Abstract
In ordinary conversation, speakers disagree not only about worldly facts, but also about how to use language to describe the world. For example, disagreement about whether Buffalo is in the American Midwest, whether Pluto is a planet, or whether someone has been canceled, can persist even with agreement about all the relevant facts. The speakers may still engage in “metalinguistic negotiation”—disputing what to mean by “Midwest”, “planet”, or “cancel”. I first motivate an approach to metalinguistic negotiation that generalizes a Stalnakerian theory of communication by including linguistic commitments in the conversational common ground. Then, I turn to cases where the very status of a disagreement as metalinguistic or factual is unclear or contested. For example, after the publication of the New York Times Magazine’s 1619 Project, some responses claimed to identify factual errors, while others took those same “errors” to be matters of interpretation. I’ll consider how to extend our theorizing about metalinguistic negotiation to this type of (even more) “meta” disagreement, using the discussion following the 1619 Project as a case study. On my view, in most such cases, there will be a metalinguistic negotiation going on. Still, I explain several ways in which, despite a dispute being metalinguistic, the factualist side can sometimes receive important vindication. I also discuss why it can make sense for speakers to contest the status of a dispute.
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Notes
Geographer Scott Drzyzga made this case on Twitter, and 40% of respondents to a 2019 CityLab survey counted Buffalo as part of the Midwest (Montgomery, 2019).
Plunkett and Sundell (2021a) discuss a variety of possible circumstances in which speakers might engage in a metalinguistic dispute over what to count as “the Midwest”.
See, e.g., Jenkins (2014), Vermeulen (2018) on merely verbal disputes in this sense. This notion of “merely verbal” contrasts with one according to which verbal disputes can be more substantive, and hence closer to metalinguistic negotiations on my understanding; see e.g., Chalmers (2011), Balcerak Jackson (2014), Belleri (2018), Abreu Zavaleta (2021), Knoll (2023), Kocurek (2023).
See Kocurek (2023) on disagreement in interpretation vs disagreement in semantic plan.
For related discussion about communication with vague language, see MacFarlane, (2020, sect. 1.6).
There are alternative accounts of apparent metalinguistic negotiations. An anonymous referee suggests an account that appeals to “dual character concepts” in the sense of Knobe et al. (2013), where “the Midwest”, for example, can refer to either a descriptive concept or a normative one. This idea is worth exploring further, and may be part of the explanation for some metalinguistic negotiations. However, it doesn’t clearly extend to the cases I will discuss in Part 2, where the disputes do not hinge on a single term that plausibly has both normative and descriptive meanings. There are also Gricean accounts, from, e.g., Belleri (2017) and Mankowitz (2021). For considerations against these, and in support of incorporating interpretations into the theory of content as I do here, see, e.g., Kocurek et al. (2020) and Einheuser (2006) on “counterconventional” conditionals, and Muñoz (2019, chap. 6) on semantic underdetermination. The semantic expressivist account advanced here also bears some similarity with the kind of semantic relativism that has been adopted for predicates or personal taste, epistemic modals and other terms (Egan, 2007; Kölbel, 2004; Lasersohn, 2005; Egan, 2010; MacFarlane, 2014). Instead of taking the contents of assertions to be world-interpretation pairs, we could instead take the contents to be sets of worlds, but which set of worlds that is will vary with an interpretation parameter that is set by the context of assessment. It is tricky to choose between expressivism and relativism (Beddor, 2019), and it is also worth considering combinations of these approaches, as has been done for PPTs by, e.g., Berškytė and Stevens (2023). Many of the lessons I draw about contested metalinguistic negotiation in Part 2 could be preserved in some form on these alternative approaches.
I use “commitment” as a neutral term for mental states that can concern facts or matters of interpretation. Factual commitments are not identical to beliefs, as a speaker may have factual commitments for the purposes of a conversation that come apart from their beliefs (perhaps, for the sake of argument, they have accepted something they don’t believe) (e.g., Stalnaker, 2002 on what he calls “presupposition”). Still, a speaker’s factual commitments will generally line up with their beliefs, and nothing in my discussion hangs on cases where they differ. While commitments are mental states, speakers express those commitments in conversation and thereby open themselves up to dispute with others who hold conflicting commitments.
In Rudolph and Kocurek (2020) and Kocurek and Rudolph (2023) we argue that a further revision to the present semantic expressivist picture is needed in order to capture communication with what we call “metalinguistic gradable” constructions, such as “Pluto is more an asteroid than a planet”. We argue that such cases support replacing interpretations with semantic orderings, i.e., rankings of interpretations. This revision, however, still allows us to hold onto the present ideas regarding non-gradable sentences, and so I stick with the simpler picture for the current paper.
See related discussion in Kennedy and Willer (2016, 2022). In a minimal sense, we might want to always think about Buffalo being in Midwest as a (potential) “fact”. As Gibbard (2003, p. 18) puts it in discussion of metaethical expressivism, there’s a sense in which “p is a fact” is interchangeable with “p”. But, at the theoretical level, it is important to distinguish between facts in this minimal sense, and facts as things that are settled by the world parameter in our theory of content.
The initial claim is a direct quote from the original version of the essay (Hannah-Jones, 2019). The rejoinder from critics is not a direct quote, but is based on arguments made by a group of historians in a letter to editor of the Times Magazine (Bynum et al., 2019; also Wilentz, 2020). The final claim from a defender is an imagined continuation based on the kinds of defenses of the original claim that have been offered. For instance, Silverstein, (2019, pp. 4–5) in his response to the historians’ letter to the editor, writes:
The work of various historians, among them David Waldstreicher and Alfred W. and Ruth G. Blumrosen, supports the contention that uneasiness among slaveholders in the colonies about growing antislavery sentiment in Britain and increasing imperial regulation helped motivate the Revolution. ...As Waldstreicher writes, “The black-British alliance decisively pushed planters in these [Southern] states toward independence.”
This is a definite plural, which is known to give rise to “non-maximality” and “homogeneity” effects. Non-maximality means that exceptions are allowed, and homogeneity means that the group is assumed to be mostly the same with respect to the property in question (Križ, 2016, 2019). In these respects, sentences with definite plurals are similar to generics, whose interpretation is notoriously variable and complex. Possibilities for metalinguistic negotiation over generics are discussed in Plunkett et al. (2023), and it is plausible that similar sorts of disagreement can also arise over sentences with definite plural subjects.
There are potentially further interpretive issues relevant for assessing Hannah-Jones’s claim, including what it means for people to have a certain motive. Several historians who objected to her claim hold that the Revolution ended up undermining slavery (Harris, 2020; Mackaman, 2019a, b). Is this relevant for assessing the motives going into the war? For my purposes, it’s not critical what exactly the interpretive dispute is, but just that there is one, at least according to the project’s defenders.
Are these disputes perhaps merely verbal, with the parties talking past each other due to misunderstanding? While possible, I do not think this is the most charitable way to understand them. Hannah-Jones can know that her critics employ a meaning of “largely alone” according to which it’s false that Black Americans struggled largely alone. Still, she objects to their view because she thinks this is not the right interpretation to adopt. There is a normative dispute about what we should mean by “largely alone”. Knowing what the other means by the phrase does not dissolve that dispute. Thus the dispute is not “merely verbal” in the sense mentioned in the introduction. Some (apparent) metalinguistic negotiations might be, but we should have something to say about cases—like the ones I am discussing here—where more seems to be going on. Note also that this example involves a vague term. I do not take that to rule out metalinguistic negotiation, as such disputes can also concern what standard to employ for a vague term (Barker, 2013; Plunkett & Sundell, 2013; Sundell, 2011). For my purposes, I will take these standards also to be settled by the interpretation parameter.
One feature of the 1619 Project disputes is that they took place mostly in writing and not in spoken conversation, whereas most examples of metalinguistic negotiation in the literature are imagined as spoken. However, I take this to be an inessential feature. Indeed, a lot of the metalinguistic negotiations that matter, especially in public life, are carried out largely in writing. An anonymous reviewer notes that a merely verbal dispute might be harder to detect in writing, without the non-linguistic cues that might help clear up misunderstandings in oral conversation. While this seems plausible for some cases, I think it is unlikely to dissolve the problems with the 1619 Project disputes, given how much back-and-forth there has been. There are further tricky issues with disputes carried out in public and in writing, including how to determine the participants and the common ground. My discussion here necessarily involves some idealization, just like most philosophical discussions in these areas. Still, I think it’s worthwhile to grapple with a naturally occurring case. By seeing where the challenges arise, and where the idealizations are needed, we better understand how our theories remain incomplete.
Support for the dispute over the colonists’ main motives not being purely factual can even be found in the words of Gordon Wood, one of the historians who signed the letter to the editor. In an interview, he holds:
It’s been argued by some historians, people other than Hannah-Jones, that some planters in colonial Virginia were worried about what the British might do about slavery. Certainly, Dunmore’s proclamation in 1775, which promised the slaves freedom if they joined the Crown’s cause, provoked many hesitant Virginia planters to become patriots. There may have been individuals who were worried about their slaves in 1776, but to see the whole revolution in those terms is to miss the complexity. (Mackaman, 2019a)
Here, Wood seems to concede the facts, but to object to the focus on those who were motivated to preserve slavery, rather than those with other motives. For discussion of disagreement about what to focus on or attend to, see Stroud (2019).
In this connection, historian Leslie M. Harris has an interesting perspective on the 1619 Project. When she was consulted as a fact-checker on the project, she objected to the claim that the preservation of slavery was a main motive for the American Revolution. However, she is still critical of the historians who penned the letter to the editor demanding corrections. She takes the overall perspective of the 1619 Project, focusing on the importance of slavery in shaping the United States, to be an important one, and one neglected in the scholarly work of at least two of the prominent historians who signed the letter. She writes:
It is easy to correct facts; it is much harder to correct a worldview that consistently ignores and distorts the role of African Americans and race in our history in order to present white people as all powerful and solely in possession to the keys of equality, freedom and democracy. At least that is the corrective history toward which the 1619 Project is moving, if imperfectly. (Harris, 2020)
I think that there is an interpretive, and not merely factual, dispute between Harris and Hannah-Jones. (And we might appeal to some of the factors I’ll mention below to evaluate which interpretation is better.) Still, we can take Harris’s point, in the present framework, to be that one doesn’t need to (or perhaps should not) accept Hannah-Jones’s interpretation of terms in order to take the corrective view of American history that the 1619 Project is—rightly, in Harris’s view—adopting.
And see Abreu (2023) for a new version of the speaker error objection.
I thank an anonymous referee for encouraging me to further explore the connections between my view and speaker error issues.
Compare Sterken (2019) on “transformative communicative disruptions”. Speakers also sometimes advocate for conceptual or interpretive choices even when they know they are unlikely to convince their interlocutors to adopt them. This is discussed by Hansen (2021) under the label of “metalinguistic provocations”.
Harms that are due to prevalent interpretive or conceptual practices are often cases of “hermenutical injustice”: “the injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experiences obscured from collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective hermeneutical resource” (Fricker, 2007, p. 155; see also McKinnon, 2016). As Maitra (2018, p. 353) discusses, one way to remedy such injustice is “to assimilate [the experience] to another whose relevant normative properties are already sufficiently familiar.” A main example Maitra uses is statutory rape, and similar ideas apply to marital rape as well.
The outlook of this paper is thus compatible with semantic externalism in the following sense. Evidence for externalism comes from Putnam- and Kripke-style thought experiments, where people judge that the reference of a term is determined by external factors, possibly unknown to the speaker. For example, the stuff on Twin Earth is not water—is not in the extension of the English word “water”—because it is not H2O; it doesn’t matter that the stuff functions just like water and that no Earthlings or Twin Earthlings (in 1750, say) can tell the difference (Kripke, 1980; Putnam, 1973). To the extent that speakers use the word “water” like this, externalism is true of that word. Nothing about semantic expressivism changes this story. For related discussion, see Koch (2021), Pinder (2021) and De Brabanter and Leclercq (2023).
As mentioned above, the essay was revised to replace “the colonists” with “some of the colonists”. Still, Hannah-Jones stands by her original claim. However, she acknowledged that “it became clear that if we didn’t clarify it in some way, it was going to dog us for eternity” (quoted in Ellison, 2020).
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Acknowledgements
This paper was presented at the Experiments and Ordinary Language Philosophy Conference at the Freie Universität Berlin in June 2022. My thanks to audience members there and to the organizers, Eugen Fischer and Nat Hansen. Thanks also to audiences at Northwestern University and the 2023 Central APA in Denver, CO. For comments and discussion, special thanks to Noah Betz-Richman, Arc Kocurek, David Plunkett, Ravi Thakral, Michael Watkins, and three anonymous referees for this journal.
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Rudolph, R.E. Contested metalinguistic negotiation. Synthese 202, 90 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04288-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04288-y