Conclusion
The results presented in the previous section tend to confirm the hypothesis that committee assignments shape the pattern of corporate PAC contributions. This note corroborates existing research on corporate PACs at a significantly lower level of aggregation than the samples on which existing research has been conducted. Further, because a nonparametric test was used (rather than the more standard regressional analysis), these results should increase our confidence that the essential institutions of government affect, and engender responses by, economic agents.
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The author thanks Arthur Denzau, Kenneth Shepsle, Barry Weingast and an anonymous referee for helpful and creative comments. Financial support for this research came from the Center in Political Economy, Washington University, St. Louis. All errors are the author's alone.
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Munger, M.C. A simple test of the thesis that committee jurisdictions shape corporate PAC contributions. Public Choice 62, 181–186 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124334
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00124334