Abstract
For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50:1431–1451, 1982) the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size.
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Valsecchi, I. Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games. Theory Decis 74, 31–53 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9326-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9326-3