Abstract
Russian regions exhibit wide diversity in institutional arrangements, not only due to varying natural conditions and economic development, but also due to the different political strategies pursued by their governors. Governors have wide discretion over the kinds of relationships they establish with local economic and social elites in the pursuit of nationally established goals. Some regional regimes are more pluralistic, others more authoritarian. Strategies for social and economic development vary as well. Some governors cooperate with local business associations and firms to induce investment and to overcome collective dilemmas such as those associated with skill formation. Characteristically, it is state actors who usually take the initiative in shaping state–society relations.
Résumé
Les régions russes présentent une grande diversité en termes de dispositifs institutionnels, non seulement en raison des conditions climatiques et du développement économique, mais aussi des différentes stratégies politiques menées par leurs gouverneurs. Les gouverneurs disposent d’une large marge d’appréciation concernant les types de relations qu’ils développent avec les élites économiques et sociales locales pour atteindre les objectifs établis à l’échelle nationale. Certains régimes régionaux sont plus pluralistes, d’autres plus autoritaires. Les stratégies pour le développement social et économique varient également. Certains gouverneurs coopèrent avec les associations professionnelles locales et les entreprises pour inciter les investissements et surmonter les dilemmes collectifs tels que ceux liés à la formation professionnelle. Typiquement, ce sont les acteurs étatiques qui prennent généralement l’initiative d’orienter les relations entre l’État et la société.
Zusammenfassung
Russlands Regionen zeichnen sich durch eine große Diversität in ihren institutionellen Strukturen aus, was nicht nur auf die unterschiedlichen natürlichen Bedingungen und die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung zurückzuführen ist, sondern auch auf die verschiedenen politischen Strategien, die von ihren Gouverneuren verfolgt werden. Es liegt größtenteils im Ermessen der Gouverneure, welche Art von Beziehungen sie mit der lokalen wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Elite zur Verfolgung national etablierter Ziele unterhalten. Einige regionale Regime sind eher pluralistisch, andere sind eher autoritär. Zudem unterscheiden sich die Strategien zur sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung voneinander. Einige Gouverneure arbeiten mit lokalen Unternehmensvereinigungen und Firmen zusammen, um Investitionen anzuregen und kollektive Dilemma, wie Probleme im Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung von Qualifikationen, zu überkommen. Typischerweise sind es staatliche Akteure, die in der Regel die Initiative ergreifen, um die Beziehungen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft zu formen.
Resumen
Las regiones rusas exhiben una amplia diversidad de acuerdos institucionales, no sólo debido a las variables condiciones naturales y desarrollo económico, sino también debido a las diferentes estrategias políticas utilizadas por sus gobernadores. Los gobernadores tienen una amplia libertad sobre los tipos de relaciones que establecen con las élites sociales y económicas locales en la persecución de las metas establecidas a nivel nacional. Algunos regímenes regionales son más plurales, otros más autoritarios. Las estrategias para el desarrollo económico y social varían también. Algunos gobernadores cooperan con las asociaciones y firmas empresariales locales para inducir la inversión y para superar dilemas colectivos tales como aquellos asociados a la formación de habilidades. De manera característica, son los actores estatales los que normalmente toman la iniciativa en la determinación de las relaciones estado-sociedad.
摘要
在俄罗斯, 由于自然状况和经济发展状况差异以及不同州长采取的不同政治策略,因此各地在制度上存在广泛差异。州长在实现国家目标时,对于和当地经济和社会精英之间建立什么样的关系享有广泛裁量权。有的地区是多元化体制,有的地区是威权主义体制。这些地区的社会经济发展战略也各不相同。 一些州长和当地的商业协会和企业合作招商引资并打破当地整体上存在的窘境, 例如,和技能的形成有关的窘境。 通常由州政府人员主动采取措施来打造州和团体之间的关系。
ملخص
المناطق الروسية تبدي تنوعا” كبيرا” في الترتيبات المؤسسية، ليس فقط بسبب الظروف الطبيعية والتنمية الاقتصادية المتنوعة، ولكن أيضا” بسبب الإستراتيجيات السياسية المختلفة التي يتبعها حكامها. الحكام لديها سلطة واسعة على أنواع العلاقات التي تقيمها مع الصفوة الإقتصادية والإجتماعية المحلية في السعي لتحقيق الأهداف المحددة وطنيا”. بعض الأنظمة الإقليمية هي أكثر تعددية، والبعض الآخر أكثر استبدادية. استراتيجيات للتنمية الاجتماعية والاقتصادية تختلف أيضا. بعض الحكام يتعاون مع جمعيات رجال الأعمال والشركات المحلية للحث على الإستثمار والتغلب على المعضلات الجماعية مثل تلك المرتبطة بتكوين المهارات. على نحومميز، فمن الجهات الحكومية التي عادة ما تأخذ زمام المبادرة في تشكيل العلاقات بين الدولة والمجتمع.
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Notes
The deflator used is the regional subsistence minimum for the given year. Although there are occasional adjustments to the method for constructing this figure over time, in any given year, the deflator is consistent across regions. The figures should therefore be interpreted as a multiple of the minimum subsistence level for the given region in the given year.
The data underlying the figures are available at: http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml.
Most income and profits tax revenue in Russia goes to the regional governments. In 2011, 37 % of regional budget revenues came from the tax on profits of enterprises; about 38 % came from individual income taxes; 13 % from property taxes; 7 % from excise taxes; 1 % from the minerals extraction tax; and 4 % from other sources. At present, most regional budgets are in deficit. They make up the deficit by borrowing from commercial banks or the federal government, and by federal budget transfers.
Much of this discussion, and some of the quotations, are derived from research done as part of a Higher School of Economics project to investigate the status of the "middle class" in Russian regions. The respondents were leading members of regional governments, business, and the expert community (Remington et al. 2011 and Remington et al. 2013).
The following discussion draws on research conducted with Israel Marques to study vocational education training institutions in Russian regions (Remington and Marques 2014).
VW prefers not to have to deal with already-established networks of ties between auto industry and local officials.
About 14 % of regional output is from the defense industry; about 16 % comes from metallurgy; about 17 % from automotive.
See: http://rark31.ru/about.
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Funding
Portions of the research on which this study is based were funded by a Grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European studies for project entitled “‘Silent Heroes:’ State and Middle Class in Contemporary Russia,” 2009–2011. This article was prepared within the framework of a subsidy Granted to the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russian Federation by the Government of the Russian Federation for the implementation of the Global Competitiveness Program.
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This paper is part of the Special Issue: Unlikely Partners? Evolving Government-Nonprofit Relationships, East and West, edited by Lester M. Salamon.
This article was prepared within the framework of a subsidy granted to the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russian Federation by the Government of the Russian Federation for the implementation of the Global Competitiveness Program. None of the organizations with which the author is affiliated or that have supported his work bears any responsibility for any errors or views expressed here. That is the author’s own responsibility.
An erratum to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11266-016-9793-1.
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Remington, T.F. Institutional Variation Among Russian Regional Regimes: Implications for Social Policy and the Development of Non-governmental Organizations. Voluntas 26, 2215–2237 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9643-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11266-015-9643-6