation,” I mean, in the context of global economic governance, new ways of doing things by emerging powers that usher in changes in international economic cooperation to the point where old ways of doing things are displaced. Such innovation initially affects a limited group of countries (e.g., countries that seek rapid loan approval, new sources of infrastructure finance or are selected for pilot projects in currency internationalization schemes) and only later migrate to more developed countries. This conceptualization accords with the definition put forth by Clayton M. Christensen that puts emphasis on neglected segments, challenges to incumbents by entrants and “more convenient, and less expensive products” [15]. As Christensen, Michael E. Raynor and Rory McDonald, who are interested in business competition issues, write, “Incumbents, chasing higher profitability in more-demanding segments, tend not to respond vigorously. Entrants then move upmarket, delivering the performance that incumbents’ mainstream customers require, while preserving the advantages that drove their early success. When mainstream customers start adopting the entrants’ offerings in volume, disruption has occurred” [16].

  2. This phrase comes from the book, Renegotiating the World Order: Institutional Change in International Relations, by Phillip K. Lipscy [45]. As Lipscy states in an interview about the book, “renegotiation plays out differently depending on the institution’s policy area: institutions in competitive policy areas tend to adjust flexibly or collapse as states exit, while institutions in noncompetitive policy areas can remain relevant even while resisting change” [76]. A similar kind of argument is made by Scott L. Kastner, Margaret M. Pearson and Chad Rector who hypothesize that a rising power will be more actively supportive of an international regime when it has relatively few outside options and either a free rider or user of a “hold up” strategy to extract concessions when its options are better, the former when it does not view its cooperation as necessary to the regime and the latter when its contributions are viewed as indispensable [40]. Evidence for these ideas are found in two cases the authors consider – China’s approach to the North Korean nuclear issue where “China’s worsening outside options contributed to a more proactive PRC approach” [40: 174] and a financial case where “Beijing’s relatively strong outside options, combined with the increasing indispensability of Chinese participation in global financial governance, contributed to a shift in PRC strategy from passive acceptance to hold up, as China conditioned its participation in the IMF’s response to the global financial crisis on reforms in voting power” [40: 174].

  3. An argument of this sort in regard to the liberal international order can be found in [35].

  4. This statement is in regard to China’s quest for a “community of common destiny” in Asia, not specifically global governance. Similar statements, however, have been made by Xi on that topic, such as “Global economic governance should be a mechanism of sharing. It should be about participation by all and benefits for all. Instead of seeking dominance or winner-take-all results, it should encourage the sharing of interests and win-win prospects” [90].

  5. The market economy issue is discussed in “Broken promises set a bad example for China in the WTO” by Henry Gao [24].

  6. This phrase is used in the title of an article by Frank-Jürgen Richter entitled “Mindset for action at the G20 summit will be determined by Chinese presidency” [69].

  7. This provision is contained in Article 8 of the annex of Agreement on the New Development Bank which says, in part: “No increase in the subscription of any member to the capital stock shall become effective, and any right to subscribe thereto is hereby waived, which would have the effect of: i) reducing the voting power of the founding members below 55 (fifty-five) percent of the total voting power” [52].

  8. Article 2 of the Agreement on the New Development Bank states in part: “The initial subscribed capital shall be equally distributed amongst the founding members. The voting power of each member shall equal its subscribed shares in the capital stock of the Bank” [52].

  9. On this topic, see Kozul-Wright and Poon [43].

  10. According to Gregory Chin, “the Chinese government has established a coherent set of principles and values, norms, rules, and operational standards for its foreign aid lending; it is rooted in the government’s long-established ‘Eight Principles,’ and portrayed as being distinct from the norms and principles of the World Bank, IMF, and the OECD.” [11: 95]. “The eight principles are: emphasize equality and mutual benefit; respect sovereignty and never attach conditions; provide interest-free or low-interest loans; help recipient countries develop independence and self-reliance; build projects that require little investment and can be accomplished quickly; provide quality equipment and material at market price; ensure effective technical assistance; and pay experts according to local standards” [11: 92].

  11. For more on this issue, see the important article by Steve Chan, Weixing Hu and Kai He entitled “Discerning states’ revisionist and status-quo orientations: Comparing China and the US” [10].

  12. For details on the notion of relationality, see Qin’s “A Relational Theory of World Politics” [67] and his “Rule, Rules, and Relations: Towards a Synthetic Approach to Governance” [65]. His purpose in the latter article is to combine relational considerations with rule-based factors to create a new model of global governance.

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The author would like to thank Gregory J. Moore and anonymous reviewers for the Journal of Chinese Political Science for their comments.

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Paradise, J.F. China’s Quest for Global Economic Governance Reform. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 24, 471–493 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-019-09610-5

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