1 Introduction and preliminaries

Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) argued that when comparing the ambiguity attitudes of two decision makers (DMs) with biseparable preferences, it is important to keep the cardinal utilities equivalent to factor out risk attitudes that, otherwise, would intrude in the comparison and confound it. With this motivation, they establish the desired cardinal utility equivalence via a trade-off condition. In this work, we present a simpler condition, based on the willingness to bet on events, that ensures this equivalence (Theorem 6).

We consider a state space S, finite or infinite, endowed with an event algebra \(\Sigma\), and a connected topological space X of consequences. We denote by \(\mathcal {F}\) the collection of (simple) acts, i.e., of the \(\Sigma\)-measurable maps from S to X that assume finitely many values.Footnote 1

The DM’s preference on \(\mathcal {F}\) is modeled by a binary relation \(\succsim\), with symmetric part \(\sim\) and asymmetric part \(\succ\). As usual, consequences are identified with constant acts and so, with a standard abuse of notation, \(\succsim\) ranks also consequences. In particular, throughout, we assume that the preference \(\succsim\) is non-trivial, i.e., there exist two consequences x and y with \(x\succ y\).

Given any two consequences x and y, with \(x\succsim y\), we denote by xAy the binary act that yields x if event A occurs and y otherwise, interpreted as a bet on event A. An event A is essential if there exist two consequences \(x\succsim y\) such that

$$\begin{aligned} x\succ xAy\succ y. \end{aligned}$$
(1)

A functional \(V:\mathcal {F}\rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) represents \(\succsim\) if, for all \(f,g\in \mathcal {F}\),

$$\begin{aligned} f\succsim g\Longleftrightarrow V(f)\ge V(g). \end{aligned}$$

The preference \(\succsim\) is monotone if, given any two acts f and g, \(f(s)\succsim g(s)\) for all s in S implies \(f\succsim g\). A functional V represents a monotone preference \(\succsim\) if and only if it is itself monotone: given any two acts f and g, \(f(s)\succsim g(s)\) for all s in S implies \(V\left( f\right) \ge V\left( g\right)\).

2 Biseparable preferences

Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001) introduced the following general class of preferences.Footnote 2

Definition 1

A monotone preference \(\succsim\) on \(\mathcal {F}\) is biseparable if there exist a functional \(V:\mathcal {F}\rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) that represents \(\succsim\) and functions \(\rho =\rho _{V}:\Sigma \rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) and \(u=u_{V}:X\rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) such that

$$\begin{aligned} V(xAy)=u(x)\rho (A)+u(y)(1-\rho (A)) \end{aligned}$$
(2)

for all consequences \(x\succsim y\) and all events A. The functional V is called a canonical representation of \(\succsim\).

It is immediate to see that

$$\begin{aligned} u\left( x\right) =V\left( x\right) \qquad \forall x\in X \end{aligned}$$

and that, given any \(x\succ y\) in X,

$$\begin{aligned} \rho (A)=\frac{V(xAy)-V(y)}{V(x)-V\left( y\right) }\qquad \forall A\in \Sigma . \end{aligned}$$
(3)

The functions u and \(\rho\) are thus unique given V. We call \(\rho\) a canonical willingness to bet of the DM since \(xAy\succsim xBy\) if and only if \(\rho \left( A\right) \ge \rho \left( B\right)\) and we call u a canonical utility function since it represents \(\succsim\) on X.Footnote 3 The monotonicity of \(\succsim\) implies that \(\rho\) is a capacity,Footnote 4 while its non-triviality implies that u is non-constant.

In reading the next definition, recall that a preference \(\succsim\) is (topologically) continuous on X if the sets \(\left\{ y\in X:y\succsim x\right\}\) and \(\left\{ y\in X:x\succsim y\right\}\) are closed for all x in X.

Definition 2

A biseparable preference \(\succsim\) is solvable if it is continuous on X and if each bet has a certainty equivalent.

The next preliminary result characterizes solvable biseparable preferences through the continuity of canonical utility functions.Footnote 5

Proposition 3

Let \(\succsim\) be a biseparable preference on \(\mathcal {F}\) that admits an essential event. The following conditions are equivalent:

  1. (i)

    \(\succsim\) is solvable;

  2. (ii)

    any canonical utility function is continuous;

  3. (iii)

    some canonical utility function is continuous;

  4. (iv)

    \(\succsim\) is continuous on X and each act has a certainty equivalent.

Proof

(i) implies (ii). Since \(\succsim\) is continuous, by Lemma 8, there exists a strictly increasing function \(f:{\hbox {Im}\, }u\rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) such that \(\tilde{u}=f\circ u\) is continuous. Therefore, \({\hbox {Im}}\,\tilde{u}\) is an interval because X is connected. Let A be an essential event, with \(\alpha =\rho \left( A\right) \in \left( 0,1\right)\). Since each bet has a certainty equivalent, for each \(\nu _{1}\ge \nu _{2}\ \) in \({\hbox {Im}}\,u\), with \(u\left( x_{1}\right) =\nu _{1}\) and \(u\left( x_{2}\right) =\nu _{2}\), we have \(V\left( x_{1}Ax_{2}\right) =\alpha \nu _{1}+\left( 1-\alpha \right) \nu _{2}=u\left( x\right)\) for some \(x\in X\). Therefore, \(\alpha \nu _{1}+\left( 1-\alpha \right) \nu _{2}\in {\hbox {Im}}\,u\). By Corollary 14 (in the special case when the topological vector space is the real line), this implies that \(\overline{{\hbox {Im}}\,u}\) is an interval. We have \({\hbox {Im}}\,f=\left\{ \left( f\circ u\right) \left( x\right) :x\in X\right\} ={\hbox {Im}}\,\tilde{u}\) and so \({\hbox {Im}}\,f\) is an interval. By Proposition 10, f is monotonically continuous. Since f is strictly increasing, by Corollary 11, the inverse \(f^{-1}\) is continuous. Therefore, also \(u=f^{-1}\circ \tilde{u}\) is continuous.

(iii) implies (iv). Suppose that u is continuous. By Lemma 8, \(\succsim\) is continuous on X. It remains to show that each act has a certainty equivalent. For any act f, denote by \(x^{f}\) and \(x_{f}\) a best and a worst consequence of f. Monotonicity implies that \(x^{f}\succsim f\succsim x_{f}\). Then,

$$\begin{aligned} u(x^{f})=V(x^{f})\ge V\left( f\right) \ge V(x_{f})=u(x_{f}). \end{aligned}$$

The image \({\hbox {Im}}\,u\) of u is an interval because X is connected. Therefore, \(V\left( f\right) \in \left[ u\left( x_{f}\right) ,u\left( x^{f}\right) \right]\) implies that there exists \(z\in X\) such that \(z\sim f\), as desired. This completes the proof as it is obvious that (ii) implies (iii) and that (iv) implies (i).□

3 Cardinal equivalence

In this section, we compare preferences over acts that are possibly defined on different state spaces. To this end, for \(i=1,2\,\) we denote by \(\Sigma _{i}\) an event algebra defined on a state space \(S_{i}\), with typical element \(A_{i}\), and by \(\succsim _{i}\) a preference defined over the corresponding collection \(\mathcal {F}_{i}\ \)of acts \(f:S_{i}\rightarrow X\).

The following definition introduces a comparative notion for betting behavior.

Definition 4

Preference \(\succsim _{1}\) is more willing to bet on event \(A_{1}\) than preference \(\succsim _{2}\) on an event \(A_{2}\) if, for all consequences \(x,y,z\in X\) with \(x\succsim _{1}y\) and \(x\succsim _{2}y\),

$$\begin{aligned} xA_{2}y\succ _{2}z\Longrightarrow xA_{1}y\succ _{1}z. \end{aligned}$$
(4)

In words, whenever DM\(_{\text {2}}\) prefers to bet on event \(A_{2}\) than to get a sure alternative, so does DM\(_{\text {1}}\) for a bet on event \(A_{1}\). For biseparable preferences, this comparative notion has the following implication that corroborates the interpretation of \(\rho\) in terms of willingness to bet.

Lemma 5

For \(i=1,2\), let \(\succsim _{i}\) be a solvable biseparable preference with a canonical representation \(V_{i}\) and an essential event \(A_{i}\). If \(\succsim _{1}\) is more willing to bet on \(A_{1}\) than \(\succsim _{2}\) is on \(A_{2}\), then \(\rho _{1}(A_{1})\ge \rho _{2}(A_{2})\).

Proof

To ease notation, set \(\rho _{1}=\rho _{1}(A_{1})\) and \(\rho _{2}=\rho _{2}(A_{2})\). By essentiality, we have \(\rho _{1},\rho _{2}\in \left( 0,1\right)\). We want to show that \(\rho _{1}\ge \rho _{2}\). Assume, per contra, that \(\rho _{1}<\rho _{2}\). First observe that, by taking \(y=x\) (so that automatically \(x\succsim _{1}y\) and \(x\succsim _{2}y\)) and using the contrapositive of (4), it holds

$$\begin{aligned} z\succsim _{1}x\implies z\succsim _{2}x \end{aligned}$$

for all \(x,z\in X\). Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} u_{1}\left( z\right) \ge u_{1}\left( x\right) \implies z\succsim _{1}x\implies z\succsim _{2}x\implies u_{2}\left( z\right) \ge u_{2}\left( x\right) . \end{aligned}$$
(5)

To ease notation, set \(U_{1}={\hbox {Im}}\,u_{1}\) and \(U_{2}={\hbox {Im}}\,u_{2}\). Since X is connected and the non-constant functions \(u_{1},u_{2}:X \rightarrow \mathbb {R}\) are continuous, both \(U_{1}\) and \(U_{2}\) are non-degenerate intervals. By (5), there exists an increasing and continuous (by Corollary 12) map \(\varphi :U_{1}\rightarrow U_{2}\) such that \(u_{2}=\varphi \circ u_{1}\). Let \(a<b\) in \(U_{1}\) and set \(c=\rho _{1}b+(1-\rho _{1})a\). Take \(x,y,z\in X\) such that \(b=u_{1}\left( x\right)\), \(c=u_{1}\left( z\right)\) and \(a=u_{1}\left( y\right)\). Since \(a<b\), we have \(x\succsim _{1}y\) and so \(x\succsim _{2}y\). We thus have

$$\begin{aligned} \left. c=\rho _{1}b+(1-\rho _{1})a\right.&\implies&u_{1}(z)=\rho _{1}u_{1}(x)+(1-\rho _{1})u_{1}(y) \\&\implies&z\sim _{1}xA_{1}y\Longrightarrow z\succsim _{2}xA_{2}y \\&\implies&u_{2}(z)\ge \rho _{2}u_{2}(x)+(1-\rho _{2})u_{2}(y) \\&\implies&\varphi \left( c\right) \ge \rho _{2}\varphi \left( b\right) +(1-\rho _{2})\varphi \left( a\right) \\&\implies&\varphi \left( c\right) \ge \rho _{1}\varphi \left( b\right) +(1-\rho _{1})\varphi \left( a\right) , \end{aligned}$$

where the last implication holds because \(\varphi\) is increasing and \(\rho _{2}>\rho _{1}\). Thus, for all \(a<b\) in \(U_{1}\),

$$\begin{aligned} c=\rho _{1}b+(1-\rho _{1})a\implies \varphi \left( c\right) \ge \rho _{1}\varphi \left( b\right) +(1-\rho _{1})\varphi \left( a\right) . \end{aligned}$$
(6)

This implies that \(\varphi\) is concave (see, e.g., Hardy et al., 1934, p. 73).

Let \(\lambda =\rho _{1}\left( 1-\rho _{2}\right) /\rho _{2}\left( 1-\rho _{1}\right)\). Since \(0<\rho _{1}<\rho _{2}<1\), we have \(\lambda \in \left( 0,1\right)\). By (6), we have

$$\begin{aligned} b-c=b-\left( \rho _{1}b+(1-\rho _{1})a\right) =\left( 1-\rho _{1}\right) \left( b-a\right) >0 \end{aligned}$$

and, by the preceding calculations,

$$\begin{aligned} -\varphi (c)\le -\left( \rho _{2}\varphi (b)+(1-\rho _{2})\varphi (a)\right) \end{aligned}$$

as well as

$$\begin{aligned} c-a=\rho _{1}b+(1-\rho _{1})a-a=\rho _{1}\left( b-a\right) >0 \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi (c)-\varphi (a)\ge \rho _{2}\varphi (b)+(1-\rho _{2})\varphi (a)-\varphi (a)=\rho _{2}\left( \varphi (b)-\varphi \left( a\right) \right) . \end{aligned}$$

Then,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\varphi (b)-\varphi (c)}{b-c}\le \frac{\varphi (b)-\left( \rho _{2}\varphi (b)+(1-\rho _{2})\varphi (a)\right) }{\left( 1-\rho _{1}\right) \left( b-a\right) }=\frac{1-\rho _{2}}{1-\rho _{1}}\frac{\varphi (b)-\varphi \left( a\right) }{b-a} \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\varphi (c)-\varphi (a)}{c-a}\ge \frac{\left( \rho _{2}\varphi (b)+(1-\rho _{2})\varphi (a)\right) -\varphi (a)}{\rho _{1}\left( b-a\right) }=\frac{\rho _{2}}{\rho _{1}}\frac{\varphi (b)-\varphi (a)}{b-a}. \end{aligned}$$

By multiplying both sides of the latter inequality by \(\rho _{1}/\rho _{2}\),

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\varphi (b)-\varphi (a)}{b-a}\le \frac{\rho _{1}}{\rho _{2}}\frac{ \varphi (c)-\varphi (a)}{c-a}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\varphi (b)-\varphi (c)}{b-c}\le \frac{1-\rho _{2}}{1-\rho _{1}}\frac{ \varphi (b)-\varphi \left( a\right) }{b-a}\le \frac{1-\rho _{2}}{1-\rho _{1} }\frac{\rho _{1}}{\rho _{2}}\frac{\varphi (c)-\varphi (a)}{c-a}=\lambda \frac{\varphi (c)-\varphi (a)}{c-a}. \end{aligned}$$

Summing up, for all \(a<b\) in \(U_{1}\),

$$\begin{aligned} c=\rho _{1}b+(1-\rho _{1})a\Longrightarrow \frac{\varphi (b)-\varphi (c)}{b-c }\le \lambda \frac{\varphi (c)-\varphi (a)}{c-a}. \end{aligned}$$
(7)

Now, fix \(c\in \text{ int }U_{1}\). Take a sequence \(a_{n}\uparrow c\) and a sequence \(b_{n}\downarrow c\) such that \(a_{n}<b_{n}\) in \(U_{1}\) and

$$\begin{aligned} c=\rho _{1}b_{n}+(1-\rho _{1})a_{n} \end{aligned}$$

for all \(n\ge 1\). For example, for n large enough,

$$\begin{aligned} c=\rho _{1}\underset{b_{n}}{\underbrace{\left( c+\frac{1}{n\rho _{1}}\right) }}+(1-\rho _{1})\underset{a_{n}}{\underbrace{\left( c-\frac{1}{n(1-\rho _{1}) }\right) }}. \end{aligned}$$

By (7), for each n, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\varphi (b_{n})-\varphi (c)}{b_{n}-c}\le \lambda \frac{\varphi (c)-\varphi (a_{n})}{c-a_{n}}. \end{aligned}$$

Since \(\varphi\) is concave, we can take the limits as \(n\rightarrow \infty\) , thus getting

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi _{+}^{\prime }\left( c\right) \le \lambda \varphi _{-}^{\prime }\left( c\right) . \end{aligned}$$

Since \(\lambda \in \left( 0,1\right)\), if \(\varphi\) is differentiable at \(c\in \text{ int }U_{1}\), it holds \(\varphi ^{\prime }\left( c\right) =0\). Therefore, \(\varphi ^{\prime }\) is zero on the differentiability set \(D_{1}\subseteq \text{ int }U_{1}\) on which \(\varphi _{+}^{\prime }=\varphi _{-}^{\prime }=\varphi ^{\prime }\). Since the complement in \(\text{ int } U_{1}\) of the set \(D_{1}\) is at most countable, the monotonicity of \(\varphi _{+}^{\prime }\) implies that \(\varphi _{+}^{\prime }\) is zero on \(\text{ int }U_{1}\). Therefore, \(\varphi\) is constant on \(\text{ int }U_{1}\). As \(\varphi\) is continuous, it is then constant on the entire interval \(U_{1}\). Hence, \(u_{2}\) is constant too, a contradiction. We conclude that \(\rho _{1}\ge \rho _{2}\). \(\square\)

In particular, with a common state space S and event algebra \(\Sigma\), if \(\succsim _{1}\) is more willing to bet than \(\succsim _{2}\) on all events, then this lemma implies that \(\rho _{1}\ge \rho _{2}\) on \(\Sigma\). Wang (2019) proves this “global” result in an Anscombe–Aumann setting.

Next, we present our main result. It provides a simple condition—the existence of two essential events, one per DM, for which the DMs share the same willingness to bet—under which biseparable preferences have cardinally equivalent utilities.

Theorem 6

For \(i=1,2\), let \(\succsim _{i}\) be a solvable biseparable preference with a canonical representation \(V_{i}\) and an essential event \(A_{i}\). The following conditions are equivalent:

  1. (i)

    \(\succsim _{1}\) is as willing to bet on event \(A_{1}\) as \(\succsim _{2}\) on event \(A_{2}\).

  2. (ii)

    \(\succsim _{1}\) and \(\succsim _{2}\) have cardinally equivalent utilities \(u_{1}\) and \(u_{2}\),Footnote 6 and \(\rho _{1}(A_{1})=\rho _{2}(A_{2})\).

Proof

We maintain the conventions introduced in the proof of Lemma 5, and we only prove that (i) implies (ii), the converse being trivial. First, observe that \(\succsim _{1}\) and \(\succsim _{2}\) coincide on X and that, by Lemma 5, we have \(\rho _{1}(A_{1})=\rho _{2}(A_{2})\). Since both \(u_{1}\) and \(u_{2}\) are continuous, there exists a strictly increasing and continuous (by Corollary 12) map \(\varphi :U_{1}\rightarrow U_{2}\) such that \(u_{2}=\varphi \circ u_{1}\) and \(u_{1}=\varphi ^{-1}\circ u_{2}\). For all \(a<b\) in \(U_{1}\), it thus holds (6) and so \(\varphi\) is concave. A similar argument proves that \(\varphi ^{-1}\) is concave. The strictly increasing map \(\varphi\) is thus affine. Therefore, \(u_{1}\) and \(u_{2}\) are cardinally equivalent. \(\square\)

Summing up, this theorem shows—using concavity arguments—that a simple behavioral condition characterizes the cardinal equivalence of the utility functions of two biseparable preferences. This significantly simplifies the condition used by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2002) that requires the two preferences to be ordinally equivalent (i.e., to agree on X) and cardinally symmetric, a trade-off assumption that permits to use techniques from additive conjoint measurement (cf. Wakker, 1989).

A remarkable consequence of the last result is the cardinal equivalence of canonical representations, so their uniqueness up to a common normalization, and the full-fledged uniqueness of the willingness to bet.

Corollary 7

For \(i=1,2\), let \(V_{i}\) be any two canonical representations of a solvable biseparable preference \(\succsim\) that admits an essential event. Then, \(V_{1}\) is cardinally equivalent to \(V_{2}\) and \(\rho _{1}=\rho _{2}\).

Thus, a solvable biseparable preference features a canonical trio \((V,u,\rho )\), in which the canonical representation V and the canonical utility u are cardinally unique, while the willingness to bet \(\rho\) is unique. This trio is the representation skeleton of the preference that, as argued in Ghirardato et al. (2005), is able to separate utility and beliefs.

Proof

By Theorem 6, \(u_{1}\) is cardinally equivalent to \(u_{2}\), that is, there exist \(m>0\) and \(q\in \mathbb {R}\) such that \(u_{2}\left( z\right) =mu_{1}\left( z\right) +q\) for all \(z\in X\). Let \(f\in \mathcal {F}\). By Proposition 3, there is \(x_{f}\in X\) with \(f\sim x_{f}\). Hence, \(V_{1}\left( f\right) =u_{1}\left( x_{f}\right)\) and \(V_{2}\left( f\right) =u_{2}\left( x_{f}\right)\), so that

$$\begin{aligned} V_{2}\left( f\right) =u_{2}\left( x_{f}\right) =mu_{1}\left( x_{f}\right) +q=mV_{1}\left( f\right) +q \end{aligned}$$

Thus, \(V_{2}=mV_{1}+q\). Let \(x\succ y\) in X. By (3), for each event A, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \rho _{2}(A)=\frac{V_{2}(xAy)-V_{2}(y)}{V_{2}(x)-V_{2}\left( y\right) }= \frac{mV_{1}(xAy)+q-mV_{1}(y)-q}{mV_{1}(x)+q-mV_{1}(y)-q}=\rho _{1}(A). \end{aligned}$$

Thus, \(\rho _{1}=\rho _{2}\). □