Abstract
I offer a theory of advice. The theory has two parts: an account of the nature of advice, and an account of the quality of advice. In Sect. 2 I defend this definition: Advice: P advises R to X iff P communicates about X-ing to R in a manner that intentionally presents X-ing as worth reasoning to by R. In Sect. 4, I defend a tripartite account of the quality of advice: the standards relevant to whether advice is good concern rational agency in general, the advisee’s particular situation, and the topic of the advice. These accounts of the nature and quality of advice are superior to extant alternatives on the basis of both descriptive adequacy and absurdity.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Examples: (a) Paula advises Roberta to eat more protein iff Paula communicates about eating more protein to Roberta in a manner that intentionally presents eating more protein as worth reasoning to by Roberta. (b) Peter advises Remy to believe in evolution iff Peter communicates about believing in evolution to Remy in a manner that intentionally presents believing in evolution as worth reasoning to by Remy.
I am taking this as an account of the nature of advice. I have no quarrel with those who contend just that advice is often, even typically, to be followed, as this is consistent with the present theory of the nature of advice. However, I disagree with those who hold either that “followability” is the nature of advice, or that advice has no nature, just typical but not necessary characteristics. I once held the latter view, but reflection led me to the present view.
Jennifer Lackey’s discussion of expert testimony exemplifies advising with regard to belief (2018), and hence helps to balance discussion against views that take a practical nature of advice for granted (v., e.g., Fleming 2016, pp. 181–182, where testimony and advice are contrasted on the assumption that advice is inherently practical). Eric Wiland argues against seeing testimony as advice (2021, Ch. 6, Sect. 2). In Sect. 3, I argue that some testimony is advice and some is not.
Utterances of this sentence are not necessarily advice—it might be offered as a joke, for instance. But I’m considering it as advice.
Arguably, “worth grasping by reason” is just as apt, and would better capture advice involving self-warranting ideas. If there are ideas necessarily acquired through first-hand experience, then, in a natural sense of “reasoning”, one cannot reason to these ideas. But I take it to be controversial that there are any such ideas. And, on the other hand, “worth reasoning to” better delivers the social process of working things out typical of much advising (cf. Fleming 2016, p. 183). I suggest an ecumenical interpretation of “worth reasoning to” that includes grasping self-warranting ideas by reason, without thereby insisting that there are ideas possessable only through first-hand acquaintance. Generally, an idea can be worth reasoning to even when we cannot reason to it. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for clarifying this territory.
Analogy: “This sentence is false” is a sentence and absurd, but it is not absurd in virtue of being a sentence. It is in virtue of its self-referential content that it is absurd.
One thing that does not matter is possibility: something can be worth reasoning to by R even if R cannot reason to it, either from her present epistemic position or from a suitably improved one. “Ought” might well imply “can”, but “worth” does not. Where advice is offered for following, impossibility compromises its quality, but not its status as advice. I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this issue.
Fleming asserts that the advice to kill oneself is always bad (2016, p. 201). If physician-assisted suicide can be desirable under some circumstances, which I and others accept, then Fleming’s contention is incorrect.
On views that treat advice as inherently practical, to treat any testimony as advice is mistaken. E.g., v. Fleming 2016, especially pp. 181–182.
See also Stewart 1978 on using advice language with a baby: pp. 205–206.
Feel free to stop reading and call your mother.
He notes that this might go for other sorts of advice also, but he does not elaborate.
She holds this view in part because she thinks that there is only an all-things-considered sense of “ought”. Even if this was once true, I don’t think it is now. I find it natural to substitute “ought” and “should” for each other, and I’m a native English speaker, and “should” is uncontroversially not all-things considered. Accordingly, I take Thomson’s point about advice to be substantial rather than grammatical.
B.J. Diggs speaks of “occasions” for advice and “problems” of choice: (1960, p. 303).
This exemplifies “semi-alienated” advice: the advisor endorses the standards she uses, but she also excludes standards that she would prefer to apply. Consequently, we should think that she neither fully endorses nor fully rejects the validity of the standards used to advise.
Fleming offers this example against positions such as Thomson’s: it’s not all things that matter to whether advice is good. He’s correct, but a version of this point counts against his position too. He ties quality of advice to the consistent judgments an advisee would make about the advice over a life following either accepting or rejecting it. But advice can be good or bad without this mattering to the course of the life that follows. Suppose you’re trying tennis for the first time. I give you some advice about your grip. You never play tennis again, nor think about how tennis fits into your life. My advice could clearly be good, even very good, without there being any judgments you would be inclined to make about accepting or rejecting it given your overall life afterwards.
A more important issue: one might interpret this utterance as advising both how to run for President and against running for President. The hint of absurdity one might detect in such an interpretation is our next topic, so let’s put it aside for a moment.
Another example of semi-alienated advice, on the assumption that the judgment that this is wrong is sincerely expressed.
Since alienated advice is not specific to moral standards, examples could be constructed with other standards (law, religion, art, an advisee’s standards, etc.).
Cf. Parfit on the “reason-implying” and “rule-involving” senses of normativity—(2011a, pp. 144–145).
A non-cognitivist version could be provided.
References
Andreou, C. (2006). Standards, advice, and practical reason. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 3(1), 57–67. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004215337_003
Archard, D. (2021). Philosophical advice. Philosophy, 96, 603–623. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819121000139
Bach, K., & Harnish, R. M. (1979). Linguistic communication and speech acts. MIT Press.
Dennett, D., & LaScola, L. (2015). Caught in the pulpit: Leaving belief behind. Pitchstone Publishing.
Diggs, B. J. (1960). A technical ought. Mind, 69(275), 301–317. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LXIX.275.301
Fleming, P. (2016). Good advice. Philosophical Papers, 45(1 & 2), 181–207. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568641.2016.1187484
Gauthier, D. (1963). Practical reasoning. Clarendon Press.
Green, M., & Williams, J. N. (2007). Introduction. In M. Green & J. N. Williams (Eds.), Moore’s paradox: New essays on belief, rationality, and the first person (pp. 3–36). Clarendon Press.
Harman, G. (1996). Moral relativism. In G. Harman & J. J. Thomson (Eds.), Moral relativism and moral objectivity. Blackwell.
Henry, B. (1967). The graduate—screenplay. Lawrence Turman Productions.
Hinchman, E. S. (2005). Advising as inviting to trust. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 35(3), 355–385. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2005.10716594
Hobbes T (1651). Leviathan. Andrew Crooke
Hubin, D. C. (2001). The groundless normativity of instrumental rationality. The Journal of Philosophy, 98(9), 445–468. https://doi.org/10.2307/2678494
Keil, F. C., Rozenblit, L., & Mills, C. M. (2004). What lies beneath? Understanding the limits of understanding. In D. T. Levin (Ed.), Thinking and seeing: Visual metacognition in adults and Children (pp. 227–249). MIT Press.
Lackey, J. (2018). Experts and peer disagreement. In M. A. Benton, J. Hawthorne, & D. Rabinowitz (Eds.), Knowledge, belief, and god: New insights in religious epistemology (pp. 228–245). Oxford University Press.
Mills, C. M., & Keil, F. C. (2004). Knowing the limits of one’s understanding: The development of an awareness of an illusion of explanatory depth. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 87, 1–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2003.09.003
Moore, G.E. (1942) A reply to my critics. In P. Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of G.E. Moore (pp. 533–678). Open Court.
Moore, G.E. (1993). Selected writings. T. Baldwin (ed.) Routledge.
Nowell-Smith, P. H. (1954). Ethics. Penguin.
Parfit, D. (2011a). On what matters, (Vol. 1). Oxford University Press.
Parfit, D. (2011b). On what matters, (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press.
Railton, P. (1986). Moral realism. Philosophical Review, 95, 163–207. https://doi.org/10.2307/2185589
Rozenblit, L., & Keil, F. C. (2002). The misunderstood limits of folk science: An illusion of explanatory depth. Cognitive Science, 92, 1–42. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1
Searle, J. R. (1969). Speech acts. Cambridge University Press.
Smith, M. (1994). The moral problem. Blackwell.
Stewart, J. D. (1978). An Analysis of “advising.” Educational Theory, 28, 202–213. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-5446.1978.tb00814.x
Stokke, A. (2014). Insincerity. Noûs, 48(3), 496–520. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12001
Thomson, J. J. (2001). Goodness and advice. Princeton University Press.
Wiland, E. (2000). Advice and moral objectivity. Philosophical Papers, 29(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/05568640009506604
Wiland, E. (2018). Moral advice and joint agency. In M. C. Timmons (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics (pp. 102–123). Oxford University Press.
Wiland, E. (2021). Guided by voices: Moral testimony, advice, and forging a “we.” Oxford University Press.
Williams, B. (1981). Internal and external reasons. In Moral luck (pp. 101–113). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139165860.009.
Williams, B. (1993). Who needs ethical knowledge? Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 35, 213–222. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511621246.018
Williams, B. (1995). Internal reasons and the obscurity of blame. In Making sense of humanity (pp. 35–45). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511621246.004.
Williams, B. (2002). Truth and truthfulness: An essay in genealogy. Princeton University Press.
Wilson, R. (2004). Boundaries of the mind. Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, R., & Keil, F. C. (1998). The shadows and shallows of explanation. Minds and Machines, 8, 137–159. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008259020140
Acknowledgements
I am very grateful to the anonymous reviewers of this paper for constructive and probing comments.
Funding
No funding was received in support of this publication.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Ethics declarations
Conflicts of interest
No conflicts of interest to declare.
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.
