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Autonomy or Privilege? Lobbying Intensity of Local Business Associations in China

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Abstract

This article examines the relationship between the state and society in contemporary China by analyzing the lobbying behavior of business associations. Particularly, it asks whether and how autonomy and/or privileged access exert/s influence on their lobbying frequency. A formal model is developed that focuses on the trade-off between lobbying intensity and the private provision of collective goods. The hypotheses are tested against the original survey data from Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces. The research finds that self-established associations lobby less, and those with consultant status assigned by the government lobby the government more often. In contrast, the impact of “autonomy” in a narrow sense is weaker than is commonly claimed in the Chinese lobbying literature.

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Notes

  1. For another recent example that applies formal modeling to an area-oriented question of village elections in China, see Takeuchi [40].

  2. Deng and Kennedy [6] confirm that the Chinese usage of the term “youshui” is consistent with the general definition of lobbying in political science.

  3. Scholars often propose labels that they claim adequately capture the relevant characteristics: fragmented authoritarianism [34], authoritarian communitarianism [15], consultative authoritarianism [41], crony communism [8], guanxi capitalism [33], and fragmented corporatism [16], among others.

  4. He also quips that “associations are like ‘pedestrian overpasses’. Some people use the overpasses, but in China most cross the road at street level” ([22], 173).

  5. However, it is unclear which statistical method (linear or non-linear, for instance) they have applied.

  6. In fact, privileged access is a central trait of the concept of corporatism [4]. Although corporatism has also been a key concept in China studies, scholars have mostly focused on the relationship between the government and the group, not between groups.

  7. After all, it was the government initiative that facilitated institutional separation between business associations and governmental departments in the first place [16, 50].

  8. It is different from the distinction between inside and outside lobbying [30], which refers to two main methods of influencing public policy, or between private and collective lobbying [12, 20].

  9. Formally, it is assumed that \( \overline{x}\kern0.5em < ar<{x}_1^{*}+{x}_2^{*} \), where \( \overline{x}\kern0.8em \equiv \frac{\beta_2-{\beta}_1}{k_2} \), \( {x}_1^{*}\equiv \frac{\beta_1}{k_1} \), and \( {x}_2^{*}\equiv \frac{\beta_2}{k_2} \).

  10. It might be the case that self-establishment is also related to a larger value of k 2; that is, the marginal return decreases more rapidly as a result of the larger initial return. However, under a relatively conservative assumption that self-establishment does not decrease x ∗2 , it can be shown that \( {\widehat{x}}_1 \) is always decreasing in β 2. The proof is as follows: substituting \( {k}_2=\frac{\beta_2}{x_2^{*}} \) into the formula for \( {\widehat{x}}_1 \) and differentiating with regard to β 2 yield \( \frac{d{\widehat{x}}_1}{d{\beta}_2}=\frac{x_2^{*}\left\{\left( ar-{x}_2^{*}\right){k}_1-{\beta}_1\right\}}{{\left({\beta}_2+{x}_2^{*}{k}_1\right)}^2} \). The “moderate scarcity” constraint, ar < x *1  + x ∗2 , can also be rewritten as (ar − x ∗2 )k 1 < β 1 by substitution, which implies that the numerator is always negative. Since the denominator is always positive, the first derivative is always negative.

  11. It is because the total benefit from lobbying might remain constant regardless of the initial responsiveness (β 1). Formally, if the total benefit is fixed (denoted by \( \frac{c}{2} \)), then \( {k}_1=\frac{{\beta_1}^2}{c} \). Substituting and differentiating with regard to β 1 yield \( \frac{d{\widehat{x}}_1}{d{\beta}_1}=\frac{-c\left({\beta_1}^2+2\left({k}_2 ar-{\beta}_2\right){\beta}_1-c{k}_2\right)}{{\left({\beta}_1+c{k}_2\right)}^2} \), whose sign depends on the value of β 1. In this case, a prediction cannot be derived without knowing the actual value of β 1.

  12. It can be shown by a similar process as appears in the footnote for Hypothesis 2 - b.

  13. It can be shown by a similar process as appears in the footnote for Hypothesis 1.

  14. Here, it is assumed that the ratio is exogenous. Relaxing this assumption is an agenda for future research.

  15. In this case, it is more reasonable to think the government responsiveness (k 1) is fixed.

  16. Differentiating with regard to β 1 yields \( \frac{\partial {\widehat{x}}_1}{\partial {\beta}_1}=\frac{1}{k_1+{k}_2} \). It suggests potential interaction effects with the indicators. For example, if self-establishment affects both β 2 and k 2 (larger), it may be predicted that the impact of the ratio (income from the government) would be smaller if an association is self-established.

  17. Alternatively, a larger total benefit may be represented by constant β 1 and smaller k 1. It does not affect the prediction regarding the main effect.

  18. The majority of business associations are affiliated with FIC in Wenzhou and Wuxi, as two trial cities of reform in business associations. A couple of associations in these cities are still affiliated with policy departments, since the government could not force them. Meanwhile, in Zhejiang Province level and Ningbo City level, business associations are affiliated with EIC, FIC, and other government departments. However, all business associations in the four places also must be separately registered in the Public Affairs Bureau. This is called the System of Dual Control for all associations in China. However, the System of Dural Control may be repealed after 2013 since the Proposal of the State Council Restructuring and Functional Transformation Plan was delivered at the First Session of the Twelfth National People’s Congress on March 5, 2013.

  19. The possibility cannot be entirely excluded that some threats to internal validity, such as self-selection, existed in the data-generating process.

  20. We replaced lobbying with “proposing policies” (zhengce jianyi) in the questionnaire, because the term “lobbying (youshui)” is commonly associated with the corporate behavior in contemporary China [6]. In contrast, “proposing policies” is more encompassing, politically neutral, and preserves the original conceptualization of lobbying.

  21. Eising [9] also utilizes MI. Although Victor [47] advocates mean substitution, it is not recommended by the statistical community because it underestimates the variance and thus biases the inference.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University, 866 Yuhangtang Road, Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province, People’s Republic of China, 310058

    Jianxing Yu & Yongdong Shen

  2. Department of Political Science, Boston University, 232 Bay State Road, Boston, MA, 02215, USA

    Kenichiro Yashima

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  1. Jianxing Yu
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Correspondence to Yongdong Shen.

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Yu, J., Yashima, K. & Shen, Y. Autonomy or Privilege? Lobbying Intensity of Local Business Associations in China. J OF CHIN POLIT SCI 19, 315–333 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-014-9301-7

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