Abstract
In this paper, we study solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs. we define four kinds of solution concepts, namely the most coalitional (marginal) stable solution and the fairest coalitional (marginal) solution, by minimizing the total variance of excesses of coalitions (individual players). All these four concepts are optimal solutions of corresponding optimal problem under the least square criterion. It turns out that the fairest coalitional (marginal) solution belongs to the set of the most coalitional (marginal) stable solutions. Inspired by the definition of nucleolus, we propose various extended nucleolus based on lexicographic criterion. Furthermore, axiomatizations of the proposed solutions are exhibited through the linkage between the stochastic and deterministic models.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Aumann, R. J., & Maschler, M. (1985). Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. Journal of Economic Theory., 36(2), 195–213.
Charnes, A., & Granot, D. (1973). Prior solutions: Extensions of convex nucleolus solutions to chance-constrained games. Proceeding of the Computer Science and Statistics Seventh Stmposium at Iowa State University, 323-332.
Charnes, A., & Granot, D. (1976). Coalitional and chance-constrained solutions to N-person games I. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 31, 358–367.
Charnes, A., & Granot, D. (1977). Coalitional and chance-constrained solutions to N-person games II. Operations Research, 25, 1013–1019.
Curiel, I., Pederzoli, G., & Tijs, S. H. (1989). Squencing games. European Journal of Operational Research, 40, 344–351.
Davis, M., & Maschler, M. (1965). The Kernel of a cooperative game. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 12, 223–259.
Driessen, T. S. H. (1988). Cooperative Games. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Solutions and Applications. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Driessen, T. S. H., & Funaki, Y. (1991). Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions. OR Spectrum, 13(1), 15–30.
Dubey, P., Neyman, A., & Weber, J. (1981). Value theory without efficiency. Mathematics of Operations Research, 6(1), 122–128.
Fernandez, F. R., Puerto, J., & Zafra, M. J. (2002). Cores of stochastic cooperative games with stochastic orders. International Game Theory Review, 4(3), 265–280.
Gillies, D.B. (1953). Some theorems on \(n\) person games. Ph.D. Thesis. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Granot, D. (1977). Cooperative games in stochastic function form. Management Science, 23, 621–630.
Grotte, J. H. (1976). Dynamics of cooperative games. International Journal of Game Theory, 5, 27–64.
Helga, H. P., & Jean, J. H. (2013). Stochastic bankruptcy games. International Journal of Game Theory, 42, 973–988.
Hou, D., Sun, P., Xu, G., & Driessen, T. S. H. (2018). Compromise for the complaint: an optimization approach to the ENSC value and the CIS value. Journal of the Operational Research Society, 69(4), 571–579.
Maschler, M., Peleg, B., & Shapley, L. S. (1979). Geometric properties of the kernel, nucleolus and related solution concepts. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 4, 303–338.
Moulin, H. (1985). The separability axiom and equal-sharing methods. Journal of Economic Theory, 36(1), 120–148.
Nelson, A. U. (2015). Stochastic linear programming games with concave preferences. European Journal of Operational Research, 243, 637–646.
Nowak, A., & Radzik, T. (1994). A solidarity value for n-person TU games. International Journal of Game Theory, 23, 43–48.
O’Neill, B. (1982). A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud. Mathematical Social Sciences., 2(4), 345–371.
Owen, G. (1975). On the core of linear production games. Mathematical Programming, 9, 358–370.
Özen, U., Fransoo, J., Norde, H., & Slikker, M. (2008). Cooperation between multiple newavendors with warehouses. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 10(2), 311–324.
Ruiz, L. M., Valenciano, F., & Zarzuelo, J. M. (1996). The least square prenucleolus and the least square nuvleolus. International Journal of Game Theory, 25, 113–134.
Ruiz, L. M., Valenciano, F., & Zarzuelo, J. M. (1998). The family of least square values for transferable utility games. Games and Economic Behavior, 24, 109–130.
Ruiz, L. M., Valenciano, F., & Zarzuelo, J. M. (1998). Some new results on least square values for TU games. TOP, 6, 139–158.
Schmeidler, D. (1969). The nucleolus of a characteristic function game. SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 17, 517–520.
Shapley, L. S. (1953). A value for n-person Games. Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28, 307–317.
Sobolev, A.I. (1975). The characterization of optimimality princples in cooperative games by functional equations (in Russian). Vorobjev NN(Ed) Mathematical Methods in the Social Sciences 6, Academy of Sciences of the Lithuanian SSR, Vilnius 94,151.
Suijs J., & Borm P. (1996). Cooperative Games with Stochastic Payoffs: Deterministic Equivalents. (FEW Research Memorandum; Vol. 713). Tilburg: Operations research.
Suijs, J., Borm, P., Waegenaere, D. A., & Tijs, S. H. (1999). Cooperative games with stochastics payoffs. European Journal of Operational Research, 113, 193–205.
Suijs, J. (2000). Price uncertainty in linear production situations. Cooperative Decision-Making Under Risk 63-87, Kluwer.
Xu, N., Arthur, F., & Veinott, Jr. (2013). Sequential stochastic core of a cooperative stochastic programming game. Operations Research Letters, 41, 430–435.
Acknowledgements
We wish to thank Dr.Water Kern from University of Twente for improving the use of language. We also appreciate the suggestion and advice from the anonymous reviewers. This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) through grant No.72001172,71871180,72071158, the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(No.310201911qd052) and Natural Science Basic Research Plan in Shaanxi Province of China(No.2020JQ-225).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Communicated by Mihai Sirbu.
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Appendices
Proof of Theorem 3.1
Proof
By calculating the Hessian matrix, it can be checked that the objective function of Problem \(\widetilde{\text {1}}\) is convex, and so is the feasible set. Hence, there exists at most one optimal solution of Problem \(\widetilde{\text {1}}\). It remains to verify the Lagrange conditions. The Lagrange function of Problem \(\widetilde{\text {1}}\) is
Taking partial derivative of \(r_{i}\) in equation (37), then the Lagrangian conditions are
For any \(i,j\in N\), we then have
Denote \(\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}cov({\mathcal {V}}(S),{\mathcal {V}}(N))\) as \(a_{i}({\mathcal {V}})\). Furthermore,
Together with equation (40), the optimal solution of equations (39) is
In conclusion, the optimal solution of Problem 1 is given by
where \(d^{*}\) satisfies \(\sum \nolimits _{i\in N}d^{*}_{i}=\mathbf{E }[{\mathcal {V}}(N)]\). \(\square \)
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Proof
Denote the objective function of Problem 2 as \(P_{2}\), then we have
Next we will make concretely analysis of the three parts respectively.
According to Proposition 3.1, the average excess \({\bar{e}}({\mathcal {V}})\) ia actually irrelevant to the allocation x, that is, it contains no unknown quantities d and r. Therefore eliminating the item \(P_{22}\) from \(P_{2}\) does not make any difference to the optimal solution of Problem 2. As to the last item \(P_{23}\), we have
Further, the first item \(P^{1}_{23}\) can be rewrite as follows:
Observe that the last item of the last equation is equivalent to \(P^{2}_{23}\), thus we have
Note that the optimal solution of Problem 2 will not change by eliminating the constant items and corresponding positive coefficients in the objective function \(P_{2}\). Denote the simplified objective function as \(\widetilde{P_{2}}\), i.e.,
In conclusion, Problem 2 is equivalent to the following modified problem:
Problem \(\widetilde{\text {2}}\): Minimize \(\widetilde{P_{2}}\) s.t. \(x\in DR({\mathcal {V}})\). \(\square \)
Proof of Theorem 3.2
Proof
Similar to the proof of Theorem 3.1, one could verify that there exists at most one optimal solution of Problem \({\widetilde{2}}\). Imposing the Lagrangian multiplication factors \(\lambda ,\omega \), we obtain the Lagrangian function of this problem
Taking partial derivative of \(d_{i}\) in equation (43), the Lagrangian conditions are
Let \(e_{i}({\mathcal {V}})\) denote \(\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}\mathbf{E }[{\mathcal {V}}(S)]\). The Lagrangian conditions immediately give the following equations:
Together with the constraint condition \(d(N)=\mathbf{E }[{\mathcal {V}}(N)]\), we can obtain the solution \(d_{i}^{*}\) of equations (44).
Taking the partial derivative of \(r_{i}\) in equation (43), then the Lagrangian conditions of r are
which is equivalent to the following conditions: For all \(i,j\in N\), it holds that
Similar to the analysis of equation (39), the optimal solution of equations (46) is
\(\square \)
Proof of Theorem 4.1
Proof
Denote the objective function of Problem 3 as \(P_{3}\), then we have
Notice that the first two summations are constants for any given \((N,{\mathcal {V}})\in SG(N)\), hence the optimal solution of Problem 3 is equivalent to that of the following problem:
Problem \(\widetilde{\text {3}}\): Minimize \(\sum \nolimits _{i\in N}\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}r_{i}^{2}\mathbf{Var }[{\mathcal {V}}(N)]-2\sum \nolimits _{i\in N}\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}r_{i}[cov({\mathcal {V}}(S)-{\mathcal {V}}(S\backslash i),{\mathcal {V}}(N))]\) s.t. \(\sum \nolimits _{i\in N}r_{i}=1\).
We could verify that the objective function of Problem \({\tilde{3}}\) is convex and so is the feasible set, hence there exists at most one optimal point. Imposing the Lagrangian multiplication factors \(\lambda \), then the Lagrangian function of Problem \({\tilde{3}}\) is
Taking partial derivative of \(r_{i}\), the Lagrangian conditions are
Denote \(\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}cov({\mathcal {V}}(S)-{\mathcal {V}}(S\backslash i),{\mathcal {V}}(N))\) as \(b_{i}({\mathcal {V}})\), then the above equations imply the following relations among players:
The solution of equations (50) is \(r^{*}_{i}=\frac{1}{n}+\frac{nb_{i}({\mathcal {V}})-\sum \nolimits _{j\in N}b_{j}({\mathcal {V}})}{n2^{n-2}\mathbf{Var }[{\mathcal {V}}(N)]},\forall i\in N\), which complete the proof. \(\square \)
Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof
Denote the objective function of Problem 4 as \(P_{4}\), then we have
Based on Proposition 4.1, \({\overline{m}}({\mathcal {V}})\) merely depends on the given game \({\mathcal {V}}\). So elimination of \(P_{4}^{1}\) has no effect no the optimal solution of Problem 4. Now we focus on the item \(P_{4}^{2}\), which can be rewritten as:
The last two equations are derived from the fact that \(d(N)=\mathbf{E }[\{{\mathcal {V}}(N)]\) and \(r(N)=1\). Once the game is given, \(P_{4}^{2}\) is uniquely determined. therefore eliminating the constant items \(P_{4}^{1}\) and \(P_{4}^{2}\) from \(P_{4}\) exerts no influence on the optimal solution with respect to Problem 4, which completes the proof. \(\square \)
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Denote the objective function of Problem 5 as \(P_{5}\), then we have
where \(b_{i}({\mathcal {V}})=\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}cov({\mathcal {V}}(S)-{\mathcal {V}}(S\backslash i),{\mathcal {V}}(N))\) and \(c_{i}({\mathcal {V}})=\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}\mathbf{E }[{\mathcal {V}}(S)-{\mathcal {V}}(S\backslash i)]\). Due to the convexity of objective function \(P_{5}\) and the feasible set, there exists at most one optimal point. Imposing the Lagrangian multiplication factors \(\lambda ,\omega \), the Lagrangian function of Problem 5 is
Taking partial derivative of \(d_{i}\) and \(r_{i}\) in equation (51), the Lagrangian conditions are
Equations in (52) and (53) imply the following relations among players,
The optimal solution of equations (54) and (55) are
\(\square \)
Extension of the models
For any weight function m, let us consider the following problems, which are extensions of optimization models in Section 3 and 4.
Problem 6: Minimize \(\sum \nolimits _{S\subseteq N}m(s)\mathbf{Var }[e(S,x)]\) s.t. \(x\in DR({\mathcal {V}})\).
Problem 7: Minimize \(\sum \nolimits _{S\subseteq N}m(s)\mathbf{E }[(e(S,x)-{\bar{e}}({\mathcal {V}},x))^{2}]\) s.t. \(x\in DR({\mathcal {V}})\).
Problem 8: Minimize \(\sum \nolimits _{i\in N}\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}m(s)\mathbf{E }[(m_{i}(S,x)-\mathbf{E }[m_{i}(S,x)])^{2}]\) s.t. \(x\in DR({\mathcal {V}})\).
Problem 9: Minimize \(\sum \nolimits _{i\in N}\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}m(s)\mathbf{E }[(m_{i}(S,x)-{\overline{m}}({\mathcal {V}},x))^{2}]\) s.t. \(x\in DR({\mathcal {V}})\).
The method to obtain the optimal solutions of the above Problems is the same as that of Theorem 3.1, 3.2, 4.1 and 4.2. Here we omit the detailed and lengthy proofs of the following results.
Proposition G.1
For any \((N,{\mathcal {V}})\in SG(N)\) and weight function \(m:{\mathcal {P}}(N)\backslash \emptyset \rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\), the optimal solution of Problem 6 is
where \(a^{m}_{i}({\mathcal {V}})=\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}m(s)cov({\mathcal {V}}(S),{\mathcal {V}}(N))\), \(\alpha =\sum \nolimits _{s=1}^{n-1}C_{n-2}^{s-1}m(s)\) and \(d^{*}\) satisfies \(\sum \nolimits _{i\in N}d^{*}_{i}=\mathbf{E }[{\mathcal {V}}(N)]\).
Proposition G.2
For any \((N,{\mathcal {V}})\in SG(N)\) and weight function \(m:{\mathcal {P}}(N)\backslash \emptyset \rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\), there exists a unique optimal solution \(x^{*}\) of Problem 7, which is
where
\(a^{m}_{i}({\mathcal {V}})=\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}m(s)cov({\mathcal {V}}(S),{\mathcal {V}}(N))\), \(\alpha =\sum \nolimits _{s=1}^{n-1}C_{n-2}^{s-1}m(s)\) and \(e^{m}_{i}({\mathcal {V}})=\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}m(s)\mathbf{E }[{\mathcal {V}}(S)]\).
Proposition G.3
For any \((N,{\mathcal {V}})\in SG(N)\) and weight function \(m:{\mathcal {P}}(N)\backslash \emptyset \rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\), the optimal solution of Problem 8 is
where \(b^{m}_{i}({\mathcal {V}})=\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}m(s)cov({\mathcal {V}}(S)-{\mathcal {V}}(S\backslash i),{\mathcal {V}}(N))\), \(\alpha =\sum \nolimits _{s=1}^{n-1}C_{n-2}^{s-1}m(s)\) and \(d^{*}\) satisfies \(\sum \nolimits _{i\in N}d^{*}_{i}=\mathbf{E }[{\mathcal {V}}(N)]\).
Proposition G.4
For any \((N,{\mathcal {V}})\in SG(N)\) and weight function \(m:{\mathcal {P}}(N)\backslash \emptyset \rightarrow {\mathbb {R}}\), there exists a unique optimal solution \(x^{*}\) of Problem 9, which is
where
\(b^{m}_{i}({\mathcal {V}})=\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}m(s)cov({\mathcal {V}}(S)-{\mathcal {V}}(S\backslash i),{\mathcal {V}}(N))\), \(\alpha =\sum \nolimits _{s=1}^{n-1}C_{n-2}^{s-1}m(s)\) and \(c^{m}_{i}({\mathcal {V}})=\sum \nolimits _{S\ni i}m(s)\mathbf{E }[{\mathcal {V}}(S)-{\mathcal {V}}(S\backslash i)]\).
Once the weight function is taken into account, the optimal solutions are highly unified with the original solutions in form. Models in Section 3 and 4 can be seen as the special cases when all the coalitions have the same weight. In this way, we extend the most coalitional (marginal) stable and the fairest coalitional (marginal) solutions and obtain a family of solution concepts for stochastic cooperative games.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Sun, P., Hou, D. & Sun, H. Optimization implementation of solution concepts for cooperative games with stochastic payoffs. Theory Decis 93, 691–724 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-022-09865-0
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-022-09865-0