Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to discuss the development of the theoretical approach to a rating of the opportunism between the principals and agents within the framework of the neo-institutional theory. The matrix of the opportunistic forms between the principals and agents designed. On the basis of the carried out experimental research of firms of the Ural region of Russia, such opportunistic forms of the agents such as flubbing, negligence, and malversation were investigated. The experimental dependences of an opportunistic level of the agents from a level of wages, level of non-financial stimulus, effectiveness of punishment, share of creative element of labor, and degree of labor specificity are defined.
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Financial support for the grant from the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fond, No. 05-02-83214a is acknowledged.
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Popov, E.V., Simonova, V.L. Forms of Opportunism Between Principals and Agents. Int Adv Econ Res 12, 115–123 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11294-006-6140-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11294-006-6140-0