Abstract
Two important questions arise concerning the properties that constitute the phenomenal characters of our experiences: first, where these properties exist, and, second, whether they are tied to our consciousness of them. Such properties can either exist externally to the perceiving subject, or internally to her. This article argues that phenomenal characters, and specifically the phenomenal characters of colours, may exist independently of consciousness and that they are internal to the subject. We defend this combination of claims against a recent criticism according to which the unconscious phenomenal character of colours exists externally to the subject. We defend internalism about (potentially unconscious) phenomenal character by appealing to recent neuroscientific and behavioural evidence, and by rejecting the claim that externalism about phenomenal character is dialectically in a better position than internalism. In addition, we briefly present certain difficulties for externalist views of phenomenal character. These concern cases where the perceptual relation fails, but a perceptual experience still results. These points suffice to defuse the externalist critique of our view, and support the internalist variant of the consciousness-independence claim as the most plausible account of the unconscious phenomenal character of colours.
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Notes
Though it is hard to know whether this is because most philosophers simply assume the relevant properties are indeed tied to consciousness, as opposed to deeming the issue less important.
Soteriou (2020) calls this view “naïve realism about phenomenal character“.
See Rosenthal (1991).
See Coleman (2022b) for a critical survey of such arguments.
Zięba himself uses the terms ‘inequivalence’ and ‘equivalence’ where we talk of independence and dependence, respectively. We do not find his terminology maximally clear, hence we substitute our own. This does not affect any substantive issue.
Interesting questions, which we will not explore here, concern whether independence internalism holds good of emotional qualitative characters (see Coleman, 2024a), cognitive qualitative characters (if such there be—see, e.g., Pitt, 2004 and forthcoming, Coleman, 2022a). Arguably, the issue of whether colour qualitative character is independent bears on questions about whether there can be unconscious mental imagery (Coleman, MS).
By admitting unconscious phenomenality, Zięba does not want to say that unconscious states have ‘what-it’s-like-ness’. It doesn’t feel like anything to be in unconscious states. However, this does not imply that unconscious perceptual states lack all qualitativity. As Zięba notes, we can treat the relation between phenomenal character and what-it’s-like-ness dispositionally: one can say that phenomenal character determines what-it’s-like-ness just in those cases where the state having phenomenal character becomes conscious. This is not to say, however, that the unconscious states only have as-if or dispositional phenomenal character. What’s dispositional is not the phenomenal character, but one’s being conscious of it.
See Table 2 at p. 434 in Cova et al. (2021).
The category of conscious visual states includes episodes of overflow as subset, for all episodes of overflow are phenomenally conscious states, but, plausibly, not vice-versa. Although we concentrate on overflow, the neural argument spelled out in this section does not apply exclusively to overflow episodes but to conscious visual episodes in general (that is, to phenomenally conscious visual episodes with or without access consciousness). The relevant contrast the argument draws upon is thus not ‘unconscious visual episodes’ vs. ‘episodes of overflow’, but ‘unconscious visual episodes’ vs. ‘conscious visual episodes (including episodes of overflow)’.
It might seem that we beg the question here, in assuming there can be unconscious perception at all. But that is not so: bear in mind that we are discussing Zięba’s argument here, and he accepts that there is unconscious perception. His claim is that, given the possibility of overflow, UPC is in strongest shape if combined with externalism. That is what we are disputing.
While access consciousness presumably has its neural basis in the frontal cortex, it would be an oversimplification to claim that all frontal activations accompanying perceptual states imply access consciousness. The activations in frontal areas we speak about here are necessary for phenomenal consciousness, not for access consciousness. At least this is how we interpret the findings referred to in the previous paragraph.
We thank one of the reviewers for pressing us on this point.
Although the neural argument spelled out in the previous section allows us to distinguish conscious from unconscious perceptual states, it doesn‘t tell us, as such, what the markers specifically of overflow are going to be. For that some further empirical work would be needed. If one identifies frontal areas implementing access consciousness, distinguishes them from other frontal areas coactivating with phenomenally conscious visual states, and further shows that in some situations the first are inactive and the latter active, one obtains a marker of overflow. So, in theory at least, such markers are possible.
We grant this premise for the sake of the argument. Note, though, that Block (2005) insists that the neural bases of phenomenal and access consciousness are importantly distinct, and that we need to distinguish two kinds of neural correlates of consciousness—PC-correlates and AC-correlates.
Suppose Zięba meant conscious visual qualitative character, instead. Then (6) would say nothing about where the independence internalist’s posited consciousness-independent visual character was produced, and would not impact II. Nor would the second part of the horn two argument work. And clearly, if horn two varies, sometimes meaning conscious visual qualitative character, and sometimes consciousness-independent visual character, by “phenomenal character of visual perception”, it will come out as invalid by virtue of equivocation. Hence Zięba must mean consciousness-independent visual character by “phenomenal character of visual perception”, throughout horn two. Thanks also to a reviewer, here, for advocating this reading.
We thank one of the reviewers for suggesting this interpretation.
It might seem II is incompatible with all forms of direct realism. However, there are representationalist versions with which it may well fit, depending on the details. We will not explore that issue here. II is of course also compatible with internalist representationalist views of various sorts, a sense-datum theory, adverbialism, etc.
Soteriou (2020).
E.g., Martin (2004).
Cf. Kalderon’s (2011) move here: he denies illusions are possible, on the grounds that they are in fact always veridical perceptions. Johnston (2004) deals with hallucinations by positing uninstantiated clusters of colour universals—perhaps Zięba could embrace a disjunctivism along these lines, but Johnston’s thesis is widely seen as extravagant. Surely II would be a more plausible option, given the common ground of UPC.
E.g., Dennett (1976) suggests we confabulate memories of having dreamed between the putative end of the dream and waking.
Hardcore direct realists can analyse memory, too, as involving relations to external things only, as a kind of time-traversing direct perception. However plausible this is for memories of external phenomena (a relationist could say that memory, like perception, represents or presents the outside world, albeit at a different time to the present), memories of dreams are memories of experiences, and do not relate the subject to anything outer.
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Funding
Tomáš Marvan was supported by a grant from the Czech Science Foundation, project no. 20–14445S (‘Dual Models of Phenomenal Consciousness’).
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Marvan, T., Coleman, S. Defending internalism about unconscious phenomenal character. Synthese 203, 169 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04582-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04582-3