Abstract
This paper explores the relationship between House committee membership and campaign contributions from financial services industry political action committees (PACs) over the 1998–2002 election periods. Three significant pieces of banking legislation were passed during this time. Because members of the financial services industry were affected greatly by this legislation, it seems logical that PACs might attempt to influence the legislative process through the distribution of campaign contributions. We examine the relationship between PAC contributions to individual legislators for the 1998–2002 election cycle and membership on the House banking committee using a sample selection model. We find committee membership matters and the different financial services industry PACs give disproportionately more to representatives with the power to write legislation favorable to the industry.
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Acknowledgment
We thank our conference discussants, the anonymous referee, and the editor for their helpful suggestions and comments. We especially thank Daniel Friesner for his econometric assistance.
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An earlier version of this paper was presented at the October 2007 International Atlantic Economic Conference.
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Bennett, R.W., Loucks, C. PAC Contributions from Sectors of the Financial Services Industry, 1998–2002. Atl Econ J 36, 407–419 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11293-008-9147-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11293-008-9147-5