Abstract
Miranda Fricker identifies a specific kind of epistemic harm that comes from assigning diminished credibility to others; when this is the result of identity prejudice it results in testimonial injustice. Fricker argues that this kind of injustice follows only from assigning diminished credibility to a person; assigning inflated credibility is never a testimonial injustice. In this paper I examine and expand arguments to the effect that assigning inflated credibility to one person can epistemically harm another. I extend this argument to self-evaluation. Psychological research on the overconfidence bias reveals ways in which we may systematically assign too much epistemic credibility to ourselves. However, our biases are not simple; they have a complex pattern revealed by the Dunning–Kruger effect. I will argue that we need to develop virtues of self-evaluation help counteract our self-bias. These virtues will be an important tool in helping us to avoid committing epistemic injustice to ourselves and to others.
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Notes
Fricker (2007, p. 28).
Fricker (2007, p. 25).
Quoted in Fricker (2007, p. 88).
Fricker (2007, pp. 20–21).
Fricker (2007, pp. 19–20).
Fricker (2007, p. 132).
As Davis nicely illustrates with examples in her (2016).
Note that I have shifted from Fricker’s terminology of “epistemic self-confidence” in the last paragraph to talking about self-assignment of credibility here and in the rest of the paper. While speaking of judging one’s own credibility may sound a bit odd, I want to highlight that we are making a judgment about the self and others and our relative abilities. There will, of course, be some differences in how we do this. We can doubt the sincerity of others, but rarely (absent cases of self-deception) doubt our own sincerity. Despite these differences, I think that it is reasonable to think about a judgement comparing the credibility of ourselves and others; this judgement is reflected in which position (our’s or the other’s) we end up believing.
Guenther and Alicke (2010, p. 755).
Alicke and Govorun (2005).
Alicke and Govorun (2005, p. 87).
Alicke (1985).
Cross (1977).
Alicke and Govorun (2005, p. 91).
Ehrlinger et al. (2008).
Kruger and Dunning (1999).
Jones (2012).
Dotson (2011). While Dotson focuses on ways that speakers might smother their testimony on the basis of perceived limitations in the hearer (that the hearer lacks the testimonial competence to appropriately receive the testimony), here we have an instance of smothering caused by the speaker inaccurately perceiving limitations in herself. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this connection between lowered self-assessment and testimonial smothering.)
Hazlett (2012, p. 220). While one could, in principle, have higher order attitudes to the beliefs of others, it is clear that Hazlett’s focus here is on higher order attitudes that take our own attitudes as their target.
Whitcomb et al. (2015, p. 6).
Whitcomb et al. make similar objections to what they call the Underestimation of Strengths view. (2015, p. 7) Both views of intellectual humility face this objection insofar as they do not dictate the affective or behavioral responses that one has to learning of one’s limitations.
Whitcomb et al. (2015, p. 8).
Whitcomb et al. (2015, p. 21).
Whitcomb et al. (2015, p. 12).
Daukas (2006, p. 111).
Ballantyne (2015, p. 156).
Daukas (2006, p. 121).
Jones (2012, p. 248).
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Acknowledgements
My thanks to the audiences at the Southeastern Epistemology Workshop at Florida State University and the Philosophy Department at Vanderbilt University for their comments on this paper. Thanks also to Matthew Jernberg and two anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful and careful feedback on earlier drafts of this paper.
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Wright, S. Epistemic harm and virtues of self-evaluation. Synthese 198 (Suppl 7), 1691–1709 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01993-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01993-x