Abstract
This ‘untimely review’ of Hume’s Treatise is written as if the book had just been published. I use this fiction to argue that the Treatise is a more fundamental critique of the concept of reason than most readers have thought. Hume’s analysis of human reasoning is grounded in empirical psychology, in which he made significant discoveries. He presents a non-propositional theory of desires, in which choice can be neither rational nor irrational. He shows that the idea that reason has authority, either in morality or science, has no substance. I argue that this critique remains valid and is not self-defeating.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Unattributed page references are to David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Oxford University Press, 1978; first published 1739–40. In quoting from the Treatise, I have acted as twenty-first century copy-editor with respect to spelling and punctuation.
For an introduction to behavioural economics, see Kahneman and Tversky (2000).
One such principle is completeness: for all objects of choice x and y, either x is weakly preferred to y or y is weakly preferred to x. Another is transitivity: if x is weakly preferred to y and y is weakly preferred to z, then x is weakly preferred to z. These two conditions imply that preferences take the form of an ordering.
This hypothesis about the effects of experience was fundamental to early versions of the theory of consistent preferences, and has been resurrected in some recent defences of the theory against attacks from behavioural economics. For more on this, see Bruni and Sugden (2007).
For more on the distinction between propositional and non-propositional theories of mental states, see Sugden (2006).
Hume seems to have rediscovered the phenomenon that behavioural economists describe as ‘hyperbolic discounting’. See Frederick et al. (2002).
It is well established that, in forming beliefs, people give more weight to relevant evidence, the more easily and more vividly it comes to mind; see Tversky and Kahneman (1973). It is also known that sentiments are contagious. The evidence for this mechanism, and some of its philosophical implications, are discussed by Sugden (2005).
See, for example, Cartwright (1983).
References
Bruni L, Sugden R (2007) The road not taken: how psychology was removed from economics, and how it might be brought back. Econ J 117:146–173
Cartwright N (1983) How the laws of physics lie. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Frederick S, Loewenstein G, O’Donoghue T (2002) Time discounting and time preference: a critical review. J Econ Lit 40:351–401
Gauthier D (1986) Morals by agreement. Clarendon Press, Oxford
Hawking S (1988) A brief history of time. Bantam, London
Harsanyi JC (1953) Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-taking. J Polit Econ 61:434–435
Kahneman D, Tversky A (eds) (2000) Choices, values, and frames. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Nussbaum M (2000) Women and human development: the capabilities approach. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Rawls J (1971) A theory of justice. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
Sen A (1999) Development as freedom. Oxford University Press, Oxford
Sugden R (2005) Fellow-feeling. In: Gui B, Sugden R (eds) Economics and social interaction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 52–75
Sugden R (2006) Hume’s non-instrumental and non-propositional decision theory. Econ Philos 22:365–391
Tversky A, Kahneman A (1973) Availability: a heuristic for judging frequency and probability. Cognit Psychol 5:207–232
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
My work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK (award no. RES 051 27 0146).
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Sugden, R. David Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature . Topoi 27, 153–159 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9034-3
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-008-9034-3