Reflexive awareness and reflexivity: an identity model of reflexive awareness with Korta and Perry’s reflexive-referential theory of content (RRT)

Abstract

In recent years, much debate has centered on the same-order representational theory of consciousness. According to this theory, (1) conscious mental episodes are episodes of which we are aware; and (2) the awareness of an external object and the immediate, reflexive awareness of the mental episode together constitute a single episode. In this paper, I propose that the reflexive-referential theory of content developed by Korta and Perry can be used to establish the claim that reflexive awareness is numerically identical to the mental episode it represents. The advantage of this model is threefold. First, it avoids misrepresentation and vicious infinite regress. Second, it illustrates the intimate connection between a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it. Third, it explains why consciousness is an intrinsic property.

1 Theories of consciousness

Imagine that one sunny day, you are walking your dog, Lily, in a large, ornate garden. You happen to see a beautiful mushroom with a tiny red cap. You have a clear image of the red mushroom: you are aware of it. Are you also aware of having a perception of the red mushroom?

This question is not easy to answer, as it concerns the basic structure of consciousness. Moreover, the question relates to the heated debate that has arisen in recent years over whether conscious mental episodes are mental episodes of which we are aware.¹ Recently, the same-order account of consciousness has re-emerged. According to this account, a mental episode and the awareness of that episode are of the same order. Same-order theory maintains that typical conscious mental episode consists of immediate awareness, an episode of awareness that is an awareness of itself, I will call ‘reflexive,’ and that the awareness of an external object and reflexive awareness together constitute a single mental episode.

The theory has the following characteristics:

• [AT1] For any conscious mental episode, there exists an awareness of that episode.

• [AT2] The awareness of a mental episode accounts for the fact that the mental episode is conscious.

• [AT3] The awareness itself is a conscious episode.²

• [AT4] The awareness is an awareness of the episode.³

• [AT5] A mental episode of x is of the same order as the awareness of the episode of x.

A general understanding of [AT5] is that a mental episode is conscious by virtue of its representing itself rather than being represented by a distinct mental episode. This is also the essence of same-order representational theory, namely that awareness is reflexive and is thus directed towards itself.

1.1 Advantages of the same-order approach

Same-order theorists claim that their approach is theoretically advantageous in the sense that it avoids vicious infinite regress and targetless misrepresentation, demonstrates that consciousness is an intrinsic property, and successfully indicates the intimacy between a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it. For instance, Levine (2001) and Hellie (2007) raise the objection to the higher-order approach, accusing it of not accurately reflecting the intimate relationship between a mental episode and the awareness of it. For defenders of the same-order approach, there is no gap between a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it because they are the same episode. Apart from this, scholars also believe that same-order theory implies that consciousness is an intrinsic property in that it is conscious by itself.⁴

1.2 Problems with the same-order approach

The idea that a mental episode represents itself seems to overcome many obstacles faced by the higher-order approach. Nevertheless, this very idea faces its own challenge: the metaphysical structure of reflexive awareness does not sound feasible. Consider a mental episode of the sound of a bagpipe. If M₁ is the awareness of the sound of the bagpipe and M₂ is the awareness of the awareness of the sound, then stating that M₁ = M₂ is somewhat misleading. Maybe one should say that M₁ and M₂ are not mental episodes but mental components, and that M₁$\ne$M₂ because they are different components of a single episode. The mental state of seeing something red has two types of content, namely < that is red> and < I am aware of seeing something red>. Given that the two types of content are different, the two parts are distinct. Therefore, reflexive awareness should only be part of a mental state. Let me call this the ‘part-whole model.’ It is obviously different from the claim that a mental episode is numerically identical to the reflexive awareness of it, which I call ‘the identity model.’

Upon closer inspection, it becomes apparent that some same-order theorists are indecisive or unclear on whether to adopt a part-whole or identity model. For instance, Smith (1986) initially describes a conscious mental episode as existing ‘as-if-of itself,’ but later acknowledges that awareness is a part of episode, stating that ‘by virtue of the content “this very experience,” this awareness aims at the experience in which it actually occurs as a part’ (p. 153). Similarly, Montague (2016) struggles to position reflexive awareness, at one point claiming that it partly constitutes a mental state, and elsewhere positing that the two states are identical: ‘By being about the experience itself, the awareness of awareness partly constitutes what the experience is’ (p. 59, italics added). Although Montague does not define partial constitution, her mode of expression suggests that if A partially constitutes B, A is not numerically identical to B. However, Montague also suggests that ‘This distinctness condition does not apply to awareness of awareness’ (p. 59, my italics), which implies that the two states are numerically identical.

In my opinion, some proponents of same-order representational theory are unsure whether to adopt a part-whole or identity model. Although their original intent was to use the identity model, they face difficulties in explaining how reflexive awareness, which represents a mental episode, can be numerically identical to the mental component that represents an external object, or to the entire conscious mental episode that includes both components. Since reflexive awareness represents an inner quality and the awareness of an external object represents something outside the subject, it appears that the two modes of awareness can never be the same thing.⁵

I attempt to solve problems faced by same-order theorists in this paper. I argue that the identity model, according to which a mental episode is numerically identical to the reflexive awareness of it, is a viable option. As stated by the same-order theorists, the identity model is effective in resolving problems with the higher-order approach, such as avoiding misrepresentation and an infinite regress, by asserting that a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it are numerically identical. It also explains the intimacy between a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it and demonstrates how consciousness is an intrinsic property. It is not my intention to argue that the identity model is the only feasible option for a theory of consciousness, nor do I want to suggest that the identity model is necessarily superior to a part-whole model. Rather, my aim is to demonstrate that the identity model is still a robust and cogent choice.

The motivation of this paper is as follows: Firstly, some proponents of same-order theory are undecided between the part-whole model and the identity model. Secondly, the challenge lies in explaining the numerical identity between reflexive awareness, which represents a mental episode, and the mental component that represents an external object. Thirdly, I aim to resolve this issue by demonstrating that the identity model remains a viable option when we adopt Korta and Perry’s Reflexive-Referential Theory of Content, RRT for short. To support this claim, I argue that this theory validates the notion that perceiving an external object and being reflexively aware of that very perception have the same veridicality conditions. Consequently, a mental episode can be considered numerically identical to the reflexive awareness of it. To achieve this, I first introduce the RRT theory. I then apply the theory to establish the veridicality conditions of a mental episode and its corresponding reflexive awareness. I demonstrate that these two have the same veridicality conditions, and they happen at the same time to the same subject, indicating that they are the same episode. Furthermore, I generalize this conclusion to include hallucinations, illusions, and other conscious states. Finally, in the last section, I address potential objections.

2 Pluri-propositionalism

Before applying this theory to understanding mental contents, I will provide a brief background of what motivates the RRT theory.

Philosophers investigating the content of statements containing proper names can be divided into two categories: descriptivists and referentialists. For descriptivists, a sentence containing a proper name expresses a general proposition, with the speaker associating specific identifying conditions that only one thing can satisfy. In contrast, referentialists posit that names function as tags for objects. Consequently, statements express propositions about the objects to which the names refer. If both you and I say, ‘Socrates is wise,’ even if we hold different beliefs about Socrates, we are still expressing the same proposition, which holds true in the same possible worlds. Kaplan (1989), a prominent representative of referentialists, would contend that the aforementioned sentence expresses a singular proposition, with Socrates being a constituent of that proposition.

Nevertheless, referentialists face criticism for their perceived failure to provide a satisfactory theory explaining how names and pronouns convey information. Two notable criticisms are referred to as ‘the problem of co-reference’ and ‘the problem of no-reference.’ The problem of co-reference arises in situations where an individual is associated with multiple names.⁶ When a speaker utters a sentence, their background beliefs and cognitive states may motivate them to make a particular statement with one specific name, but not other names which would express the same proposition. Likewise, the hearer’s background beliefs can lead to understanding one sentence but not the other. For example, consider the sentences ‘Bill Clinton loves hamburgers’ and ‘Bill Blythe loves hamburgers.’ If Bill Clinton and Bill Blythe are the same person, these statements express the same proposition. But the person who asserts the first might not be willing to assert the second, if they don’t realize that ‘Bill Blythe’ also stands for Clinton. Similarly, the two sentences convey different information: for many U.S. citizens, the first sentence provides information about their former president, whereas the second does not.

The problem of no-reference arises in cases where certain names fail to refer to anything. For instance, Santa Claus does not exist. However, referentialists would be compelled to concede that the sentences ‘Santa Claus wears a red suit’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes wears a red suit’ both express no proposition, as neither individual exists and thus cannot constitute any proposition. This counterintuitive consequence is questioned by many scholars.

According to Perry (2012, pp. 5–9), these issues arise from the mistaken presupposition, held by Kaplan (1989) and others, that the proposition expressed exhausts the cognitive significance of the utterance. Perry argues that relying solely on referential content is insufficient to account for the cognitive significance of utterances. Reflexive content is required to fully explain this significance. In response to these challenges, Perry and Korta (2011) propose the RRT theory.

Let us consider the utterance u: ‘I am a computer scientist’ spoken by David Israel. A truth-condition of this utterance is that the speaker of the utterance is a computer scientist. But that is not the proposition expressed. It is rather what Perry calls a ‘reflexive content’ of the utterance, since it is about the utterance itself. We can distinguish between the reflexive and referential contents of this utterance: the referential content is that David Israel is a computer scientist. Listeners who hear this utterance may not be aware of the speaker’s identity, as they may not know that the person in front of them is David Israel, and so will not realize that the truth of the utterance requires that the person in front of them is a computer scientist. But, if they understand English, they will grasp the reflexive content; they will realize that the truth of the utterance requires that the person of whom ‘David Israel’ is a name is a computer scientist.⁷

Korta and Perry posit that the introduction of reflexive content offers a solution to the problems of co-reference and no-reference. In addition to reflexive content and referential content, there are further levels corresponding to information in addition to the language is taken for granted. For example, suppose you are seated at a table with three others. You know that one of three others is David Israel, for he is the host, but you don’t know which one. Someone says, ‘David Israel is a computer scientist.’ Given that David Israel is at the table, and that you are not David Israel, this remark can only be true if one of the others at the table is a computer scientist. This is not just the reflexive content, but it is not quite the referential content either. Korta and Perry call it an ‘incremental content.’ According to their perspective, all statements, regardless of the presence of indexicals, possess multiple reflexive and incremental contents that can be comprehended by a semantically competent listener. The challenge of co-reference is effectively addressed, as reflexive content allows for various ways of referring to the same entity.

To tackle the problem of no-reference, Perry goes a step further and proposes the concept of network content. The underlying notion is that our utilization of names and discussions concerning objects with which we have no direct interaction relies on our involvement in causal, historical, and informational chains of a particular nature. For example, the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ exists within a network that started with Conan Doyle’s novels in the 19^th century. Some readers know he is fictional, others do not. They can engage in conversation centered around this shared concept.

The RRT theory is primarily employed in the context of utterances, where information is communicated to an audience. Facts pertaining to utterances involve the identity of the speaker and the content of what is being said. The theory considers different levels of information, including what additional elements are necessary for the truth of the episode, given the known facts about the utterance, which corresponds to the knowledge possessed by the hearer.

On the other hand, facts concerning mental episodes revolve around the individual experiencing the episode and the content of that experience. The content of mental episodes is characterized by their truth conditions, often referred to as ‘veridicality conditions.’ While utterances transmit information from one person to another, mental episodes establish connections between different levels of knowledge within a single individual.

The content of an utterance is due to the meanings of the words used and further facts about the utterance. The content of a mental episode like your perception of the mushroom in the garden is due to the type of experience: the sort normally caused by seeing a mushroom, and the fact that this particular episode is caused by a particular mushroom. Although philosophy of language and philosophy of mind are distinct disciplines, the determination of content of utterance may not be entirely dissimilar from that of mental content, as they share certain similarities.

In my view, the RRT theory is not limited to its application solely to utterances; it can also be extended and applied to mental episodes. As evidenced by Perry’s (2001) insightful discussion on the nature, characteristics, and function of mental states, including the concept of reflexive mental content, it is clear that the theory can be fruitfully employed in understanding mental episodes. In the following sections, I will elucidate how the RRT theory can be extended to mental episodes and how this extension can aid in explaining how a mental episode can be identical to the reflexive awareness of itself.

Let us commence by establishing some foundational background information regarding mental content. Within the framework of the traditional representational theory of content, the identity model encounters certain challenges due to disparities between the content of a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of said episode. Traditional theories typically conceive mental episodes as being characterized by propositions about what one is perceiving or otherwise being aware of. However, a paradigm shift occurs when we consider the content of mental states not as individual propositions but as an interconnected network of related propositions.

The RRT theory challenges the notion that the content of an utterance can be encapsulated by a single proposition.⁸ Instead, it advocates for a reflexive-referential theory of content, which entails a more comprehensive understanding of content. This perspective has led to the RRT theory being referred to as ‘pluri-propositionalism.’⁹ By extending the RRT theory to mental episodes, we can similarly reject the idea that the content of a mental state can be captured by a single proposition. To demonstrate the feasibility of this extension, let us return to the example of seeing a red mushroom. Suppose that I am fond of mushrooms and have plenty of knowledge about the innocent-looking but extremely poisonous red lawn mushroom Conocybe filaris (C.filaris). I have an idea of C. filaris in my mind, along with lots of information about this kind of mushroom. However, I have never actually seen a C. filaris. One day, I am walking my dog in a garden. We see a beautiful red mushroom, which I inspect with interest. I do not at first consider the possibility that it is a C. filaris mushroom. However, I then notice a black caterpillar, Papilio polyxenes, on the stem of the mushroom. As I know that C. filaris is the only mushroom that attracts Papilio polyxenes, I immediately realize that the mushroom is indeed C. filaris. I term my initial perception of the red mushroom, before I recognize that it is C. filaris, ‘perception (1),’ and I term my subsequent perception of the red mushroom, after recognizing that it is C. filaris, ‘perception (2).’

Traditional referentialists, such as Kripke (1980) and Kaplan (1989), take the content of sentences to be propositions (or sets of worlds) about individuals that are referred to by indexicals and demonstratives. For them, this model can be extended to perceptions or beliefs: the content of which can be regarded as propositions as such. Perry (2001) calls this kind of content ‘subject matter (or referential) content’ or the ‘subject matter (or referential) truth condition’ (p. 20). If we follow the traditional referentialists and consider the content of mental states to be singular propositions about things we refer to, the content of my perceptions of the red mushroom (1) before and (2) after knowing that it is C. filaris are as follows:

• Content (Perception 1): < That red mushroom is in front of Lily.>.

• Content (Perception 2): < That C.filaris is in front of Lily.>.

As mentioned, for referentialists, the subject matter condition consists solely in the relevant proposition. Thus, the content of my perception before and after recognizing the mushroom as C. filaris is the same. But this seems wrong. Perception (1) does not cause me to pull Lily away from the red mushroom, but perception (2), combined with my belief that C.filaris mushrooms are poisonous which I already had at the time of the first perception, does.

As I want to keep my dog away from poisonous things and there is a poisonous mushroom in front of me, as a rational person, I should pull my dog away from the mushroom. If we only deal with the referential contents, given that the above propositions are the information I use and my recognition of the mushroom as C. filaris does not change any of these propositions, it is difficult to understand why I do not immediately pull my dog away from the mushroom upon perceiving it. It is also difficult to explain how my recognition of the mushroom as C. filaris triggers my action of pulling my dog away, whereas my perception of the mushroom without such recognition does not, if the content of the two perceptions is the same. To solve this problem, the RRT theory can be further applied to content of mental states as well, such that a mental state can involve multiple propositions corresponding to different levels of information. I briefly introduce these levels in the following sub-section.

2.1 Reflexive content

For Perry, a mental state is an internal state with certain causal roles. Episodes of mental states are individuated by various contents, causal roles, and veridicality conditions. The same type of mental state can occur in the same person at different times, or in different people at the same or different times. Perry calls the occurrence of a mental state in a person at a certain time ‘an episode.’ Each mental state possesses its own truth conditions, often referred to as ‘veridicality conditions.’ As mentioned by Burge (2014, p. 389), being veridical means being accurate regarding a particular subject matter. When the veridicality conditions of a mental state are satisfied, its content is considered to be veridical. Conversely, if these conditions are not met, its content is regarded as non-veridical.

On the other hand, truth conditions are commonly understood as properties of propositions.¹⁰ As it remains a topic of debate whether the content of mental states is entirely propositional, scholars frequently employ the term ‘veridicality conditions’ instead of ‘truth conditions’ to describe the accuracy of mental contents.¹¹ Following this line of reasoning, I adopt the term ‘veridicality conditions’ to characterize the overall contents of a mental state, while utilizing ‘truth conditions’ specifically for its reflexive contents, which are propositional in nature. Furthermore, I also employ ‘veridicality conditions’ to describe the subject matter content of a state, aligning with Burge’s notion that being veridical entails being correct about a specific subject matter.

The general veridicality conditions for a mental state determine the veridicality conditions for an episode, given facts about the episode such as its agent, the time, and the relevant circumstances. The conditions are reflexive because they contain the mental state as a constituent. Perry (2001) writes: ‘To get at that aspect, we need to bring in, in addition to the subject matter content, what I call the ‘reflexive contents’ of the thoughts or statements. These contents are not merely conditions on the subject matter but conditions on the utterances or thoughts themselves.’ (p. 21) The reflexive content of a mental state is the truth conditions that our analysis of content gives us when we do not take the contextual facts as given. To apply the RRT theory to analyze the content of mental states, let us first take perceptions (1) and (2) to be mental states. The truth conditions of perception (1), seeing a red mushroom before recognizing that it is C. filaris are:

(1-V) That there is a subject s, a perception p, a red mushroom m, and a time t, such that

• (i) s is the subject of (1),

• (ii) t is the time that (1) occurs,

• (iii) m causes s to have p in the right way at t, and¹²

• (iv) p causes s to believe that m is a red mushroom in front of Lily.

The truth conditions of perception (2), after my recognizing the mushroom as C. filaris are as follows:

(2-V) That there is a subject s, a perception p, a C. filaris c, and a time t, such that

• (i) s is the subject of (2),

• (ii) t is the time that (2) occurs,

• (iii) c causes s to have p in the right way at t, and

• (iv) p causes s to believe that c is a C. filaris mushroom in front of Lily.

Thus, the truth conditions of perceptions (1) and (2) are different. To explain this, I need to introduce some more distinctions. For Perry, there are also perceptual buffers or notions that temporarily store information we obtain from our perceptions until we identify the perceived object and form a permanently detached notion about it. Detached notions are mental files that store information about a certain type of thing for a relatively long period. Information on a perception buffer is associated with our current knowledge when a certain notion matches our perception of it.

Reflexive content coincides with the capacity of a belief to motivate actions. Thus, the reflexive content affects the perceptual buffers and leads to action. Accordingly, Perry would argue that I do not pull my dog away from the mushroom because these beliefs and desires do not involve the same notions. In this case, two distinct and disconnected beliefs are involved– my long-standing knowledge of C. filaris and the perceptual buffer of m as a red mushroom.

We can think of the structure of our thought as a three-story building. There are ‘detached’ files stored at the top level of the building, that is, beliefs involving notions not currently connected with perceptions. In the mushroom case, these are my beliefs about C. filaris. Before seeing the mushroom and the caterpillar, I already have a notion of the C. filaris kind of mushroom and various beliefs about it. However, this notion of C. filaris is not connected to my perception. Thus, initially, I do not have the belief that a C. filaris is in front of me, that this C. filaris mushroom is 10 cm tall, etc. I only have the belief that there is a red mushroom in front of me; that it has a caterpillar on its stem, etc. These perceptions and perceptual buffers are at the bottom level of the three-level structure of thought, with the information I obtain from my perception of the mushroom being temporarily stored in my perceptual buffers. However, there is also a middle level of informational wiring, such that the information from the perceptual buffers can be wired into top-level notions. For instance, when I suddenly recognized that the mushroom is C. filaris, my notion of C. filaris becomes attached to my perception of the red mushroom and wiring thus occurs.

I have three mental episodes before I realise that the mushroom is C. filaris. First, I believe that C. filaris mushrooms are poisonous, with my detached notion of C. filaris being associated with my idea of being poisonous. The second mental episode is my desire for my dog Lily to stay away from poisonous things. The third episode is my perception that the mushroom in front of me is red. I also have information in my perceptual buffers about C. filaris being associated with the idea of being red. When I recognize that the red mushroom is C. filaris, wiring occurs and the information is sent in both directions, from top to bottom and from bottom to top. After I see the caterpillar, my perceptual buffers are enriched by the idea that the mushroom is C. filaris. As Perry (2001) puts it, ‘perceptual plug finds notional socket.’ (p. 121) Upon realizing that the mushroom is C. filaris, I immediately stop my dog from approaching it.

For Perry, the causal role of a mental state is not reflected in its subject matter content but in its reflexive content. Thus, two mental episodes with the same subject matter content can have different causal roles by virtue of having different reflexive content. For example, the thoughts ‘I need to comb my hair’ due to looking in a mirror, and ‘She needs to comb her hair,” due to seeing a vague image on a Zoom call that happens to be of me, can induce different reactions if I don’t recognize myself in the second case. Perry (2001) believes that conscious mental episodes both cause events and are caused by events that occur both inside and outside us. In the example of my perceiving a red mushroom, perceptions (1) and (2) are distinct episodes by virtue of having different reflexive content and thus different causal roles. Briefly, if perception (2) is veridical and I believe that the mushroom I perceive is C. filaris, I will pull my dog away from the mushroom. However, I need not believe that the mushroom is C. filaris even if perception (1) is veridical. As the information wiring has not occurred at this stage, I do not take any action. Perry’s theory can thus explain the difference between the veridicality conditions of (1) and (2) and the difference between my actions when I do and do not recognize the mushroom as a C. filaris.

3 Reflexive awareness revisited

Now let us return to the problem of reflexive awareness. Are the episodes of perceiving something red and of the reflexive awareness of it the same episode?

I argue that they are the same. I now show my reasons for this claim by first examining the reflexive truth conditions of a mental state of perceiving something red and of the reflexive awareness of it. Again, let r be the type of perception of something as red. Let reflexive awareness Ar be the type of mental state of being aware of the mental state of type r.

3.1 The reflexive content of a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it

I first deal with the perception of a red mushroom. Consider two mental states, r and Ar. The reflexive truth conditions of mental state r are as follows:

(r-V) There is a subject s, a perception p, a red object o, and a time t, such that

• (i) s is the subject of r,

• (ii) t is the time that r occurs,

• (iii) o causes s to have p in the right way at t, and

• (iv) s is aware that o is red.

In this case, the reflexive truth conditions of reflexive awareness Ar are as follows:

(Ar-V) There is a subject s, a perception r, an awareness Ar and a time t, such that

• (i) Ar is an awareness of r,

• (ii) s is the subject of Ar,

• (iii) t is the time that Ar occurs, and

• (iv) r is veridical.

The reflexive truth conditions of (r-V) and (Ar-V) are, prima facie, different. Nevertheless, if we consider reflexive awareness of a mental episode as necessary for it to be conscious, we need to add an extra condition (v) to the truth conditions for the mental state, such that its revised truth conditions are as follows:

(r-V) There is a subject s, a perception p, a red object o, and a time t, such that

• (i) s is the subject of r,

• (ii) t is the time that r occurs,

• (iii) o causes s to have p in the right way at t,

• (iv) s believes that o is red, and

• (v) s is aware of r.

Embedded within the truth conditions is the premise that any conscious mental episode is always accompanied by reflexive awareness. In this case, reflexive awareness is regarded not as a separate mental component or mental state but as one of the criteria for the veridicality of the corresponding perception. Similarly, the same-order theorists require that a mental episode necessarily coexists with the reflexive awareness of it. It follows that if there is a reflexive awareness, there must be a corresponding mental episode of it. If we do the same for the veridicality conditions of reflexive awareness, then the veridicality conditions of a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it are always fulfilled at the same time by the same subject. That is, the veridicality conditions of the two are equivalent. More formally, it is such that necessarily, if (Ar-V) is fulfilled, so is (r-V), and vice versa. In short, a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it can be regarded as having the same veridicality conditions. If they have the same veridicality conditions, and they happen at the same time to the same subject, then they are the same episode.

3.2 Identical episodes!

Let us return to the traditional definition of representational content. The subject matter content of an episode of perceiving something red (episode r) is simply.

• Subject matter content(r) = the proposition < that is red>.

The subject matter content of reflexive awareness Ar is simply

• Subject matter content(Ar) = the proposition < I am perceiving something red>.

However, the subject matter content of an episode of perceiving something red and that of the reflexive awareness of it do not appear to be the same. Thus, following Korta and Perry, we need to examine how we can deal with such a difference. Does it mean that the two can never be the same thing?

For Perry (2001), the reflexive content of a mental state is determined by its truth conditions. If that of two mental states are the same, then they have the same causal role. If they have the same causal role, and the two episodes happen at the same time to the same subject, resulting in the same reflexive content, it follows that they are the same episode.

In my opinion, there is only a difference of expression, not a difference of fact, between a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it. According to Nida-Rümelin (2013, p. 703), there is a ‘genuine factual difference’ between two statements if and only if we have the conceptual capacity to clearly and positively understand or conceive an objective feature of the world that would make it the case that one statement is true whereas the other is false.

To determine whether there is a factual difference between ‘there is reflexive awareness’ and ‘there is a conscious mental state,’ we need to consult our first-person experience. After all, we are talking about features of the mental realm. We may wish to ascertain whether we can grasp the difference between merely having a conscious mental episode and having the reflexive awareness of being in a conscious mental episode. Same-order representationalists may argue that we do not have a positive understanding of having a conscious mental episode without being aware of having such an episode, and vice versa. Echoing Nida-Rümelin, we do not have the conceptual capacity to clearly and positively understand that we are perceiving a red mushroom without being aware of having the perception, and vice versa.

I believe that this argument makes considerable sense. Now I try to imagine being aware of having a perception. I discover that I cannot do much apart from imagine having a conscious perception. Maybe we can think of ourselves as being very attentive to a particular perception. However, same-order representational theorists would say that reflexive awareness is not about how attentive we are to perception, but about what makes perception conscious. One may thus infer that there is no genuine factual difference between ‘there is reflexive awareness of a mental episode r’ and ‘there is mental episode r.’¹³

3.3 Generalisations

Above, I analyze the relation between a certain kind of perception and the reflexive awareness of it. I now turn to the relation between other kinds of mental states, such as hallucinations and illusions, and their reflexive awareness. Do hallucinations and illusions have reflexive content? According to Perry, all mental states, including thoughts, hallucinations, and illusions, have reflexive content, as each has its own causal role. We may not want to call the reflexive content of hallucinations ‘veridicality or truth conditions’ because we probably do not want to assert that hallucinations are veridical or true at all. However, we should not neglect their causal roles. For instance, a hallucination of a red mushroom is caused by certain malfunctions of the brain, not by a red mushroom. In addition to promoting the belief that this mental episode is genuine, the hallucination may play a causal role in supporting the action of reaching out to touch the mushroom. Alternatively, if the subject believes that the mental episode is not genuine, this belief, together with the mental episode, may play a causal role in leading the subject to consult a physician. Hossack (2003, p. 199) points out that even if the mental episode is a hallucination, being aware of the occurrence of that hallucination does not imply that one is conscious that it is a hallucination. Thus, the veridicality conditions of a hallucination and its awareness are identical, given that the fact that one is aware of the occurrence of a mental episode does not necessitate that the person knows that they are hallucinating. If the hallucination does not fulfil the veridicality conditions, nor does its awareness.

Overall, I believe that the method of analysis presented above demonstrates that in line with Perry’s theory of reflexivity, anyone should be able to deduce that any conscious mental state, including hallucinations and illusions, has the same reflexive content as the reflexive awareness of it. Thus, it can be concluded that any conscious mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it are numerically identical. This applies to various mental states, such as judgements, imaginations, suppositions, decisions, and emotions, with each mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it being numerically identical.

My theory is to admit that reflexive awareness never misrepresents. As mentioned above, when I consciously perceive of a red mushroom, I am certain that I am aware of having this perception. However, this does not necessarily imply that I am certain that the red mushroom exists in the world when I have this perception. Rather, my theory simply posits that I am aware of having the perception of a red mushroom, not that I am aware of the existence of a red mushroom in front of me. I am sure about the characteristics of my mental episode, not about the characteristics of the external world. There is no doubt that I recognize that I am in such a state, but there may of course be misrepresentations of whether what I perceive exists in the external world.¹⁴

My identity model has several advantages. First, it easily eliminates all kinds of misrepresentation because a mental episode simply cannot misrepresent itself. Second, the problem of vicious infinite regress does not arise in my setting, as the content of the episode and the reflexive awareness of it are the same– they are numerically identical. The mental episode represents itself; hence the regress ends in the first step. Third, my theory explains the intimacy between a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it by demonstrating that they are the same thing. This illustrates how in representing itself, consciousness is an intrinsic property.

4 Potential objections

4.1 Multilayered view and pluri-propositionalism

What distinguishes a multi-layered view of mental content from Korta and Perry’s Pluri-Propositionalism, and why is the latter preferable for shaping the identity model?

4.2 My response

In my view, a multi-layered view of mental content does not demonstrate how a mental episode can be numerically identical to the reflexive awareness of it. To illustrate this, consider the perspectives of Lycan (1996, pp. 144–151) and Tye (1996, pp. 117–120), who hold that perception has multiple layers. For example, in the perception of two trees of the same size, one located far from the other, Lycan posits that at one level, the subject’s perception represents that the two trees are of the same size. At another level, the mental state represents two colored tree-shapes, with one tree-shape appearing larger than the other. Similarly, Tye suggests that the representation of viewpoint-relative features of surfaces occurs at the basic level, while the view-point-independent features of objects are represented at a higher level. For the perception of two trees, there is a non-conceptual represented feature of two shapes at the lower level, one smaller and one larger. At the higher level, the two trees are conceptually represented as being the same size. For both philosophers, although a single perceptual representation contains both levels of content, different levels represent different things. It would be unusual to consider one level of representation to be numerically identical to another level of representation, or to treat one of the levels as numerically identical to the entire mental episode, given that they have distinct representational contents. On the other hand, Korta and Perry’s reflexive-referential theory supports the notion that the act of perceiving an external object and the reflexive awareness of it have the same veridicality conditions. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that a mental episode is numerically identical to the reflexive awareness of it.

4.3 Phenomenal adequacy

According to Kriegel (2009), the identity model suffers from phenomenal inadequacy due to the identity model’s inability to capture the phenomenology of consciousness. As the identity model posits that the entire mental episode represents its whole self, it neglects the fact that any conscious mental state has a structure with reflexive awareness being peripheral. If a model does not accurately describe the structure of consciousness, it is phenomenally inadequate.

4.4 My response

My identity model acknowledges the intricate internal structure of mental states such as synchronic and diachronic unity without conceding that reflexive awareness is peripheral. This is not a radical proposition; indeed, most phenomenologists, starting with Husserl (1984, p. 252), and perhaps revived by contemporary scholar Zahavi (2004, pp. 80–81), maintain that reflexive awareness is not peripheral but synchronically ubiquitous, as reflexive awareness encompasses all conscious items within our mental realm at any given time, implying that we are aware of all conscious items. As reflexive awareness is the mechanism by which the entire mental episode is conscious, it does not serve to focus on specific items within the conscious mental realm, and thus should not be selective but synchronically ubiquitous.

Admittedly, there is a range of same-order views, with some asserting that reflexive awareness is peripheral and others denying it.¹⁵ It is challenging to determine which view is correct since thinkers tend to describe their own first-person experience differently. Therefore, I am inclined to say that it is optional but not necessary for same-order theorists to claim that reflexive awareness is peripheral. This stems from the notion that we can never selectively distinguish reflexive awareness from a mental episode, as they always manifest together. If we acknowledge the idea that reflexive awareness is not peripheral but synchronically ubiquitous, it follows that the identity model is phenomenally adequate since it effectively explains phenomenological appearance and accurately describes the structure of the mental state.

4.5 Problems with naturalization

For Levine (2001, p. 171-3) and Kriegel (2009, p. 202–205), the identity model fails to provide a self-representation specific enough to illuminate the explanatory gap between consciousness and physical properties, thus threatening the naturalization project of consciousness.

4.6 My response

Let me briefly explain the above worry. To begin, a theory of consciousness must meet several criteria to be naturalizable. Firstly, it should adopt a naturalistic perspective that posits mental states as brain features resulting from neurobiological processes. Naturalists hold that the vehicle and content of representation are physical states, with the former being a neurophysiological brain state and the latter describing the environment and the subject’s bodily characteristics. Secondly, it should identify the specific type of representation that occurs between the brain state and environmental state during consciousness. For proponents of same-order theory, consciousness is grounded in a specific self-representation. In other words, if this specific self-representation is instantiated, then there is consciousness. This grounding relation facilitates the naturalization of consciousness. Thirdly, it should accurately describe the structure of consciousness. For example, if reflexive awareness is a peripheral part of a mental state, a phenomenally adequate theory of consciousness must capture this feature in its theory. As the third criterion, phenomenal adequacy, is already discussed in Sect. 4.3 and 4.4, I will now focus on the first two criteria.

Kriegel (2009, p. 202–205) and Levine (2001: 171–3) argue that there are several possibilities under which a conscious mental state realized by a neurophysiological brain state represents itself: it may represent itself qua a neurophysiological state, or qua a phenomenal state, or qua whatever is doing the representing in a non-descriptive, indexical way. However, none of these alternatives are feasible. The first choice is problematic because reflexive awareness does not describe any neurophysiological state. The second alternative is not feasible because the phenomenal description is general and does not differentiate itself from the self-representation of the word ‘word,’ which is also general. The third alternative does not specify what information it represents and does not capture the characteristics of conscious self-representation.

Kriegel proposes a fourth consideration that combines the second and third alternatives by describing a conscious mental state as representing itself indexically yet with a phenomenal description. However, for him, this option still fails to account for the phenomenological appearance, as it does not accurately describe the internal structure of a mental state. Kriegel argues that any conscious mental state is structured with various discernible experiential parts and relations between them, with reflexive awareness being a peripheral part of it. However, the identity model posits that the entire mental state represents its whole self, thus overlooking the fact that any conscious mental state has a structure.

After enumerating the challenges of grounding consciousness with the identity model, Kriegel proposes a set of grounding conditions for conscious self-representation that a self-representational model should satisfy to establish consciousness in a self-representational relation. Interestingly, my identity model aligns with most of Kriegel’s grounding conditions for conscious self-representation, except for the structure of consciousness, namely, reflexive awareness being peripheral. If we incorporate Kriegel’s specific conditions of conscious self-representation into the identity model, the identity model could also establish consciousness in a self-representational property.

Here is how we do this. Kriegel’s (2009, pp. 157–162) set of necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness include non-derivativeness, specificity, and essentiality. Non-derivative self-representation involves representing an object in and of itself, independently of how we interpret it. For instance, the term ‘cat’ is not a non-derivative self-representation since its representation depends on the language system used. Additionally, conscious self-representation must be specific, one that purports to represent a particular. Lastly, conscious states must be essentially self-representing, that is, representing oneself as oneself instead of representing what happens to be oneself. For example, the self-representation in ‘My father’s best friend’s daughter’s romantic partner is happy’ is accidentally self-representing (if it turns out to be so), whereas ‘I am happy’ is essentially self-representing. Kriegel introduces the idea of ‘display sentences’ as a mental language to further develop his theory. Display sentence is a language of thought with objects of representation being the constituent of the representation. In his words, the representational object is displayed instead of being referred to. Kriegel postulates that the representational content of a conscious state is a display sentence if and only if it is non-derivatively, specifically, and essentially self-representing.

Kriegel provides the necessary and sufficient conditions of self-representation to be conscious, thus is able to ground consciousness in a self-representational property and offer a specific kind of representational relation that holds between the brain state and the environmental state when conscious self-representation occurs, allowing for naturalization of consciousness. My identity model is compatible with all these conditions, making it a robust candidate for naturalism of consciousness alongside Kriegel’s part-whole model.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, I show how Korta and Perry’s reflexive-referential theory of content can be used to support the idea that a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it are numerically identical. I redefine the veridicality conditions of a mental state to reveal the necessity of reflexive awareness. Specifically, if reflexive awareness, as a necessary condition, is added to the veridicality conditions of the corresponding mental episode, and the veridicality of reflexive awareness necessarily depends on the veridicality of the mental episode it represents, then the veridicality conditions of a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it must be the same. I also argue that although the subject matter content of a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it appear to be different, they actually describe the same fact. As the reflexive content of a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it are the same, and they occur at the same time in the same subject, one can conclude that a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it are numerically identical. The approach presented in this paper, as I argue, successfully avoids the problems of vicious infinite regress and misrepresentation. Moreover, it illustrates the intimate connection between a mental episode and the reflexive awareness of it, at the same time demonstrating that consciousness is an intrinsic property.