Abstract
This paper connects the debate regarding perceptual representation of high-level properties and the debate regarding non-conceptual perceptual representation. I present and defend a distinction between representationally-complex properties and properties that are simpler to represent and offer ways of assessing whether a property is representationally complex. I address conditions under which such a property might be non-conceptually represented and conclude that most representationally-complex properties are simply too complex to be non-conceptually represented. Thus, most mental states that represent representationally-complex properties must be conceptual. This conclusion is relevant for a variety of philosophical theories (perception, ethics, emotions, pain) and is especially dramatic with respect to accounts according to which a mental state can non-conceptually represent such properties. As a test case for applying my argument I consider a group of such accounts: non-conceptual perceptual views of emotions, which my argument entails are false. I end by considering the implications my argument has for different theories.
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Notes
For an overview, see Siegel (2021).
Recently, Burnston (ms) has also addressed the importance of such an assessment. I will not be able to engage with his view, which significantly diverges from mine.
Seigel (2006, p. 486) claims that her high-level account is neutral with respect to the conceptual\non-conceptual debate. However, she does note that there is an implicit assumption that kind properties are unlike properties such as colors in that they require at least some conceptualization. In my view, there is much more than an ‘implicit assumption’ here.
It may be possible to construct a version of my argument that targets non-Fregean views of concepts. However, because the Fregean view is the bon-ton in the literature, I do not attempt to construct such a version.
This notion has been dubbed “State Non-Conceptuality” by Heck (2000). Heck discusses another notion of non-conceptuality—Content Non-Conceptuality. As far as I can see, this distinction does not affect my argument. It should also be noted that some (for example, Schmidt 2015, pp. 37−38) argue against the distinction. For these reasons, I will not discuss it further.
Some philosophers reserve the locution “represent as” for aspect perception. I use the term more liberally, not limiting it to aspect perception.
I will be assuming a hierarchical model of perception that some may reject. Naturally, this assumption limits the scope of my argument.
I defined RBPs by relying on two conditions, one related to an experiential in-virtue-of claim and the other to computational processing. Granted, these are claims about different domains, which my argument brings together. I cannot argue here for the way these two domains are connected. For my purposes I think it is sufficient to note that the philosophers with which I will be concerned assume such a connection. This is evident in two ways. First, they turn to brain regions and sensory apparatuses when they argue for a shared experience between animals and humans, and when they argue for non-conceptual representation of a property. Second, they assume two supervenience theses: one whereby representational content supervenes on the natural and the second whereby phenomenal content supervenes on representational content. Combined, these two theses provide the needed connection between experience and computation.
I leave open the question of whether this is a representation of a conjunction of properties or a conjunction of representations of properties. For example, it would seem that to represent a shape, a representation of a conjunction is necessary if it is impossible to represent a shape without representing a color (the same holds with respect to sounds and representing a location). This is not obviously so for other properties. I suspect that the answer might vary.
Siegel uses the method to show that the high-level property indeed is represented in perception. Although the method has been subject to criticism (for example, Koksvik, 2015), I am assuming that at least in some instances phenomenal contrast arguments succeed at showing that a high-level property such as being a tree is perceptually represented.
Much like the “in-virtue-of” relation above, many theories of representation can be plugged in here, which will result in somewhat different ways of spelling out irreducibility. However, for all these theories the definition below will hold.
Assume that being a line is an RBP (if it is not, the argument will apply to the lines’ RBP-Ground). Note that it is not the case that the experience is one of representing the lines and then representing the square. This supports my claim that the RBPs representation grounds the representation of the square and does not merely cause it.
RBPs are irreducible in another sense—they do not have a ground in-virtue-of which they are represented.
Note that for many RCPs it will not be the case that one particular set of RSPs will be necessarily represented. Rather, it is some disjunct of RSPs out of a long disjunction of properties that will be necessarily represented when a creature represents an RCP. Crucially, because the RSP-Ground is not sufficient for representing the RCP, the RCP will only be partly represented in-virtue-of representing the RSPs.
“N” here should be understood as different RSPs or RBPs. Thus, representing a large or a small square requires representing the same number of RBPs. Representing a square with one diagonal, requires representing n + 1 RSPs compared to representing a square without the diagonal.
Gestalt properties are not “subordinate level rich properties”. For example, the duck Gestalt—the complex, abstract indeterminate shape that ducks share—is not identical to the kind property of being a duck (Landers, 2021, p. 82).
This does not entail that base-information includes only RBPs. RSPs will be recoverable from base-information alone because they are reducible to RBPs that are contained within it.
An RBP is a property the relevant creature can represent in virtue of affecting the relevant organ alone. The creature need not be representing it thus in each token representation of the property.
It is logically possible that for some creature a human RCP is in fact an RSP and that a human RSP is an RCP for it. This does not affect my argument.
Toribio (2007) discuss four main motivations for positing non-conceptual content: (1) continuity with animals and babies, (2) explaining know-how, (3) the fine-grainedness of experience and (4) acquisition of observational concepts. I discuss motivations 1–3 shortly. I briefly address the fourth motivation in note 23.
Thus, although representational simplicity is relative to the relevant sensory apparatus, according to continuity, our sensory apparatus is sufficiently like that of (some) animals for our sharing some RBPs. This does not mean that all such RBPs are shared.
However, arguments that turn to this motivation usually posit non-conceptual content at the subpersonal level (Toribio, 2007, p. 452). Given my concern with personal level non-conceptual content, I will not further discuss this.
I do not mean to claim that there is no other way to argue for non-conceptual representation of RCPs. However, it is the continuity motivation coupled with the discrimination motivation that seem most relevant for such arguments. The Acquisition of Observational Concepts motivation (see note 20) seems, for example, inapplicable. This is because, according to Peacocke, observational concepts are concepts of things like a pyramid, a circle, a square and the like. In addition, he explicitly states that observational concepts are not concepts of kind properties (Peacocke, 1983, Chap. 4). This makes it seem that observational concepts are concepts of RSPs (or RBPs) and not of RCPs.
I am focusing here on non-conceptual animals and the representations required for explaining their discrimination. Humans can discriminate both by representing RSPs non-conceptually and by representing RCPs (such as discriminating eucalyptus and pine trees). Whether or not representing RCPs requires conceptual representation does not affect my point here.
Burge (2010, pp. 323-324) argues that animals can represent what he calls “functional attributives” such as edible that are parasitic on but do not seem to be reducible to properties like size, motion, and color. I do not think that the above rules out Burge’s claim. My argument entails that functional-attributives can be non-conceptually represented only if there is a dedicated apparatus related to their representation. Edible may be such an attributive.
Similar findings are reported in Suthana and Fried (2012).
Lander’s paper is one of the few philosophical discussions of gestalt properties relevant to the matter at hand (see her note 1). I thus rely on it, and on the deep discussion she provides. I will not assess the account itself.
I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this worry and pushing me to address it fully.
Peacocke (1992, pp. 89–90) makes a similar claim to mine with respect to words, arguing that what explains someone’s ability to come and recognize Cyrillic characters as letters and words are concepts.
It is worth noting that Landers has very little to say about whether gestalts are non-conceptually represented. All she says is that: “[T]he representation of gestalt properties does not obviously involve any explicit conceptual labeling…” (p. 81). “Does not obviously” is a rather weak qualifier. It is also far from clear how we should understand “explicit labeling”, which sounds like an overly strong condition on a representation being conceptual.
Here are two possible ways of developing a more general account. First, for some RCPs it may be sufficient to show that the relevant class of properties cannot be represented iconically, which would suggest it must be represented conceptually. I think irreducibility of RCPs makes this claim reasonable. Second, one may argue that only RCPs that comply with the “irresistibility of the stimulus criterion” which Toribio (2018) argues limits the set of truly perceivable high-level properties, can be non-conceptually represented.
Whether or not Bain’s sense of “bad” is an RCP will depend on how this is cashed out and whether the emerging property is reducible to RSPs or is an RSP.
For some perceptualists (such as D’Arms and Jacobson and Tappolet), the represented properties are response-dependent, such as “fearsome”.
Which RSPs are necessary for representing an RCP depends on many factors related to the particular object and evaluative property one is considering. It seems that with respect to evaluative properties such RSPs will be non-evaluative properties. However, there need not be one particular set of such properties that is necessarily represented when representing the evaluative property, rather it will be a particular disjunct of a long disjunction (see note 14).
Much like the constraint I argued for with respect to discriminatory capabilities, there is reason to posit an apparatus that represents RCPs only if the relevant representation cannot be explained without turning to a representation of an RCP.
I thank Preston Werner for this objection.
While Burge disagrees with me about dangerous, we are in agreement that animals do not represent kind properties, nor that a frog (in his example) can represent something as a fly (2010, p. 323).
I thank an anonymous referee for this objection.
I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to clarify this.
Pace Roberts (2013), who claims (but does not support this claim) that his conceptual account applies to animals as well.
Note that if a theory attempts to avoid this cost by arguing that animals and babies have concepts (for example, Bermudez, 2003), the theory would have to show that they have the relevant RCP concepts. Even if this succeeds, the result will be a conceptual account, one that undercuts the continuity motivation for non-conceptual content.
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Acknowledgements
I am incredibly grateful to Hagit Benbaji, David Enoch, and Preston Werner who read and made crucial and substantive comments and suggestions on drafts of this paper. I am also thankful to Michael Brady, Daniel Burnston, Robert Cowan, Noga Gratvol and Shlomit Wygoda-Cohen for helpful comments and valuable feedback. Early versions of my argument were presented at the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotions Annual Conference in Athens (2016) and at the Israeli Philosophy Association Conference in Ben-Gurion University (2017), I’d like to thank the participants of these conferences.
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Kenan, A.M. Simply too complex: against non-conceptual representation of (most) complex properties. Synthese 200, 525 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03992-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03992-5