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How to improve the function of government carbon tax in promoting enterprise carbon emission reduction: from the perspective of three-stage dynamic game

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Abstract

Flexible strategy of carbon tax is an important chip for the government to promote the implementation of carbon emission reduction. However, low-carbon technological innovation of enterprises is bound to produce market competition problems with traditional production technology. Based on this, in order to explore the relationship between heterogeneous objectives, carbon tax pricing strategy of government and decision-making of heterogeneous enterprise in the market, and how the government can make better use of carbon tax to promote the implementation of carbon emission reduction, this paper constructs and analyzes a three-stage dynamic game model between the government and heterogeneous enterprises. It is found that higher carbon tax pricing is not necessarily conducive to promote the implementation of carbon emission reduction. When the government's primary goal is to promote low-carbon technology innovative enterprise to increase innovative investment, the government should adopt the unified pricing strategy of carbon tax and improve carbon tax pricing; when the primary goal of the government is to promote the promotion of low-carbon products, the government should adopt the differentiated pricing strategy of carbon tax and reduce the carbon tax pricing of low-carbon technology innovative enterprise. In addition, this paper also studies the impact mechanism of different government pricing strategies on heterogeneous enterprise decision-making under heterogeneous objectives of government.

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Acknowledgement

We appreciated Pro. Wu S J for providing financial support.

Availability of data and materials

All data generated or analyzed during this study are included in this published article.

Funding

This study is supported by the Project funded by Shandong Natural Science Foundation (Grant numberZR2019MG030), the Project funded by Qingdao philosophy and social science planning (Grant numberQDSKL1801132).

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Xinchi Qu was involved in methodology, software, and formal analysis. Xiangyan Sun was involved in conceptualization and wrote the paper.

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Correspondence to Xiangyan Sun.

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Qu, X., Sun, X. How to improve the function of government carbon tax in promoting enterprise carbon emission reduction: from the perspective of three-stage dynamic game. Environ Sci Pollut Res 29, 31348–31362 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11356-021-18236-1

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