Skip to main content

Advertisement

SpringerLink
Log in

Epistemic justice and experiential self

  • Published:
Mind & Society Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Epistemic injustice is a matter of not doing justice to the knowledge claims of a person, and it is pervasive in our everyday interactions. It can be traced to the susceptibility of the human mind to cognitive biases and distortions. The paper discusses some ways proposed to mitigate epistemic injustice and suggests that this endeavor requires efforts in more dimensions. The paper tries to demonstrate that the existing efforts to combat epistemic injustice need to be complemented by looking into the very manner in which the self is automatically conceptualized. A shift from the remembering or narrative mode of understanding oneself to the experiential or episodic one will help contain misleading biases and reduce epistemic injustice. Practices such as mindfulness can help enormously in this task.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Here 'knowledge claim' needs to be understood broadly. It need not be articulated but can remain implicit, imbued with the feeling of knowing.

  2. Though a clear distinction is made between social bias and cognitive bias, the former has its roots in the latter. Further dual processes are recognized both in social psychology and cognitive psychology. That is to say, given the prevalence of cognitive biases, social biases are expected.

  3. It is acknowledged that there are varieties of approaches within dual processing theory. Further, there have been criticisms of dual processing approaches such as Mercier and Sperber(2017). But since even such criticisms grant that there are distinct types of processing different in degree and accept the wide prevalence of biases, they are tangential to the purpose of this paper.

  4. The two systems should not be understood as watertight compartments. There is indeed close interaction between them, and there can be cases of blurred boundary as well.

  5. This does not mean that System 2 processes always follow rules of reasoning. In fact, the notion of fully rational is not tenable when the dichotomy between reason and emotion no longer holds good.

  6. Reduction in psychological boundary is explained in terms of open attention towards the end of this section.

References

  • Albahari M (2006) Analytical Buddhism: the two-tiered illusion of self. Palgrave MacMillan, New York

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Allport GW (1954) The nature of prejudice. Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, MA

    Google Scholar 

  • Anderson E (2016) Epistemic Justice as a virtue of Social Institutions. Soc Epistemol. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2011.652211

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baehr JS (2011) The inquiring mind: on intellectual virtues and virtue epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Barrett L (2011) Beyond the Brain: How Body and Enviornment Shape Animal and Human Minds Princeton University Press.

  • Batchelor M (2011) Meditation and mindfulness. Contemporary Buddhism 12(1):157–164. https://doi.org/10.1080/14639947.2011.564832

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beeghly E, Madva, A (2020) An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice and the Social Mind Routledge

  • Bhargava R (2013) Overcoming the Epistemic Injustice of Colonialism Global Policy Volume 4 . Issue 4 . November 2013

  • Blair I (2002) The malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice”. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3: 242–261.

  • Brown WK, Ryan RM, Creswell JD (2007) Mindfulness: theoretical foundations and evidence for its salutary effects. Psychol Inq 18(4):211–237. https://doi.org/10.1080/10478400701598298

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brownstein M (2015) Implicit bias.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Zalta, E.(ed.). <http:plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicit-bias/>.

  • Brownstein M, Saul J (2016) Implicit Bias and Philosophy Oxford University Press.

  • Burton, Robert (2009) On Being Certain Griffin

  • Christoff K, Gordon AM, Smallwood J, Smith R, Schooler JW (2009).”Experience sampling during fMRI reveals default network and executive system contributions to mind wandering.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 106(21),8719–8724.

  • Damasio A (1994) Descartes’ Error Penguin Books

  • Damasion A (2018) Strange Order of Things Penguin Random House

  • Daukas N (2011) Altogether Now: A Virtue-Theoretic Approach to Pluralism in Feminist Epistemology.” In: Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, edited by H. E. Grasswick, 45–67. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.

  • Davidson R, Goleman D (2017) The Science of Meditation: How to Change Your Brain, Mind and Body. Great Britain: Penguin Life.

  • Evans J, Frankish K (ed) (2013) In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond Oxford University Press.

  • Farb NAS, Segal ZV, Mayberg H, Bean J, McKeon D et al (2007) Attending to the present: mindfulness meditation reveals distinct neural modes of self-reference. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci 2(4):313–322

    Article  PubMed  PubMed Central  Google Scholar 

  • Fricker M (2007) Epistemic Injustice: power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Fricker M (2013) Epistemic justice as a condition of political freedom?”Synthese, 190, 1317–1332.

  • Friedman LT (1999) The Lexus and the Olive Tree Farrar, Straus and Giroux

  • Gallagher S (2000) Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. Trends Cogn Sci 4:14–21

    Article  CAS  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher S, Zahavi D (2012) The phenomenological mind, 2nd edn. Routledge, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Gaukroger S (2006) The Emergence of a Scientific Culture: Science and the Shaping of Modernity, 1210–1685 Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Gawronsky et al (2008) “When “Just Say No” is not enough: Affirmation versus negation training and the reduction of automatic stereotype activation” J Exp Soc Psychol Volume 44, Issue 2, March 2008, Pages 370–377

  • Gendler TS (2011)”On the epistemic costs of implicit bias” Philosophical Studies Vol 156 No 1 pp33–63

  • Gibson CE, Losee J, Vitiello C (2014) A replication attempt of stereotype susceptibility (Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999). Soc Psychol 45:194–198

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gigerenzer G, Selten R (2001) Rethinking rationality. In: Gigerenzer G, Selten R (eds) Bounded rationality: The adaptive toolbox. The MIT Press, pp 1–12

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilbert D, Wilson T (2001) Miswanting in J Forgas ed Thinking and Feeling: The role of affect in social cognition pp166–185 London:Sage

  • Gilovich T et al (2002) Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment Cambridge University Press.

  • Greenwald AG, McGhee DE, Schwartz JLK (1998) Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: the implicit association test. J Pers Soc Psychol 74:1464–1480

    Article  CAS  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Hoppers CA, Odora (2009) Education, culture and society in a globalizing world: implications for comparative and international education” Compare Vol. 39, No. 5, September, 601–614

  • Jha A (2021) Peak MindFind Your Focus, Own Your Attention, Invest 12 Minutes a Day HarperOne

  • Kahneman D (2011) Thinking, fast and slow Penguin Books

  • Kant I, Wood A (1784/1996) An answer to the question: What is enlightenment?” . In: M. Gregor (Ed.), Practical Philosophy (The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, pp. 11–22). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

  • Kawakami K, Dovidio JF, van Kamp S (2005) Kicking the habit: Effects of nonstereotypic association training and correction processes on hiring decisions. J Exp Soc Psychol 41(1):68–75

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kawakami K, Dovidio JF, Moll J, Hermsen S, Russin, A (2000)”Just say no (to stereotyping): effects of training in the negation of stereotypic associations on stereotype activation.” J Personality and Soc Psychol 78 , 871–888

  • Kidd IJ, Medina J, Pohlhaus G (eds) (2017) The Routledge handbook on epistemic injustice. Routledge, London

    Google Scholar 

  • Kristie D (2014) Conceptualizing epistemic oppression. Soc Epistemol 28(2):115–138. https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2013.782585

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lai KC, Hoffman MK, Nosek AB (2013)“ Reducing Implicit Prejudice” Soc Personality Psychol Compass 7/5 : 315–330, https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12023

  • Langer EJ (2000) Mindful learning. Curr Dir Psychol Sci 9:220–223

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leary MR (2004) The curse of the self: Self awareness, egotism and the quality of human life. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Madiva A (2017) Biased against Debiasing: on the role of (institutionally sponsored) self-transformation in the struggle against Prejudice. Ergo 4(06):2017. https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.12405314.0004.006

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maitra, K (2020) Testimonial Injustice and a Case for Mindful Epistemology Southern Journal of Philosophy Volume 58, Issue 1 March 2020

  • Maitra K (2013) The Questions of Identity and Agency in Feminism without borders: A Mindful Response Hypatia vol. 28, no. 2 (Spring 2013)

  • Maymin Z Philip and Langer J Ellen and (2021)”Cognitive biases and mindfulness” Humanities and Social Sciences Communications volume 8, Article number: 40 (2021

  • McGilchrist L (2010) The Master and His Emissary:The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World. Yale University Press

  • Mendoza SA, Peter M, Gollwitzer, and David M. Amodio, (2010) Reducing the expression of implicit stereotypes: reflexive control through implementation intentions. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 36(4):512–523. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167210362789

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Mercier H, Sperber D (2017) The Enigma of Reason: A New Theory of Human Understanding Penguin Books.

  • Metzinger, T (2013) “The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy” Front. Psychol., 19 December 2013 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00931

  • Mueser PR, Cowan N, Mueser KT (1999) A generalized signal detection model to predict rational variation in base rate use. Cognition. Jan 1;69(3):267–312. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(98)00072-9.

  • Olson MA, Fazio RH (2006) Reducing automatically-activated racial prejudice through implicit evaluative conditioning. Pers Soc Psychol Bull 32:421–433

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Olson KR, Dunham Y (2010). “The Development of Implicit Social Cognition.” In: Bertram Gawronski and B. Keith Payne (Eds.), Handbook of Implicit Social Cognition: Measurement, Theory, and Applications (241–254)

  • Pasnau R (2020)”Bias and interpersonal skepticism.” Noûs. 2020;1–22.https://doi.org/10.1111/Nous.12352

  • Payne BK (2001) Prejudice and perception: the role of automatic and controlled processes in misperceiving a weapon. J Pers Soc Psychol 81:181–192

    Article  CAS  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Pohl FR (2017) Cognitive Illusions: intriguing Phenomena in Judgement, Thinking and Memory Routledge

  • Sabin JA, Rivara FP, Greenwald AG (2008) Physician implicit attitudes and stereotypes about race and quality of medical care. Med Care 46(7):678–685

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Saul J (2013) Skepticism and implicit bias. Disputatio 5:243–263

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schooler JW, Smallwood J, Christoff K, Handy TC, Reichle ED, Sayette MA (2011) “Meta-awareness, perceptual decoupling and the wandering mind.” Trends in Cognitive Sci, 15(7), 319–326. http://dx.doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2011.05.006.

  • Shih M, Pittinsky T, Ambady N (1999) Stereotype susceptibility: Identity salience and shifts in quantitative performance. Psychol Sci 10:80–83

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smallwood Jonathan and Schooler Jonathan (2015) The science of mind wandering: empirically navigating the stream of consciousness. Annu Rev Psychol. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015331

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Stanovich KE (1999) Who is rational? studies of individual differences in reasoning. Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Stanovich KE (2004) The robot’s rebellion: finding meaning in the age of DARWIN. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Strawson G (2008) “Against Narrativity” in Real Materialism and Other Essays, Oxford: Clarendon Press.pp428–452

  • Valian,Virginia (1988) Why So Slow? The Advancement of Women. The MIT Press

  • Visvanathan S (2000) “Democracy, plurality and the Indian university”. Economic and Political Weekly, September 30, 3597–606.

  • Wielgosz J (2019) Mindfulness meditation and psychopathology. Ann Rev Clin Psychol. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-021815-093423

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Liberal Arts, IIT Jodhpur, Jodhpur, India

    V. Hari Narayanan

Authors
  1. V. Hari Narayanan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to V. Hari Narayanan.

Ethics declarations

Conflict of interest

On behalf of all authors, the corresponding author states that there is no confict of interest.

Data availability

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analysed during the current study.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Narayanan, V.H. Epistemic justice and experiential self. Mind Soc 22, 67–85 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-023-00297-z

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11299-023-00297-z

Keywords

Search

Navigation