Theory and Decision

, Volume 78, Issue 3, pp 451–456 | Cite as

Prospectism and the weak money pump argument

  • Martin PetersonEmail author


Hare (Analysis 70:237–247, 2010) proposes a view he calls prospectism for making choices in situations in which preferences have a common, but problematic structure. I show that prospectism permits the decision-maker to make a series of choices she knows in advance will lead to a sure loss. I also argue that a theory that permits the decision-maker to make choices she knows in advance will lead to a sure loss should be rejected.


Money-pump Pragmatic argument Prospectism Small-improvement argument Hare 


  1. Broome, J. (2000). Incommensurable values. In R. Crisp & B. Hooker (Eds.), Well-being and morality: Essays for James Griffin (pp. 21–38). Oxford University Press, Oxford. Reprinted in Ethics out of economics (pp. 145–61). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.Google Scholar
  2. Gustafsson, J. E., & Espinoza, N. (2010). Conflicting reasons in the small-improvement argument. Philosophical Quarterly, 60(241), 754–763.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Hare, C. (2010). Take the sugar. Analysis, 70, 237–247.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Peterson, M. (2007). Parity, clumpiness, and rational choice. Utilitas, 19(4), 505–513.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. Peterson, M. (2009). An introduction to decision theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Eindhoven University of TechnologyEindhovenThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations