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Legal concepts and legal expertise

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Abstract

Scholarship in experimental jurisprudence has reported surprising findings about various concepts of legal significance: acting intentionally, causation, consent, knowledge, recklessness, reasonableness, and law itself. Often, these studies examine laypeople’s ordinary concepts and draw broader conclusions about legal experts’ concepts. This Article questions such inferences, from empirical findings about ordinary concepts to conclusions about the concepts of those with legal expertise. It presents a case study concerning what it means to act intentionally. An experiment examines intentionality judgments across four populations (N = 774): laypeople, law students, non-law students, and United States judges. Legal training affected judgments in three ways that are consistent with the acquisition of a distinctive legal concept. This case study supports the Article’s broader claim: Laypeople’s ordinary concepts are not equivalent to experts’ legal concepts. The acquisition of legal concepts is an important form of legal expertise.

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Notes

  1. This claim is different from the claim that “intentionally” in law is ambiguous between an ordinary and legal meaning.

  2. See, e.g., (Hannikainen & Donelson, 2020 on the ordinary concept of law; Kneer & Bourgeois-Gironde, 2017 on the ordinary concept of intentional action; Macleod, 2019 on the ordinary concept of causation; Mott, 2018 on the ordinary concept of identity; Sommers, 2020 on the ordinary concept of consent; Knobe & Shapiro, 2020 on the ordinary concept of causation; Tobia, 2018 on the ordinary concept of reasonableness).

  3. On possible personality differences, see Vedel (2016).

  4. This could occur for reasons specific to the concept. For example, perhaps certain features of the ordinary concept of reasonableness are particularly suited to meeting the aims of legal reasonableness standards. Or it could occur for more general reasons. For instance, if the legal concept corresponded to the ordinary concept, the law might better meet the aims of publicity and clarity.

  5. It is unlikely that these legal concepts (e.g. reasonable) are entirely unique. While concepts with no ordinary counterpart are unique (e.g. parol evidence) the central legal concepts discussed here all have an ordinary counterpart. It is technically possible that legal cause is entirely unrelated to the ordinary notion of cause, but this seems extremely unlikely. So while that does remain an open empirical possibility, the Article will (for simplicity) often describe the key question as one pitting Identity against Similarity theory.

    It also possible to hold a view on which the Selection Hypothesis might be compatible with Similarity Theory. For example, perhaps there are two distinct concepts of causation—a legal concept and an ordinary concept. Moreover, the legal concept is not acquired by training; rather it is only accessible to those with sufficient reflective ability, or intelligence, or some other feature.

    Similarly, one might hold a view on which the Legal Training Hypothesis is compatible with Identity Theory. For example, perhaps legal training does not provide the acquisition of distinctive concepts, but rather helps people become better critical thinkers, ones who make fewer performance errors in applying ordinary concepts.

    In general, this Article does not discuss these options, in large part because they are less plausible theoretically and the data in Part III does not support these interpretations. For example, the divergences between law and other students suggests against the compatibility of the Legal Training Hypothesis with Identity theory. Thus, for simplicity, the Article understands the Selection Hypothesis as closely connected to Identity Theory and the Legal Training Hypothesis as closely connected to Similarity Theory.

  6. There is a large philosophical literature that addresses whether conceptual learning is possible. Compare (Carey, 2011; Margolis, 1998; Margolis & Laurence, 2011; Sabo, 2014; Cain, 2013; with Fodor, 2008; Fodor, 1975).

  7. Compare, e.g. Model Penal Code 1.13 General Definitions with Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. For Physical Harm § 1.

  8. Model Penal Code 1.13 General Definitions.

  9. Model Penal Code 2.02 (2)(a).

  10. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. For Physical Harm § 1; see also Bublick (2009).

  11. Restatement (Second) of Torts: Intent § 8A.

  12. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intent §1.

  13. Id.

  14. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18.

  15. “The applications of the substantial-certainty test should be limited to situations in which the defendant has knowledge to a substantial certainty that the conduct will bring about harm to a particular victim, or to someone with a small class of potential victims within a localized area. The test loses its persuasiveness when the identity of potential victims becomes vaguer and when…the causal sequence connecting conduct and harm becomes more complex.” For example, “in many situations a defendant’s knowledge of substantially certain harms is entirely consistent with the absence of any liability in tort. For example, an owner of land, arranging for the construction of a high-rise building, can confidently predict that some number of workers will be seriously injured in the course of the construction project… Despite their knowledge, these actors do not intentionally cause the injuries that result.”.

  16. 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955).

  17. Restatement (Third) of Torts §1.

  18. Restatement (Third) of Torts §1.

  19. As Gideon Yaffe puts it: “[I]t is a hypothesis worth exploring that all of the various senses of the legal term “intention” circle around a core notion that has its natural home in ordinary discourse. The law is better when it uses ordinary terms in ordinary ways and employs concepts that bear a close resemblance to those used in everyday life.” Yaffe (2014): 107.

  20. Part III.C provides further interpretation of this case. It is worth noting that, although the bad outcome is clearly foreseeable, it likely falls short of tort law’s test of “knowledge of a substantial certainty.” For one, it is not clear that there is a substantial certainty of injury, rather than a likelihood. Second, it is not clear that the chairman has knowledge of any substantial certainty; he may have notice or awareness of the possibility, but it is not obvious that he has knowledge. Finally, the injury occurs in a general area to a diffuse population, which differs from the typical substantial certainty case involving a specific area (e.g. workplace) injury to specific people.

  21. Id.

  22. I conducted a 4(Population: MTurk, non-law student, law student, judge) × 2(Context: ordinary, legal) × 2(Severity: moderate, severe) ANOVA.

  23. There was a main effect of population, F(3, 758) = 24.57, p < .001, \(\eta_p^2\) = .089.

  24. See Section 3.2.1 infra.

  25. F(3, 758) = 3.29, p = .02, \(\eta_p^2\) = .013. There was no main effect of Context, F(1, 758) = 1.70, p = .192, \(\eta_p^2\) = .002.

  26. There was a significant severity by population interaction, F(1, 758) = 2.76, p = .041, \(\eta_p^2\) = .011. There was no main effect of severity, F(1, 758) = 2.24, p = .135, \(\eta_p^2\) = .003, and no three-way interaction, F(3, 758) = .49, p = .491, \(\eta_p^2\) = .002.

  27. t(210) = 8.30, p < .001, d = .57.

  28. t(194) = 5.88, p < .001, d = .42.

  29. t(236) = 1.73, p = .085, d = .11.

  30. t(130) = -3.63, p < .001, d = .32.

  31. Mage = 25.1, 54.1% female, 44.3% male, 1.6% non-binary.

  32. Mage = 26.4, 51.0% female, 49.0% male, 0.9% non-binary.

  33. Mage = 26.7 48.0% female, 51.0% male, 1.0% non-binary.

  34. Independent-Samples Kruskal–Wallis test, p = .016.

  35. M = 4.69, SD = 1.49.

  36. M = 4.18, SD = 1.56.

  37. M = 3.80, SD = 2.01.

  38. F(1, 367) = 16.12, p < .001, \(\eta_p^2\) = .043.

  39. F(2, 773) = 27.70, p < .001, \(\eta_p^2\) = 068.

  40. F < 1.

  41. F(2, 773) = 5.14, p = .006, \(\eta_p^2\) = .013.

  42. M = 4.22, SD = 1.89.

  43. M = 3.62, SD = 1.97.

  44. F(1, 367) = 8.55, p = .004, \(\eta_p^2\) = .023. Moreover, for judges, ordinary ratings were greater (M = 3.69, SD = 2.12) than legal ratings (M = 3.05, SD = 2.13). For law students, ordinary ratings were also greater (M = 4.48, SD = 1.72) than legal ratings (M = 3.96, SD = 1.84).

  45. M = 5.03, SD = 1.84.

  46. M = 5.04, SD = 1.79.

  47. F < 1.

  48. M = 4.54, SD = 1.69.

  49. M = 4.97, SD = 1.83.

  50. F(1, 194) = 2.89, p = .091, \(\eta_p^2\) = .015.

  51. F(2, 773) = 29.09, p < .001, \(\eta_p^2\) = .070.

  52. F(2, 773) = 4.73, p = .03, \(\eta_p^2\) = .006.

  53. F(2, 773) = 3.94, p = .020, \(\eta_p^2\) = .010.

  54. M = 3.91, SD = 1.99.

  55. M = 3.87, SD = 1.96.

  56. F < 1. Moreover, for judges, moderate ratings (M = 3.38, SD = 2.25) were no different from severe ratings (M = 3.26, SD = 2.05). For law students, moderate ratings (M = 4.22, SD = 1.77) were no different from severe ratings (M = 4.19, SD = 1.84).

  57. M = 4.69, SD = 1.71.

  58. M = 4.80, SD = 1.93.

  59. F < 1.

  60. M = 4.61, SD = 1.86.

  61. M = 5.45, SD = 1.65.

  62. F(1, 773) = 12.08, p < .001, \(\eta_p^2\) = .055.

  63. Berinsky et al. (2012) (“MTurk respondents... may also exhibit experimental demand characteristics to a greater degree than do respondents in other subject pools, divining the experimenter’s intent and behaving accordingly”).

  64. Mage = 39.5, 50.0% female, 49.1% male, 0.9% non-binary.

  65. Mage = 23.4, 78.6% female, 19.4% male, 1.9% non-binary.

  66. Mage = 28.0, 58.0% female, 38.0% male, 4.0% non-binary.

  67. F(2, 301) = 2.64, p = .073, \(\eta_p^2\) = .02.

  68. MTurk M = 4.02 (SD = 1.77); Non-Law M = 3.87 (SD = 2.28); Law Student M = 3.45 (SD = 2.05).

  69. F(2, 301) = 206.6, p < .001, \(\eta_p^2\) = .41.

  70. Help M = 2.30 (SD = 1.60), Harm M = 5.33 (SD = 1.91).

  71. F(2, 303) = 20.0, p = .001, \(\eta_p^2\) = .044.

  72. F < 1.

  73. F(1, 303) = 436.51, p < .001, \(\eta_p^2\) = .56.

  74. Harm M = 6.30 (SD = 1.13); Help M = 2.75 (SD = 1.67).

  75. F(2, 303) = 1.702, p = .184, \(\eta_p^2\) = .01.

  76. It is worth emphasizing the distinction between these kinds of arguments (e.g. concerning severity sensitivity) and traditional debates about other experimental-legal findings (e.g. the effect of politically motivated reasoning). While it is uncontroversial that racist attitudes or political beliefs should not affect the application of legal standards, it is an open question whether the legal concept of intentional action should be severity sensitive. This represents an important distinction between traditional work in psychology of law and a more philosophically inspired “experimental jurisprudence” or “experimental legal philosophy.” The discoveries of the latter do not solve debates, but rather enhance them. Learning whether the legal concept of intentional action is severity-sensitive is important, but that knowledge does not come with an easy answer to the normative question: Should the legal concept be severity-sensitive?

  77. But see Sugarman (2017) (arguing that both should fall under a new conception of torts focused on wrongful action).

  78. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons, Scope Note to Project (Am. Law Inst. Tent. Draft No. 1, April 8, 2015).

  79. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Intentional Torts to Persons, Scope Note to Project (Am. Law Inst. Tent. Draft No. 1, April 8, 2015).

  80. See, e.g. Kobick (2010) (arguing that law should accommodate the valence-sensitive folk notion of intentionality in equal protection jurisprudence).

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    Kevin Tobia

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Tobia, K. Legal concepts and legal expertise. Synthese 203, 107 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04512-3

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