Abstract
What is the relevance of ideals for determining virtuous argumentative practices? According to Bailin and Battersby the telos of argumentation is to improve our cognitive systems, and adversariality plays no role in ideally virtuous argumentation. Stevens and Cohen grant that ideal argumentation is collaborative, but stress that imperfect agents like us should not aim at approximating the ideal of argumentation. Accordingly, it can be virtuous, for imperfect arguers like us, to act as adversaries. Many questions are left unanswered by both camps. First, how do we conceptualize an ideal and its approximation? Second, how can we determine what is the ideal of argumentation? Third, can we extend Stevens and Cohen’s anti-approximation argument beyond virtue theory? In order to respond to these questions, this paper develops a second-best perspective on ideal argumentation. The Theory of the Second Best is a formal contribution to the field of utility (or welfare) optimization. Its main conclusion is that, in non-ideal circumstances, approximating ideals might be suboptimal.
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Notes
See, for instance, Godden (2016, 345–46). By contrast, some theories of argumentation are interested in the properties of a good argument, understood as an object or a product. For instance, a good argument is explicit, cogent and relies on inference principles such as deduction, induction or abduction. Context can also play a role in determining what counts as a good argument. See Walton (2009) for an overview of the literature. For classical work and references in argumentation theory, see Blair (2015) on informal logic, Cohen (1995, 2005, 2015) on adversarial argumentation and education, Gilbert (2013) on argumentation, agreement and disagreement, Hahn and Oaksford (2007) on Bayesianism and argumentation, van Eemeren and Grootendorst (2004) on pragma-dialectical approaches to argumentation, Walton (2003) on relevance in argumentation, and Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008) on argumentation schemes.
See Aberdein (2016) and Cohen (2005) on virtue-based argumentation theory. See Cohen and Miller (2016) on empathy, sympathy and cognitive compathy as features of correct argumentation. See Kidd (2016) on intellectual humility as an intellectual virtue. See Kwong (2016) on open-mindedness and argumentative virtues. See also Godden (2016) and Stevens (2016).
See Wein (2016, 2) on why there are exceptions to this claim.
Bailin and Battersby are responding to Cohen’s paper titled “Missed Opportunities in Argument Evaluation” (Cohen 2015). In this paper, Cohen analyzes missed opportunities in argumentation, such as failing to notice a good argument in favour of a thesis, or failing to signal it to an opponent. There are some contexts in which agents who fail to notice or signal a good argument in favour of a thesis are subject to criticism. However, there also seems to be contexts in which missed opportunities are permitted. Cohen tries to make sense of such a datum by analyzing roles, impartiality, and adversariality in argumentation. See Wein (2016) for a reply to Bailin and Battersby’s argument.
And not all interpretations of approximation make sense. For instance, consider Kwisthout et al.'s discussion of Bayesian modeling in cognitive science. For them, a problem for Bayesian modeling in cognitive science is computational intractability. Very roughly, the problem is that Bayesian modeling sometimes proposes solutions that are too costly. The proposed solution cannot be implemented with a reasonable amount of time and resources. Some reply that Bayesian computations can be approximated using inexact algorithms. However, Kwisthout et al. (2011, 780) doubt that this interpretation of “approximation” is mathematically founded.
I make the same observations in Daoust (m.s.).
See, e.g., Gaus (2016, chap. 1).
See Gaus (2016, chap. 1) for a similar argument.
See Wiens (2020, 3–10) and Daoust (m.s.).
For full belief, one has an accurate belief in P if and only if one's belief is true. For credence, accuracy comes in degrees. If P is true, then the more one's credence in P is closer to 1, the more one has an accurate credence in P. If P is false, then the more one's credence in P is closer to 0, the more one has an accurate credence in P.
Why do F and G need to be functions of at least three variables? Recall that the Theory of the Second Best defines the first-best scenario in terms of ratios of derivatives. In our cake example, this is given by two ratios—namely, \(\frac{{F^{\prime}_{a} }}{{F^{\prime}_{c} }} = \frac{{G^{\prime}_{a} }}{{G^{\prime}_{c} }}\) and \(\frac{{F^{\prime}_{b} }}{{F^{\prime}_{c} }} = \frac{{G^{\prime}_{b} }}{{G^{\prime}_{c} }}\). Then, it analyzes cases in which some ratios of derivatives are satisfied, while other ratios are not. For instance, if a constraint refrains us from satisfying the first ratio, should we still satisfy the second one? However, if F and G are functions of less than three variables, you will not have two ratios of derivatives. If you only have two variables, you have at most one ratio, and the question "if a constraint refrains us from satisfying the first ratio, should we still satisfy the second one?" makes no sense.
See note 2.
An idealtype refers to a case in which the essential features of a phenomenon are most accentuated. In accordance with the Weberian tradition, an idealtype can be disvaluable or unethical. There can be, for instance, idealtypes of dictatorship, corruption, mafia, and so forth.
Also, think of Kitcher’s (1990) ideal division of epistemic labour. Kitcher roughly says that diversity can be essential for optimizing an ideal community’s division of epistemic labour. But Kitcher does not assume that ideal epistemic communities have access to infinite resources. He takes the bounded resources available to an epistemic community as an initial constraint.
Recall that, when w=0, non-epistemic factors like winning the argument are maximally important, and when w=1, they do not matter at all.
Mathematically speaking, the violation of separability conditions have to do with the system of partial derivatives that result from optimization in second-best scenarios. See Daoust (m.s.).
Compare: Driving your car for an hour won’t cost you much. Drinking a bottle a vodka won’t cost you much. But drinking a bottle of vodka just before driving your car could be extremely costly. Here, the costs associated with these activities are somehow synergetic.
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I warmly thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments on this project.
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This study was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (grant #756–2019-0133).
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Daoust, MK. Adversariality and Ideal Argumentation: A Second-Best Perspective. Topoi 40, 887–898 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09749-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-021-09749-y