Topoi

, Volume 34, Issue 1, pp 37–54 | Cite as

The Opacity of Truth

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Abstract

The paper offers a critical examination of a prominent, “quasi-deflationist” argument advanced in the contemporary debate on the semantic paradoxes against non-naive and non-transparent theories of truth. The argument claims that truth unrestrictedly fulfils certain expressive functions, and that its so doing requires the unrestricted validity of naivety and transparency principles. The paper criticises the quasi-deflationist argument by considering some kinds of cases in which transparency and naivety arguably fail. In some such cases truth still fulfils the relevant expressive functions without being transparent or naive; in some other such cases, truth does not fulfil the relevant expressive functions and other conceptual resources must be called upon. Thus, in different ways, all such cases belie the quasi-deflationist argument’s insistence that naivety and transparency should be unrestrictedly valid for truth unrestrictedly to fulfil the relevant expressive functions. There might however be other reasons for solving the semantic paradoxes by revising classical logic, and the paper in effect closes by offering versions of the liar paradox that rely on compelling but opacity-friendly truth-theoretic principles.

Keywords

Context dependence Deflationism Naivety Semantic paradoxes Transparency Truth Truth-bearers Truth-value gaps 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.LOGOS, Logic, Language and Cognition Research Group, Department of Logic, History and Philosophy of ScienceUniversity of BarcelonaBarcelonaSpain
  2. 2.Northern Institute of Philosophy, Department of PhilosophyUniversity of AberdeenAberdeenUK

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