Abstract
Government intervention often gives rise to contests and the government can influence their outcome by choosing their type. We consider a contest with two interest groups: one that is governed by a central planner and one that is not. Rent dissipation is compared under two well-known contest success functions: the generalized logit and the all-pay auction. We also consider the case in which the government can limit the size of the non-governed interest group in order to determine the scope of rent dissipation, with the goal of either increasing the rent obtained by the government or reducing the wasted resources invested in the contest.
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Notes
A major focus of the contest literature has been the issue of how changing the parameters of the contest (number of the players, valuations and abilities of the contestants, and the nature of the information they possess) will alter the equilibrium efforts and the extent of relative prize dissipation (Hillman and Riley 1989; Hurley and Shogren 1998; Konrad 2002; Nitzan 1994; Nti 1997). In addition, attention is paid to the effect of the changes made in these parameters on the contestants’ expected payoffs (Gradstein 1995; Nti 1997). Moreover, a major effort has been made to clarify the different levels of rent under-dissipation in contests (Gradstein and Konrad 1999; Kahana and Nitzan 1999; Konrad 2004; Konrad and Schlesinger 1997; Nitzan 1994; Nti 1997).
See Munster (2009) for a generalization of the axiomatic approach to group CSFs.
Note that Hurley (1998) mentions that rent dissipation can be a misleading measure of the welfare implications of a contest when players have asymmetric valuations.
Esteban and Ray (2001) and Baik (2007) study contests with group-specific public goods prizes. Esteban and Ray (2001) consider a collective action with three features: it is undertaken in order to counter similar action by competing groups, marginal individual efforts are increasingly costly and collective prizes are seen to have mixed public–private characteristics. All individuals in a group are assumed to have the same benefit from the public good, while private goods benefit the group as a whole. Thus, increasing the size of the group decreases the benefit to each of its members. Esteban and Ray (2001) show that there exist conditions under which increasing the size of the group will increase the probability of winning, even though the benefit per member has decreased. Baik (2007), on the other hand, presents a model in which \(n \)groups compete to win a group-specific public goods prize, the individual players choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently and the probability of winning depends on the level of the groups’ efforts.
For \(\alpha =1\), Baik (2007) applies.
Based on the calculations presented in the Appendix and according to Part 2.a in Proposition 1, there may exist combinations of \(k\) and \(\alpha \) for which the condition \(N<\left[ {\frac{\alpha k-1+\sqrt{\alpha k\left( {\alpha k-2} \right) }}{k^{\alpha }}} \right] ^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha }}\) does not hold. However, according to Part 2.b in Proposition 1 there exists an interval of values of \(N\) that satisfies the condition. In order to prove this, we need to show that the RHS of the inequality in Part 2.b is greater than one\(. \)Since \(k\le \frac{\alpha }{2}\), it holds that \(\frac{\alpha -k+\sqrt{\alpha \left( {\alpha -2k} \right) }}{k^{1+\alpha }}\ge \frac{\alpha -0.5\alpha +\sqrt{\alpha \left( {\alpha -2k} \right) }}{\left( {0.5\alpha } \right) ^{1+\alpha }}\ge \frac{\alpha -0.5\alpha }{\left( {0.5\alpha } \right) ^{1+\alpha }}=\left( {\frac{2}{\alpha }} \right) ^{\alpha }>1\).
\(k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) is not necessarily a natural number in the discussion of Proposition 2, but we kept it as \(k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) in Proposition 2.1.a for simplicity. When \(k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) is not a natural number, denote \(B\) as the highest natural number that is lower than \(k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) (thus it holds that \(B<k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}<B+1)\). Then \(N^{*}=k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) should be rounded to \(B+1\) when \(B\left( {B+1} \right) <k^{\frac{2\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\). For proof see the Appendix.
Since in this case, which is described in the previous footnote, there exists an interval of values of \(N\) such that \(RD_\mathrm{A}^*<RD_\mathrm{L}^*\), it is clear that if we choose the \(N\) that maximizes rent dissipation under the generalized logit CSF, i.e.\(N^{*}=k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\), then for this size of the non-governed group \(RD_\mathrm{A}^*<RD_\mathrm{L}^*\).
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Acknowledgments
Financial support from the Adar Foundation of the Department of Economics of Bar-Ilan University is gratefully acknowledged. We are grateful to the referees for their constructive comments
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Appendix
Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
a. For \(k\ge 1\) .
Rewriting (1a), we obtain that (1a) holds if the following inequality holds:
Denote \(z=N^{1-\alpha }\). (1a) becomes
We now wish to find the \(N\) that satisfies (3a).
If \((1\le )k\le \frac{2}{\alpha }\), the determinant of (3a) is not positive, and thus \(z^{2}k^{2\alpha }-2zk^{\alpha }\left( {\alpha k-1} \right) +1>0\) always holds. However, if \(k>\frac{2}{\alpha }\) then (3a) holds for the following values:
We will show that for \(k>\frac{2}{\alpha }\) the first inequality is not possible; therefore, the second inequality remains. \(\alpha k-1-\sqrt{\alpha k\left( {\alpha k-2} \right) }<1\) holds for all values of \(k>\frac{2}{\alpha }\). Since \(k>\frac{2}{\alpha }>1\), then \(k^{\alpha }>1\). Thus, \(\left[ {\frac{\alpha k-1-\sqrt{\alpha k\left( {\alpha k-2} \right) }}{k^{\alpha }}} \right] ^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha }}<1<N\). We conclude that if \(k>\frac{2}{\alpha }\), then for \(N\) that satisfies \(N>\left[ {\frac{\alpha k-1+\sqrt{\alpha k\left( {\alpha k-2} \right) }}{k^{\alpha }}} \right] ^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha }}\) it holds that \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*<RD_\mathrm{A}^*\). If \(N=\left[ {\frac{\alpha k-1+\sqrt{\alpha k\left( {\alpha k-2} \right) }}{k^{\alpha }}} \right] ^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha }}\), then \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*=RD_\mathrm{A}^*\); otherwise \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*>RD_\mathrm{A}^*\).
We will now show that the condition \(N>\left[ {\frac{\alpha k-1+\sqrt{\alpha k\left( {\alpha k-2} \right) }}{k^{\alpha }}} \right] ^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha }}\) has substance. Denote \(f(k)=\left[ {\frac{\alpha k-1+\sqrt{\alpha k(\alpha k-2)}}{k^{\alpha }}} \right] ^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha }}\). We will show that for all \(0<\alpha <1\) and \(k>\frac{2}{\alpha }\), \(f(k)\) increases with \(k\) and that when \(k\rightarrow \frac{2}{\alpha }\) it holds that \(f<1\) (namely \(N>f\) for all \(N)\) and when \(k\rightarrow \infty \), then \(f\rightarrow \infty \) (thus, there exist values for which \(N>f)\). First, \(\frac{\partial f}{\partial k}=\frac{1}{\left( {1-\alpha } \right) k^{2\alpha }}\left\langle {\begin{array}{l} \left\{ {\alpha +0.5\left[ {\alpha k(\alpha k-2)} \right] ^{-0.5}\left( {2\alpha ^{2}k-2\alpha } \right) } \right\} k^{\alpha } \\ -\alpha k^{\alpha -1}\left\{ {\alpha k-1+\left[ {\alpha k(\alpha k-2)} \right] ^{0.5}} \right\} \\ \end{array}} \right\rangle ^{\frac{\alpha }{1-\alpha }}\) which is identical to \(\frac{\partial f}{\partial k}=\frac{\alpha }{\left( {1-\alpha } \right) k^{\alpha }}\left[ {1-\alpha +\frac{1}{k}+\frac{\left( {\alpha k-1} \right) \left( {1-\alpha } \right) +\alpha }{\left[ {\alpha k(\alpha k-2)} \right] ^{0.5}}} \right] ^{\frac{\alpha }{1-\alpha }}>0\). Since when \(k=\frac{2}{\alpha }(>2)\) we obtain \(f=\left[ {\frac{1}{k^{\alpha }}} \right] ^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha }}=k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}=k^{\frac{2}{2-k}}<1\) and \(f=\left[ {\frac{\alpha -\frac{1}{k}+\sqrt{\alpha \left( {\alpha -\frac{2}{k}} \right) }}{k^{\alpha -1}}} \right] ^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha }}\)therefore when \(k\rightarrow \infty \) we obtain \(f\rightarrow \left( {2\alpha } \right) ^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha }}k\rightarrow \infty \).
b. For \(k<1\). (1a) becomes:
This inequality is identical to \(N^{2-2\alpha }k^{1+\alpha }+2N^{1-\alpha }\left( {k-\alpha } \right) +k^{1-\alpha }>0\) and its determinant is \(4\alpha k^{2\alpha }\left( {\alpha -2k} \right) \). If the determinant is negative, which means that \(\frac{\alpha }{2}<k(<1)\), then \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*<RD_\mathrm{A}^*\). If the determinant is positive, which means that \(k<\frac{\alpha }{2}\), then \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*<RD_\mathrm{A}^*\) if:
or
or
From \(a\) and \(b\) we obtain Proposition 1. \(\square \)
Proof of Proposition 2
The first-order condition for maximization is:
Solving the first-order condition yields \(N=k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) and it can be verified that the second-order conditions for maximization hold.
Part 1.a: For \(k<1\), it holds that \(N=k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}>1\), while for \(N<k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\), \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) increases with \(N\) and for \(N>k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\), \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) decreases with \(N\). Therefore, when \(N_\mathrm{P} \ge k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) the maximal level of \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) is attained by limiting the size of the non-governed interest group to \(N^{*}=k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) and for \(N_\mathrm{P} <k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) the maximal level of \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) is attained at \(N^{*}=N_\mathrm{P}\).
Part 1.b: For \(k\ge 1\), it holds that \(N=k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\le 1\). Thus, for all \(N>1\), \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) decreases with \(N\) and the maximal level of \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) is attained at \(N^{*}=1\).
Part 2: For \(k<1\), given the proof of 1.a, it holds that \(N=k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}>1\). For \(N<k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\), \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) increases in \(N\) and for \(N>k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\), \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) decreases in \(N\). Thus, the minimal \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) is attained at a corner solution of either \(N^{*}=1\) or \(N^{*}=N_\mathrm{P}\). We now show the conditions for obtaining each of these two solutions. The legislators/regulators will be indifferent between \(N=N_\mathrm{P} \) and \(N=1\) when:
namely, if \(\frac{N_\mathrm{P}^{1-\alpha } }{\left( {N_\mathrm{P}^{1-\alpha } k^{\alpha }+1} \right) ^{2}}=\frac{1}{\left( {k^{\alpha }+1} \right) ^{2}}\) which is identical to \(N_\mathrm{P}^{2-2\alpha } k^{2\alpha }-N_\mathrm{P}^{1-\alpha } \left( {k^{2\alpha }+1} \right) +1=0\). Denote \(w=N_\mathrm{P}^{1-\alpha } \) and the equation becomes \(w^{2}k^{2\alpha }-w\left( {k^{2\alpha }+1} \right) +1=0\). Solving this equality, we obtain that \(N_\mathrm{P} =\,k^{\frac{2\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) or \(N_\mathrm{P} =\,1\). At the value of \(N=k^{\frac{2\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\), \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) decreases with \(N. \)Therefore:
-
a.
If \(N_\mathrm{P} >k^{\frac{2\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\), we obtain \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*(N_\mathrm{P} )<RD_\mathrm{L}^*(N=1)\) and the value that minimizes \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) is \(N^{*}=N_\mathrm{P} \) such that \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*=\frac{\alpha N_\mathrm{P}^{1-\alpha } k^{\alpha }\left( {n+m} \right) }{\left( {N_\mathrm{P}^{1-\alpha } k^{\alpha }+1} \right) ^{2}}\).
-
b.
If \((1<)N_\mathrm{P} <k^{\frac{2\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\), we obtain \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*(N_\mathrm{P} )>RD_\mathrm{L}^*(N=1)\) and the value that minimizes \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) is \(N^{*}=1\) such that \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*=\frac{\alpha k^{\alpha }\left( {n+m} \right) }{\left( {k^{\alpha }+1} \right) ^{2}}\).
For \(k\ge 1\), from the proof of 1.b, the maximal level of \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) is obtained when \(N=1\). This value, \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\), decreases as \(N\) increases. Thus, the minimal \(RD_\mathrm{L}^*\) is attained at \(N^{*}=N_\mathrm{P} \). \(\square \)
Proof of footnote 7
Assume that \(k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) is not a natural number. Denote \(B\) as the highest natural number that is lower than \(k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\), thus it holds that \(B<k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}<B+1\). It follows that we have to round upward \(N^{*}=k^{\frac{\alpha }{\alpha -1}}\) to \(B+1\), if it holds that
or
Taking the square root of both sides we obtain
Rewiring this inequality we get
Since \(\left( {B+1} \right) ^{0.5(1-\alpha )}-B^{0.5(1-\alpha )}>0\), we obtain that the last inequality is identical to
or
\(\square \)
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Epstein, G.S., Mealem, Y. Politicians, governed versus non-governed interest groups and rent dissipation. Theory Decis 79, 133–149 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9454-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-014-9454-z