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Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?

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Abstract

Consider an election in which each of the n voters casts a vote consisting of a strict preference ranking of the three candidates A, B, and C. In the limit as n→∞, which scoring rule maximizes, under the assumption of Impartial Anonymous Culture (uniform probability distribution over profiles), the probability that the Condorcet candidate wins the election, given that a Condorcet candidate exists? We produce an analytic solution, which is not the Borda Count. Our result agrees with recent numerical results from two independent studies, and contradicts a published result of Van Newenhizen (Economic Theory 2, 69–83. (1992)).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Union College, Schenectady, NY, 12308, U.S.A

    Davide P. Cervone & William S. Zwicker

  2. Department of Business Administration, University of Delaware, Newark, DE, 19716, U.S.A

    William V. Gehrlein

Authors
  1. Davide P. Cervone
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  2. William V. Gehrlein
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  3. William S. Zwicker
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Correspondence to Davide P. Cervone.

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Cervone, D.P., Gehrlein, W.V. & Zwicker, W.S. Which Scoring Rule Maximizes Condorcet Efficiency Under Iac?. Theor Decis 58, 145–185 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-6594-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-005-6594-1

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