1 Introduction

Forty years ago, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst published Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (1984), which constituted the international presentation of the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation. That marked the beginning of a new era for dialectics—the perspective on argumentation that focuses on procedures for the reasonable conduct of an argumentative discussion. At a moment when the dominant paradigm for the study of arguments was formal logic, and the practice of debate (mainly in North America) was accompanied by an interest in rhetorical rather than dialectical considerations, the birth of pragma-dialectics meant in effect the resurgence of the dialectical approach to argument. At the same time as informal logicians in Canada and United States were revitalising logic, van Eemeren and Grootendorst in Amsterdam were giving dialectic a new shape and flavour, more appropriate to contemporary concerns and tastes.

Previous dialectical theories, such as those of Lorenzen and Lorenz (1978) and Barth and Krabbe (1982), which in any case influenced pragma-dialectics, were too formal to be really useful for the study of real argumentative discussions in natural language. Instead, in Speech Acts, van Eemeren and Grootendorst adopted a pragmatic approach to the analysis of arguments and grounded their theory in Searle’s and Grice’s insights. Such a fusion of pragmatic and dialectical elements proved to be very fruitful. Their analysis of the argument as a speech act complex, their concept of “critical discussion” as a four-stage procedure for resolving a difference of opinion, and their proposal of a set of rules for the reasonable conduct of critical discussions, were all insights that could be readily applied to real (ordinary or technical) discussions.

Twenty years after the appearance of Speech Acts, the mature form of what has come to be known as “standard pragma-dialectics” was presented in A Systematic Theory of Argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). That book— unfortunately the last one which Grootendorst could co-author—laid the groundwork for future developments of the theory. Together with Peter Houtlosser, van Eemeren later incorporated rhetorical elements using the concept of “strategic maneuvering” in Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse (van Eemeren 2010), thus producing the “extended” version of pragma-dialectics. This also led to the incorporation of contextual elements, particularly the institutional constraints of critical discussions in specific domains—called “argumentative activity types”—and to empirical research about how critical discussions are conducted in political, medical, and legal contexts (cf. van Eemeren 2018).

In this paper, I will focus on what has arguably become one of the most important concepts in the pragma-dialectical theory: reasonableness. Although there was no explicit mention of reasonableness in Speech Acts,Footnote 1 that concept turned out to be central from A Systematic Theory onwards. As we will see, the pragma-dialectical research program is grounded on a philosophical conception of reasonableness that constitutes the foundation for the pragma-dialectical rules of critical discussion. In extended pragma-dialectics, a dichotomy is presented between effectiveness, which pertains to rhetorical goals of the discussion, and reasonableness, which is considered as the main concern of the dialectical perspective. Fallacies, which have always been treated by pragma-dialecticians as violations of the rules for critical discussions (see especially van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992), are interpreted as cases in which the arguers’ pursuit of effectiveness overrides their commitment to reasonableness (derailments).

The pragma-dialectical concept of reasonableness is based on a critical rationalist philosophy (Albert 1985; Popper 2002) according to which standpoints are never conclusively justified, but rather must be systematically subjected to critical examination in order to see whether they can withstand criticism. The pragma-dialectical rules for critical discussions are supposed to give shape to the critical rationalist conception of reasonableness. In the next section, I will present the details of such a conception. Then, in Sects. 3 and 4, I will discuss its weaknesses and I will make a new proposal for the philosophical foundation of pragma-dialectics—one based on the notion of argumentative virtue. On this view, what pragma-dialectical rules attempt to capture is the behaviour of the virtuous arguer. Reasonableness, I will argue, could be understood as the minimally virtuous disposition that arguers must possess to be able to participate in a healthy and fruitful critical discussion—that is, as the pragma-dialectical second-order conditions. That way, a direct link is established between the philosophical grounds of the theory and the second-order conditions for a reasonable critical discussion: they are both agent-based. Pragma-dialectical rules would then be a (quite successful) attempt to provide guidance to arguers that are less than virtuous—as most of us are—but that are at least reasonable arguers.

2 The Pragma-Dialectical Conception of Reasonableness

Rather than just a theory about critical discussions, pragma-dialectics presents itself as a whole research program for the study of argumentation, which includes five components or “estates” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004; ch. 2). First, in the philosophical estate, a philosophical view of reasonableness is set forth that functions as the conceptual foundation for a model of argumentation. Then, in the theoretical estate, that concept of reasonableness is given a specific shape in the form of a model of critical discussion. At this estate, pragma-dialecticians deploy their ideal model designed to resolve a difference of opinion on the merits, which includes the stages of the critical discussion and the rules with which reasonable arguers must comply. The next estate is the analytical estate, which addresses the various ways in which elements of real discussions must be modified so that they can be analysed on the basis of the ideal model. This involves reconstructions of discourse through four kinds of transformations: deletion of parts that are not relevant, addition of implicit parts that must be made explicit, substitution of parts that are confusing or ambiguous, and permutation of parts so that they fit the order established in the ideal model (Ibid., pp. 103–104). Fourth, the empirical estate involves empirical research intended to figure out how ordinary arguers engaged in argumentative discussions attempt to resolve their differences of opinion, and to what extent the pragma-dialectical model and rules are actually endorsed. And finally, in the practical estate the goal is to improve argumentative practice by increasing the arguers’ argumentative competence as well as the procedures that are followed in each context.

One can see, then, that the philosophical concept of reasonableness plays a fundamental role in the pragma-dialectical system. It is the basis on which the theoretical model of the critical discussion—and all the rest—is built. As van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2015, p. 245) claim, reasonableness is “the philosophical rationale for adopting a certain theoretical approach to argumentation.” Such a rationale, they explain, has two dimensions: the criterion of problem validity refers to the effectiveness of the model—and specifically of the rules—to facilitate a resolution of the difference of opinion on the merits, whereas the criterion of conventional or intersubjective validity requires that the pragma-dialectical rules be acceptable to ordinary arguers. The intersubjective validity of the pragma-dialectical rules has been tested in a series of experiments that might give us some reason to believe that ordinary arguers indeed endorse them and regard their violation as unreasonable moves in a critical discussion (van Eemeren et al. 2009).

What about problem validity? This criterion establishes that the pragma-dialectical rules are acceptable to the extent that they contribute to the resolution of differences of opinion on the merits. The last specification is important, since a difference of opinion could also be resolved by means of fallacies and other deceitful strategies. Here, “on the merits” means that “the resolution is achieved in a reasonable way by means of argumentative discourse” (van Eemeren 2018, p. 34). What this involves in practical terms is that the rules prevent the commission of fallacies, which are defined in pragma-dialectics as violations of the rules of the critical discussionFootnote 2 (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 22).

So far, however, I have not said much about what exactly is the philosophical conception of reasonableness on which pragma-dialecticians rely. (References to the rules, to fallacies, and to argument schemes cannot be said to be part of the philosophical estate, since they belong to the theoretical estate.) The terms “rational” and “reasonable” have a long history of philosophical discussions—they are sometimes used interchangeably, since both certainly refer to an act of reason that is evaluated positively, but more often they are carefully differentiated. Without going into all the details of that history, rationality is usually taken as requiring either logical consistency among beliefs or adoption of the most efficient means to achieve some end, whereas reasonableness also involves moral considerations, such as taking into account the interests of other people (Gewirth 1983). Rationality is optimal and selfish; reasonableness is moral and (sometimes) suboptimal. On the other hand, within the field of argumentation theory, Perelman (1979) identifies rationality with mathematical reasoning “which grasps necessary relations, which knows a priori certain self-evident and immutable truths” (p. 117), while he characterises the reasonable person as someone who relies on common sense and who—in a Kantian vein—attempts to conform to principles that are acceptable to everyone. Pragma-dialecticians, however, do not differentiate between rationality and reasonableness in that way, but rather they adopt a distinction between a descriptive term (“rationality”) and an evaluative term (“reasonableness”). The distinction they make is between “acting rationally in the sense of using one’s faculty of reason and acting reasonably in the sense of utilizing one’s faculty of reason in an appropriate way”Footnote 3 (van Eemeren 2018, p. 3, n. 3).

As I have already pointed out, the “appropriate way” to use one’s faculty of reason cannot be simply the pragma-dialectical ideal model of the critical discussion, for in that case it would be the theoretical estate that informed the philosophical estate—instead of the other way around. Although, in latter works, pragma-dialecticians sometimes do seem to describe the ideal model as though reasonableness was constituted by it,Footnote 4 van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1988) provided a philosophically richer conception of reasonableness. They adopted what they called a “critical approach” to reasonableness that drew from insights by Popper (2002), Albert (1985), and Toulmin (1976). In particular, they rejected any conception of justification based on the idea that all our beliefs must be grounded on other, more basic beliefs until the ultimate foundation of our knowledge is reached in the form of indubitable principles—the epistemological view that they call “fundamentalist justificationism” (Letztbegründung). According to the pragma-dialectical conception of reasonableness, being reasonable means being open in principle to accept criticism of any standpoint. This is how they described reasonable persons (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1988, p. 286):

They should be persons who accept doubt as an integral part of their way of life and who use criticism towards themselves and others to solve problems by trial and error. They use argumentative discussions as a means to detect weak points in our viewpoints regarding knowledge, values and objectives, and eliminate these weaknesses where possible. Such persons are opposed to protectionism with regard to viewpoints and to the immunization of any kind of viewpoint against criticism, and they reject all forms of fundamentalist justificationism (Letztbegründung).

Popper was a particularly important source of inspiration for van Eemeren and Grootendorst, as they regarded reasonable persons as members of his “open society” (Ibid., p. 287): “A member of the Open Society is anti-dogmatic, anti-authoritarian, and anti-Letztbegründung; in other words against monopolies of knowledge, pretensions of infallibility, and unfaltering principles.”

Such an anti-foundationalist conception of reasonableness, which embraces doubt about any standpoint and rejects basic and indubitable beliefs, clearly informs the theoretical estate of the pragma-dialectical research program, where the model and the rules of the critical discussion are laid out. The first rule of the code of conduct for reasonable discussants establishes that calling any standpoint into question is a basic right that “all discussants must accord each other unconditionally and without reservation” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 191). However, calling all standpoints into question at the same time would quickly lead to an inescapable scepticism. For this reason, in the opening stage of the critical discussion, the arguers must agree on certain material starting points that will not be open to question during that particular critical discussion (Ibid., p. 60). These must not be regarded as indubitable claims, for they can be called into doubt in a different critical discussion in which they do not figure as starting points; they simply constitute the common ground for the present discussion. Those material starting points are a matter of agreement, not indubitability.Footnote 5

Since then, expositions of the pragma-dialectical conception of reasonableness have mainly focused on Toulmin’s views. In his introductory philosophy book Knowing and Acting, Toulmin (1976) identified three views that have been adopted during the history of philosophy about what it means to have reasons for our beliefs and actions (pp. vi-vii). The specific concept of reasonableness rarely appears in that book—at the beginning, Toulmin refers to rationality and, as the book proceeds, one soon realises that he is actually talking about ways of doing philosophy. Nevertheless, what Toulmin says is taken by pragma-dialecticians to refer to reasonableness in their sense.Footnote 6

The first view that Toulmin discusses is the geometrical view, which was adopted by Greek philosophers (Socrates and Plato) who were impressed by the rigour and precision of geometry and adapted it to human reasoning by devising formal procedures. According to this conception of rationality, justified beliefs (not only scientific but also ethical and political beliefs) should be logically deduced from fundamental assumptions that are themselves unchallengeable. Knowledge, then, is conceived as an edifice, and rationality requires that it must possess a rigid structure and must be anchored to firm ground (p. 82). Thus, for the geometrical view (p. 89):

We “know” something (in the full and strict sense of the term) if-and-only-if we have a well-founded belief in it; our belief in it is well-founded if-and-only-if we can produce good reasons in its support; and our reasons are really “good” (by the strictest philosophical standards) if-and-only-if we can produce a “conclusive”, or formally-valid argument, linking that belief back to an unchallenged (and preferably unchallengeable) starting point.

Next comes the anthropological view, which approaches the issue of rationality empirically. In this view, the focus is not on arguments as isolated products—as a set of propositions connected by an inferential link—as in the geometrical view, but on the argumentative discussions in which they take place (p. 164). This account of rationality relies on how justificatory activities are actually carried out in their specific contexts and how agreement is reached on the basis of a common ground. Thus, discussions are seen as human activities with specific purposes whose appropriateness depends on the context and the domain—science, law, religion, and so on—to which they belong. As Toulmin (p. 168) puts it, such a conception of rationality “begins to look more like cultural anthropology than like pure geometry.” And he concludes that the anthropological view has an obvious relativistic character (pp. 201–202):

For, in that case, we shall apparently have to conclude that beliefs are true, reasons are good, arguments are sound and convincing… depending entirely on for whom they are said to be true/good/sound/convincing.

According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004, p. 131), the geometrical and the anthropological conceptions of reasonableness are but different versions of the justificationism that they reject, for both assume that standpoints can be definitely justified. Hence, they claim, we should adopt Toulmin’s (1976, p. 220) third approach—the critical view. As van Eemeren and Grootendorst interpret it (2004, p. 129), Toulmin’s critical conception of rationality involves “not only scrutiny of the effectiveness of the argumentative procedure, but also reflection on the advantages and disadvantages of following this procedure for the potential parties in a disagreement.” This approach abandons the requirement that beliefs must be conclusively justified—whether on formal or empirical grounds—and focuses instead on the procedure (i.e. critical discussion) through which beliefs are reached.

Thus, pragma-dialectics eschews any resort to fundamental beliefs and emphasises the role of systematic criticism through critical dialogue. Apart from Toulmin’s objections to geometrical and anthropological conceptions of rationality, their main inspiration comes from Albert (1985), follower of Popper, who criticised what he called the “revelation model of rationality” (p. 28). This includes the empiricist and the rationalist traditions in philosophy, which—for all their differences—have in common the conviction that “knowledge is justified through recourse to some absolutely certain authority” (Ibid.). This, according to Albert, encourages epistemic conservatism by “protecting old errors against relevant criticism and innovation” (p. 54). Instead, he argues for the method of “critical examination,” which is specifically designed to revise established dogmas and to overcome the current state of knowledge. What such a method involves is precisely the rejection of epistemic foundations, the adoption of a thoroughgoing fallibilism, and “critical discussion of all statements that come in question with the help of rational argument” (p. 46).

3 Argumentative Virtue as the Philosophical Foundation

The conception of reasonableness on which pragma-dialectics is built can then be summarised as involving two commitments: (1) absolute fallibilism, which does not exclude any belief from the realm of doubt, and (2) argumentative discussion as the method for detecting inconsistencies and other kinds of errors. Someone who embraces these two principles can certainly be said to be reasonable to some extent. However, one could ask whether that is all there is to reasonableness. Moreover, it might be relevant even to ask whether the concept of reasonableness is the best philosophical ground on which the theoretical study of argumentation can rely. In this section, I will argue that the philosophical estate is a weak part of the pragma-dialectical research program and I will propose a virtue approach to the practice of argumentation as the best alternative. As I have argued elsewhere (Gascón 2017), virtue argumentation theory and pragma-dialectics could be fruitfully regarded as complementary approaches to argumentation. Virtue argumentation theory can offer a rich conception of argumentative excellence, while pragma-dialectics is in a better position to provide specific rules and analytical tools for the practical study of argumentation.

Let us consider, first, Toulmin’s and Albert’s accounts of rationality, on which pragma-dialecticians base their conception of reasonableness. Toulmin’s proposal is not easy to interpret—as I have remarked in the previous section, the book ends up looking like a discussion of ways of doing philosophy, rather than of accounts of rationality. In the Preface, he claims that the book deals with “three styles of philosophical attack on the question, ‘What is it to have reasons for our beliefs or actions?’” (1976, pp. vi–vii). His exposition of the geometrical style, in the second Part of the book, clearly corresponds to a philosophical view of justification of beliefs and actions: they must be logically deduced from a set of basic and unchallengeable principles which function as axioms. However, by the time one reaches the fourth Part of the book, where Toulmin discusses the critical style, what one finds is rather different. Contrary to what van Eemeren and Grootendorst seemed to assume, Toulmin does not talk there about the rejection of ultimate foundations for knowledge and the constant need of critical testing of our beliefs through critical dialogue. Rather, he is talking about the task of philosophy (p. 225):

Considered from this third, “critical”, direction, accordingly, the philosophical problems of thought, argument, and rationality take on additional complexities. The ultimate significance of our propositions and logical relations becomes clear when we place them […] in the broadest possible context and ask how all our different rational activities and enterprises come to be possible at all.

Toulmin is referring here to the study of the “preconditions” (p. 222) for any rational activity, whatever makes it possible and justifies it. He argues for a complex account of those preconditions that must take into account both objective elements about how the world is, subjective elements about how our minds work, and the interaction between our minds and the world (p. 237):

Instead of demanding that “reasoning” should be as it is (validity and all) for a single, simple reason—because either the World, or the Mind, or the way in which they interact provides a sufficient guarantee of that validity—we can drop the “either/or” in favor of the possibility that our different modes of reasoning may be as they are (validity and all) for reasons of all three kinds.

This can hardly be considered as an account of what characterises “a rational critic who judges reasonably” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 12), which is what the philosophical estate of the pragma-dialectic research program requires. It is, rather, a defence of a particular way of doing a “transcendental” philosophical analysis of human rationality (Toulmin 1976, p. 246). So Toulmin’s views can be useful for pragma-dialectics when he criticises geometrical approaches to rationality, which inevitably lead to scepticism, and anthropological approaches, which entail an unacceptable relativism; however, his proposal of a “critical” approach to philosophy does not seem to be quite relevant to the concept of reasonableness that pragma-dialecticians are after.

Furthermore, in my view, the conception of reasonableness that pragma-dialecticians adopt in the philosophical estate is too narrow to ground the whole system of the ideal model of the critical discussion, with its stages and rules, that they propose in the theoretical estate. Both Toulmin’s geometrical conception of rationality and his anthropological conception refer to different philosophical understandings of how beliefs and actions are supported by reasons. The same happens with Albert’s critical rationalism and his criticism of classical foundationalism. Albert begins by rejecting the principle of sufficient reason, famously stated by Leibniz, according to which all true claims must be supported by reasons that are sufficient to show why they are true (Albert 1985, p. 13). In practice, Albert tells us, this principle states (p. 14): “always seek an adequate foundation—a sufficient justification—for all your convictions.” But such a search for sufficient justification for everything that we believe quickly forces us to face what Albert calls the “Münchhausen trilemma” (p. 18): we must choose between an infinite regress, a logical circle, or the breaking-off of the process of justification at an arbitrary point. As we have seen in the previous section, Albert—following Popper—argues instead for the principle of critical examination, which urges us to constantly search for errors in our system of beliefs by means of critical dialogue.

All those considerations are certainly relevant to appreciate the value of argumentation.Footnote 7 However, as an account of what it means to be a reasonable arguer, they do not take us very far. The pragma-dialectical conception of reasonableness simply establishes that reasonable people are willing to argue with each other and to submit any of their beliefs to public critical scrutiny. As van Eemeren and Grootendorst summarise it (2004, p. 16):

The starting point of the critical perspective on reasonableness is, philosophically speaking, that we cannot be certain of anything. We should therefore be skeptical with regard to any claim to acceptability, whoever makes it and to whatever it refers. This critical perspective focuses pre-eminently on discussion; it encourages the systematic submission of the one party’s standpoints to the other party’s critical doubts.

Beyond that, however, pragma-dialecticians do not tell us how reasonable people behave, how they listen to others, how they evaluate their arguments,Footnote 8 how they respond, and so on. Many of these points are established in the pragma-dialectical rules, which regulate specific aspects of the behaviour of arguers from the beginning of the critical discussion, where the roles of protagonist and antagonist are assigned and the starting points are agreed upon, to the concluding stage, where the result of the discussion is determined. But the pragma-dialectical philosophical conception of reasonableness, which consists in adoption of critical rationalism and a dialectical approach to reason, is not broad enough to cover the point of those rules. A richer philosophical ground is needed if the theoretical estate of the pragma-dialectical research program, which is where the rules are laid out, is supposed to link “abstract philosophy with actual reality” and to be “fine-tuned to the chosen philosophical view of reasonableness” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, p. 19).

Moreover, I do not find it plausible to regard the reasonable person as someone who is “skeptical with regard to any claim to acceptability, whoever makes it and to whatever it refers.” There are many claims that it would be quite unreasonable to question unless one has good grounds for doubt.Footnote 9 A typical example is the claim that I am in pain, which a reasonable person would only dare to challenge if she had strong reasons to believe that I am faking it.Footnote 10 Wittgenstein insisted on a similar point in On Certainty (1969), where he presented our epistemic practices as forms of life in which certain “hinge propositions” cannot be meaningfully put into question in normal circumstances. Thus, he argued (§ 220): “The reasonable man [vernünftige Mensch] does not have certain doubts.” And (§ 325): “When we say that we know that such and such…, we mean that any reasonable person [Vernünftige] in our position would also know it, that it would be a piece of unreason [Unvernunft] to doubt it.” A reasonable person knows when it is appropriate to express doubts about a claim and when it is not. Sometimes it is not.

So what kind of philosophical view could be the basis on which the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion could stand? I believe that the starting point should be a broad philosophical conception of argumentative practice and of the attitude and behaviour that characterise arguers who excel in that practice. We are, after all, trying to develop a theory of argumentation—not an epistemological theory (as is the case of Popper’s and Albert’s critical rationalism) or even a whole theory of rationality, however much argumentation may be connected to rationality. If dialectical rules are supposed to capture the main aspects of the kind of conduct that we all admire and hope to see in argumentative discussions, we had better begin with a clear picture of what that conduct looks like. Then, that broad and general picture can be used as ground for the development of systematic and specific rules in the theoretical estate. As Aberdein (2010, p. 169) puts it: “The practice comes first, and the rules strive to capture what makes it effective.”

What I am proposing, of course, is that the best candidate for the philosophical estate of a research program on argumentation is a theory of argumentative virtue. Virtue theories are often criticised for not being able to provide specific advice on what exactly one should do in a given situation (van Zyl 2019; ch. 7). This is due to the virtue theorists’ commitment to particularism—the view that right action is too dependent on context and cannot be specified by a set of general rules. If one wants to know what to do, the answer a virtue theory would give is that one ought to do what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances. Of course, some rules have been proposed. Hursthouse (1999, p. 37) famously claimed that virtue ethics comes with what she called “v-rules,” which are rules that refer to virtues, such as “do what is honest” or “do not do what is uncharitable.” In fact, the idea of v-rules has also been adapted to argumentation (Thorson 2016; Aberdein 2023). However, arguably, those rules do not determine precisely what should be done, and the knowledge of the virtuous person involves much more than the v-rules (Hursthouse 2011).

Nevertheless, here I am interested in the philosophical estate, and the place for clear and concrete rules is the theoretical estate—where pragma-dialecticians have arguably developed their most interesting and useful insights. In the philosophical estate, what we need is rather a broad and complex conception of what an excellently and admirably conducted argumentative discussion looks like. We need the answer to the question that Cohen (2013, p. 477) posed some time ago: “What would make an argument satisfying to the point that the participants could say at the end, ‘Now that was a good argument’?” Notice that he was using here “argument” in the sense of argumentative discussion. And, as Cohen himself pointed out (p. 478), what such a satisfactory discussion requires is, first of all, extraordinary arguers. Then, in the theoretical estate, other approaches such as pragma-dialectics can address the task of developing precise criteria and rules that attempt to capture the main features of what has been described in the philosophical estate.

Hence, an account of the virtues that characterise the virtuous arguer can give us a rich philosophical ground from which the theorists can draw inspiration for their proposals of dialectical rules. Consider, for example, the virtue of intellectual humility. This virtue has been characterised in a variety of ways, from the adoption of a proper degree of confidence in our beliefs to acknowledgement of our cognitive limitations or even a low estimation of ourselves regardless of evidence to the contrary (cf. Whitcomb et al. 2015). For reasons that I cannot discuss here, the characterisation that I find most plausible is Maura Priest’s (2017) interpersonal account of intellectual humility, according to which a person is intellectually humble if she (1) respects the intellect of others, and so rarely feels immune to their criticisms, and (2) declines intellectual advantagesFootnote 11 (p. 469). What this virtue involves, then, is admitting that all of us—regardless of our intellectual capacities, which we do not need to undervalue or ignore—must comply with the same norms in the practice of giving and asking for reasons. None of us is entitled to dismiss criticisms or to refuse to support our beliefs with good reasons. We exercise intellectual humility when, even if we are experts in some field or possess outstanding intellectual skills, we do not fail to pay attention to what others have to say and to take it seriously.

Such a manifestation of intellectual humility is, in my view, one of the aspects of argumentative practice that the first rule of the pragma-dialectical code of conduct (Freedom Rule) tries to capture (van Eemeren 2018, p. 59): “Discussants may not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or from calling standpoints into question.” Likewise with the second rule (Obligation to Defend) (Ibid.): “Discussants who advance a standpoint may not refuse to defend this standpoint when requested to do so.” The point of those rules is to prevent arguers from silencing each other and from refusing to fulfil their dialectical obligations—as an arrogant person who feels a sense of entitlement would do. Of course, rules can only go so far in capturing the complexities of argumentative reality. A virtuous arguer knows that sometimes it is appropriate not to pay attention to others’ criticisms or to refuse to give reasons for some claim—what should I respond to someone who challenged my conviction that hurting people for fun is wrong? Nevertheless, the rules do their best to communicate the gist of argumentative virtues and to provide guidance to arguers that are less than virtuous.

For another example, take the third rule of the code of conduct (Standpoint Rule), which states (Ibid.): “Attacks on standpoints may not bear on a standpoint that has not actually been put forward by the other party.” This rule is intended to prevent the protagonist or the antagonist from distorting the standpoint that is in discussion. Here, several virtues from the philosophical estate can be mentioned whose manifestation the rule intends to capture. It might be the case that the rule is violated because one of the arguers is not very good at grasping the precise meaning of the claims put forward by the other arguer and exactly what they entail. The arguer just distorts them inadvertently. In that case, the vicious behaviour is a result of the lack of the virtue of sensitivity to detail (Aberdein 2010, p. 175). On the other hand, an arguer might deliberately distort some claim—produced by her co-arguer or by herself—with the purpose of criticising a straw man or of confusing her co-arguer about to what exactly she has committed herself. In that case, such an arguer obviously lacks the virtue of intellectual honesty, which involves a commitment to accurately representing the truth as one sees it (King 2021, p. 141).

Thus, a general account of argumentative virtues which provides a broad outline of what it is to aspire to excellence in argumentative practice could be a more adequate philosophical ground for the theoretical work that pragma-dialecticians have so successfully done. The pragma-dialectical conception of reasonableness, as we have seen, does not give us enough philosophical material to support all the theoretical apparatus. We need a broader view.

Of course, here I have presented just a couple of examples of what a virtue approach to argumentation could do for pragma-dialectics; what we need—and what we do not have yet—is a whole theory of argumentative virtues. Such a theory will probably need to include, beyond responsibilist virtues that are defined in agent-based terms and have to do with the motivation and behaviour of the arguers, also reliabilist virtues, more appropriately defined in act-based terms and concerned with the way arguers produce and appraise argumentsFootnote 12 (Gascón 2018b). In any case, it can provide a rich and general picture of argumentative practice and argumentative excellence that will be sufficient to ground specific models, rules, and criteria.

An intriguing question would be whether the philosophical conception of reasonableness that a virtue argumentation theory could provide would yield precisely the pragma-dialectical model of critical discussion and rules of conduct.Footnote 13 Given that no complete virtue argumentation theory has been developed yet, this question must remain open. I do believe that pragma-dialecticians have done a good job in the theoretical estate and that their rules capture many aspects of what can be considered as virtuous behaviour in argumentation. However, a new philosophical ground could indeed require certain modifications of the rules. Conversely, perhaps the rules could also guide the development of a philosophical conception of reasonableness, so that both the philosophical and the theoretical estate must be developed through a method of reflective equilibrium. I remain open to these possibilities.

4 Reasonableness as Minimal Argumentative Virtue

I have argued that the kind of philosophical view that should inform the theoretical estate of a research program for the study of argumentation is a conception of excellence in argumentative practice—that is, of argumentative virtues. But then, what about the concept of reasonableness, which is so central to the pragma-dialectical theory? Should we dispense with it altogether, or does it still have a theoretical role to play? In this last section, I will argue that reasonableness can be understood as minimal argumentative virtue and can form part of the pragma-dialectical preconditions for critical discussions.

Argumentative virtues, just as any other kind of virtues, come in degrees. Arguers can be (and usually are) less than fully virtuous. In a critical discussion between fully virtuous arguers, there would be no need to establish rules—those arguers would spontaneously perform in an excellent manner. That is why the virtue theory that, as I have argued, should be included in the philosophical estate of the research program on argumentation, should not be understood as specifying the prerequisites that all arguers must fulfil in order to participate in a critical discussion. It is, rather, a depiction of argumentative behaviour that both theorists and arguers should aspire to realise—something the theorists seek to achieve by developing rules of conduct. Yet, at the same time, it is clear that a minimum degree of virtue is necessary for a reasonable critical discussion to take place at all. Extremely vicious arguers, who constantly try to deceive, are incapable of listening, take any opportunity to denigrate and humiliate their interlocutors, and, in general, never take argumentation seriously, cannot participate in a serious critical discussion—no matter how many rules we devise for them.Footnote 14

Here is where the pragma-dialectical concept of higher-order conditions as preconditions for reasonable argumentative dialogue—about which I have said nothing so far—enters the picture. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst regarded the pragma-dialectical rules that they proposed as “first-order conditions” for having a critical discussion (2004, p. 189), but they also acknowledged the necessity of “second-order” and “third-order” conditions. Second-order conditions refer to the state of mind of the arguers and include, for example, their willingness to come to an agreement (van Eemeren 2018, p. 91). Third-order conditions, on the other hand, are related to the social and institutional circumstances in which the discussion takes place—whether, for instance, arguers can speak freely without fear of punishment and whether there is an important power asymmetry between the arguers. Insofar as these higher-order conditions are not fulfilled in a given case, there is no point in engaging in critical discussion and attempting to follow the rules.

Pragma-dialecticians have not said much about what those second-order conditions amount to. In my view, what is necessary in order to fulfil them is precisely that minimum degree of virtue which I mentioned earlier. Most of us, for example, fail to be completely open-minded: we are reluctant to seriously consider certain claims and to question some of our beliefs—certain political or religious convictions, for example, are too strong in us. Nevertheless, we may be open to discuss many other issues and, to that extent, we are prepared to participate in a critical discussion in most circumstances. The same could happen with the virtue of recognition of reliable authority (Aberdein 2010, p. 175). Someone may be fairly good in general at spotting whackos who spread pseudo-scientific misinformation, and may decide whom to trust on the basis of solid criteria (relevant field of expertise, agreement with the scientific community, and so on). From time to time, however, that same person may also be taken in by people who do not know what they are talking about. Such a person cannot be said to be fully virtuous, but she is certainly virtuous enough to engage in a critical discussion.

Those people who possess at least a minimal disposition to address a difference of opinion by means of reasoned dialogue and to attempt to reach an agreement, without necessarily possessing full-fledged argumentative virtue, are what I would call reasonable people. They may not be truly admirable in the same way as an arguer that is (or comes close to being) fully virtuous, but surely they are the kind of people that one would like to find when one engages in argumentation. Likewise, unreasonable people are to be avoided, for they lack even the basic dispositions for engaging in healthy and fruitful discussions.

As the previous paragraph suggests, when it comes to minimal argumentative virtue, all that matters are dispositions. I do believe that full-fledged argumentative virtue requires the appropriate motivations, so that an arguer who behaves excellently in a critical discussion merely because she wants to convey a good image of herself or because such behaviour is rewarded is not a fully virtuous arguer. Full possession of argumentative virtue involves believing in reason, valuing argumentation in itself, pursuing truth and the good, and motivations of that kind. However, that might well be too much to ask of reasonable—that is, minimally argumentatively virtuous—arguers. In order to be capable of engaging in a fruitful critical discussion, it is enough if the arguer is disposed to abide by argumentative norms and behave reasonably—try to put forward honest and strong arguments, listen to the other arguers’ objections, adjust her claims to the available evidence, and so on. Reasonable arguers are at least disposed to behave in a minimally virtuous way, whatever their motivations.Footnote 15

Notice that the conception of reasonableness that I am proposing here is not the same as the current pragma-dialectical conception. It is not limited to anti-dogmatism, admission of fallibility, and willingness to engage in critical discussion. It also involves possession of all the other argumentative virtues, but not necessarily to a full (or even a great) extent. Of course, people who are pig-headed and refuse to question any of their beliefs are quite unreasonable—on this, pragma-dialecticians are undoubtedly right. But so is also someone who questions everything, who interprets all utterances in a strictly literal manner (thus ignoring implicatures), who systematically relies on extremely dubious sources of information, or who insists on her superior intellectual capacities. In order to be reasonable, to be someone with whom others find it worthwhile to argue, one needs to possess at least a little bit of open-mindedness, intellectual humility, recognition of reliable authority, intellectual honesty, and the rest of argumentative virtues. Otherwise, engaging in a discussion with such an unreasonable person is rarely worth the effort.

5 Conclusion

The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, which has been around for forty years since the publication of Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, can be credited with having revived the dialectical perspective of argumentation. Nowadays, in the realm of argumentation studies, “dialectical” is virtually synonymous with “pragma-dialectical.” Van Eemeren and Grootendorst, and later Houtlosser and others, managed to create a dialectical system that dispensed with artificial and unnecessary formalities and was relevant to the analysis and evaluation of real-life discussions. Their ideal model for critical discussions, their distinction between the four stages—in each of which the arguers must complete different tasks—and their rules for reasonable conduct—whose violation constitutes the very definition of fallacies—provide a very useful theoretical tool for both analytical and pedagogical purposes.

Following the pragma-dialectical distinction between five estates of a research program for the study of argumentation, I believe it is fair to say that pragma-dialectics stands out as a great accomplishment of the theoretical estate. Yet, the pragma-dialectical research program was quite ambitious, and aspired to provide also a philosophical ground for the ideal model of critical discussions in the form of a conception of reasonableness. In this paper, I have argued that the conception of reasonableness that pragma-dialecticians adopted—based on Popper’s, Albert’s, and Toulmin’s insights—is too narrow to support the whole pragma-dialectical theoretical system. Anti-dogmatism, assumption of fallibilism and willingness to engage in critical discussion are no doubt part of the philosophical spirit that inspires pragma-dialectical rules, but much more is needed.

Here, I have proposed that the ideal candidate for the philosophical estate of the research program is a theory of argumentative virtue. What should ground a system of dialectical rules is a broad and general conception of how excellent (virtuous) arguers participate in argumentative discussions—a depiction of the virtuous traits that characterise those arguers and how their virtues are manifested in different contexts. We should reflect on what a virtuously conducted discussion involves, taking a wide variety of aspects into account—the arguments that are put forward, the behaviour of the participants, their motivations, and so on. Only then, when we have a clear (even if unsystematic) picture of the kind of arguers that we all should become, we can lay out rules which attempt to make that picture a reality—even for us, non-virtuous arguers. Thus, as I argued some time ago (Gascón 2017), pragma-dialectics and virtue argumentation theory do not need to be seen as two opposed approaches to argumentation, but as brothers in arms with a common goal.