Abstract
Protecting people from air pollution is an important task for developing countries. Over the past several decades, different types of policies have been enacted in developing countries to improve air quality, with policy impact analysis being conducted as well. As for China, while there is some existing literature on the impact of short-term action on air quality, there is much less research to investigate the roles of long-term air quality control mechanism on air quality change. This paper uses the “2 + 26” city cluster in China as a case study area to particularly analyze the roles played by short-term campaigns that compose the Winter Action Plan and a long-term mechanism referred to as the environmental accountability system in pollution control. Based on econometric and descriptive statistical analyses, it is found that the implementation of the Winter Action Plan has significantly improved the air quality, and the environmental accountability system seems to have exerted an impact, as cities with better air quality appear to establish a more stringent environmental accountability system. The paper provides the following insights for other developing countries: short-term campaigns can quickly reduce pollution and protect human health, while long-term mechanisms are needed to ensure sustainable environmental protection.
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Data Availability
The data that supports the findings of this study are available in the China Meteorological Data Service Center (https://data.cma.cn/data/detail/dataCode/A.0012.0001.html), data released by China's National Bureau of Statistics (https://data.stats.gov.cn/search.htm?s=%E9%93%81%E8%B7%AF), and statistic yearbooks of different provinces.
Notes
These 26 prefecture-level cities are: Shijiazhuang, Tangzhan, Langfang, Baoding, Cangzhou, Hengshui, Xingtai, Handan, Taiyuan, Yangquan, Changzhi, Jincheng, Jinan, Zibo, Jining, Dezhou, Liaocheng, Binzhou, Heze, Zhengzhou, Kaifeng, Anyang, Hebi, Xinxiang, Jiaozuo, Puyang.
Provinces and cities in the northern China include Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Shandong, Henan, Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia.
Please refer to the appendix for more information.
One claim states that that “leading cadres of the party and government who are held responsible will be disqualified from the annual assessment and selection of all kinds of advanced cadres in that year. For those who are transferred from their posts, they shall not be promoted for at least one year; for those who are solely subject to resignation, order to resign or removal, they shall not be assigned positions for at least one year, and shall not hold positions higher than their original positions for at least two years; for those who are demoted, they shall not be promoted for at least two years.”.
In November 1979, the Organization Department of the CPC Central Committee issued the “opinions on the implementation of the cadre assessment system,” which included a proposal to “encourage the advanced, stimulate the backward, and mobilize the enthusiasm of cadres,” and began to explore the performance appraisal system used throughout the country.
Party committee can interfere with government actions, such as decisions on the development of real estate, tourism, and other projects. They may also forbid the environmental law enforcement department from imposing sanctions on environmental law violations, such as not punishing the illegal sewage discharge of local large taxpayers (Rooij et al. 2017).
The local government shall report to the people’s Congress or the Standing Committee of the people’s Congress at the corresponding level of the completion of environmental protection objectives every year (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (SCNPC 2014).
“For areas which exceed the state’s total discharge volume control indicators of key pollutants or fail to achieve the environmental quality objectives determined by the state, the environmental protection administrative departments of the people's governments at and above the provincial level shall suspend the procedures for approving the environmental impact assessment documents on construction projects in such areas that will increase the total discharge volume of key pollutants”(SCNPC 2014).
Local legal documents refer to local regulations passed by the Standing Committee of the Local People’s Congress and local government regulations reviewed and approved by the local people’s government. Local normative documents refer to legally binding documents issued by local governments and their various departments through legal procedures, in addition to local legal documents. And the working documents refer to the specific work arrangements issued by the local government regarding a specific environmental governance issue during a certain period.
It should be noted that the documents we collected in this paper include local legislative documents, local normative documents, and local working documents. Among them, normative documents and working documents of provincial and city governments do not belong to local legislation. However, based on the hierarchical relationship between provincial and city governments in the administrative management system, the effectiveness relationship of documents formulated by provincial and city governments is theoretically equivalent to the relationship between “superior law” and “inferior laws.”.
Four periods are used in calculating the stringency of the environmental accountability systems. (Period 1: before February 17, 2017; Period 2: February 18, 2017–August 29, 2017; Period 3: August 30, 2017–September 21, 2018; and Period 4: September 22, 2018–October 11, 2019). The dates separating each period are milestone dates for the development and implementation of the Winter Action Plan. Specifically, the meanings of these dates are as follows: February 17, 2017 was the date when the concept of the 2 + 26 city cluster was first mentioned in a national policy; August 29, 2017 was the date when the 2017–2018 Winter Action Plan was enacted; September 21, 2018 was the date when the 2018–2019 Winter Action Plan was enacted; October 11, 2019 was the date when the 2019–2020 Winter Action Plan was enacted.
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This research is supported by fund for building world-class universities (disciplines) of Renmin University of China. Project No.KYGJD2022009.
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Xiao Zhu: conceptualization, resources, writing (original draft).
Rixin Zhu: conceptualization, methodology, writing (original draft).
Lin Ding: conceptualization, investigation, project administration, writing (original draft), supervision.
Yazhen Gong: conceptualization, investigation, methodology, writing (review and editing).
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Highlights
• Air pollution control in the developing world is often hindered by the “principal-agent” problem.
• Both short-term and long-term mechanisms are adopted in China to solve the principal-agent problem.
• The short-term campaign for pollution control in China significantly improved air quality.
• A negative relationship exists between environmental accountability stringency and air pollution.
• Long-term mechanisms are needed to ensure sustainable environmental protection.
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Zhu, X., Zhu, R., Ding, L. et al. Role of short-term campaigns and long-term mechanisms for air pollution control: lessons learned from the “2 + 26” city cluster in China. Environ Sci Pollut Res 31, 14748–14761 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-024-32051-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-024-32051-4