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Empathy, Embodiment, and the Unity of Expression

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Abstract

This paper presents an account of empathy as the form of experience directed at embodied unities of expressive movement. After outlining the key differences between simulation theory and the phenomenological approach to empathy, the paper argues that while the phenomenological approach is closer to respecting a necessary constitutional asymmetry between first-personal and second-personal senses of embodiment, it still presupposes a general concept of embodiment that ends up being problematic. A different account is proposed that is neutral on the explanatory role of the first-person sense of embodiment, which leads to an emphasis on the transformative nature of empathy and a broadening of the scope of possible targets of empathic awareness.

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Notes

  1. On perceptual objectivity, see Husserl (2001, vol. 2) Investigation VI (viz. §10); on communicative action, see Husserl (2001, vol. 1) Investigation I (viz. §7); on empathy, see Husserl (1989) §56ff.

  2. For example, see Descartes’ analysis of perception in the Sixth Replies (1984, vol 2, 294–296).

  3. See Descartes’ (1989, §§35–36).

  4. See Descartes (1989), §§35–36. There is a lively debate regarding the reach of judgment in perceptual life in Descartes. See Hatfield (2007) for an account of why Descartes must be understood as keeping judgment and sensation distinct from one another. See Shapiro (2003) for a compelling reading of Descartes along more phenomenological lines.

  5. See Dwyer (2007) for an excellent account of the role of apperception in Husserl’s philosophy and his appropriation of it from the apperceptive psychology of Wundt.

  6. See Pitt 2004, 2011 and Siewert 2011 for in-depth explications of this notion.

  7. Cf. Siewert (2011) pp. 243–247 on how to interpret the phrase “what it’s like”.

  8. At this point I want to make clear that “expression” should be understood as expressive bodily movement and not linguistic expression. Unpacking the relation between these two senses of expression is a task for another day.

  9. See Gallagher and Zahavi (2008).

  10. Cf. Legrand (2006)’s discussion of the “body image” and “body schema”. Legrand cites Gallagher (1995) in distinguishing the “body image”, which is a phenomenally conscious representation of one’s body, from the “body schema”, which is an organizing principle of the sub-personal body and is not phenomenally conscious. Here my focus is on the body image, not the body schema.

  11. Perhaps this is why it is usually very obvious to the TV viewer when soccer or basketball players “flop” or “dive” in an attempt to have a foul called. Their movement appears intentional, whereas the movement of the body of one who is actually fouled appears as externally caused (from being pushed, tripped, etc.).

  12. Cf. Schutz (1967) for further phenomenological analyses distinguishing the basic recognition of expressive behavior from the fuller understanding that comes with grasping the other’s motives.

  13. I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for pushing me on this point.

  14. Cf. Gallagher and Miyahara 2012; Carassa and Colombetti 2011; Rietveld 2012.

  15. This process, no doubt, would be most affective and transformational during one’s early developmental years.

  16. See Margaret Gilbert’s canonical (1989) account of plural subjects, which she characterizes in terms of group members being “jointly committed to Φ as a body” (433).

  17. See Mathiesen (2005), who argues that collective consciousness is achieved through the individual’s simulation of the group’s collective mental state.

  18. I would like to thank David Woodruff Smith, Martin Schwab, Dan Siakel, Louise Kleszyk, and two anonymous reviewers for discussion and comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of California, 85 Humanities Instructional Building, Irvine, CA, 92697-4555, USA

    Philip J. Walsh

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Walsh, P.J. Empathy, Embodiment, and the Unity of Expression. Topoi 33, 215–226 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-013-9201-z

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