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Undermining versus rebutting: options for responding to evolutionary debunking arguments

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Abstract

In this paper, I argue that the success of evolutionary debunking arguments hinges on what theory of epistemic justification one endorses. More specifically, I argue that what it takes to satisfactorily respond to evolutionary debunking arguments depends on what view of epistemic justification one is operating under and that a thorough analysis of any line of response to evolutionary debunking arguments must take into account whether there is a specific view of justification motivating the response or looming in the background. In particular, I argue that pace Andrew del Rio’s claim in the article “Why Undermining Evolutionary Debunkers is Not Enough,” merely undermining the empirical claim can in fact be a successful line of response to debunkers if one endorses a particular version of doxastic conservatism. I also argue that examining how satisfying a response to an evolutionary debunking argument seems to us and considering what theory of justification is looming in the background of the response can shed light on the plausibility of certain theories of epistemic justification.

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Notes

  1. For examples of prominent evolutionary debunking arguments see, e.g., Joyce (2006), Joyce (2016), Ruse (1995), and Street (2006).

  2. See, e.g., Kahane (2011), Koon (2021), Korman & Locke (2020), and Morton (2019).

  3. Kyriacou (2019) makes a similar point but focuses on metaepistemic norms and what he refers to as the “demarcation problem.”

  4. In the remainder of this paper, I will refer to epistemic conservatism as doxastic conservatism.

  5. According to del Shafer-Landau (2012), Fitzpatrick (2014, 2015), and Vavova (2014, 2015) are examples of mere underminers.

  6. Levy and Levy (2020) and Plakias (2022) seem to employ this strategy.

  7. There are also authors who target the epistemic premise rather than the empirical premise. See e.g., Brosnan (2011). However, for the purposes of this paper, I will focus on responses that target the empirical premise.

  8. Joyce refers to this view as “epistemic conservatism.”

  9. Although it is not clear that any of the mere underminers del Rio mentions explicitly endorse doxastic conservatism, Fitzpatrick (2015) seems to endorse such a view, at least implicitly, when he states that when we become aware of a debunking argument the “default justification we may have had for our moral beliefs is thereby defeated” (p. 890).

  10. For further explanations of doxastic conservatism see e.g., Chisholm (1980), Foley (1983), Harman (1986), and Vahid (2004).

  11. Lycan (1985, 1988, 2013) and Chisholm (1980) seem to endorse something like this version of doxastic conservatism.

  12. Harman (1986) seems to endorse something like this version of doxastic conservatism.

  13. Brosnan (2011) makes a similar point about how EDAs may fail to undermine justification but lays out the discussion in terms of probabilities of our moral judgments being true.

  14. Bergmann (2005) endorses a similar view.

  15. Steup (2021) endorses a similar view.

  16. In this paper, I focus specifically on doxastic justification. However, propositional justification raises similar complications.

  17. For more on the dialectic surrounding various theories of epistemic justification see e.g., Alston (1993), BonJour (1985), Cohen (2002), Huemer (2000), Huemer (2007), Pryor (2000), and Steup (2018).

  18. See, for example, Foley (1983), Vahid (2004), Feldman (2003), and Christensen (1994).

  19. This example comes from Christensen (1994).

  20. This view is endorsed by Huemer (2007).

  21. Huemer (2007) also adds a basing requirement for justification, which states that S must base the belief that P on the undefeated appearance. However, I will leave this basing requirement aside for the purposes of this paper.

  22. One complication to consider is what an “appearance” might be like in the context of a moral belief as opposed to a perceptual belief. Huemer (2005 p. 102) notes that initial intellectual appearances are intuitions. Thus, a relevant comparison in the moral realm to an appearance may be a moral intuition. For further discussion of appearances within the moral realm, see Fuqua (2021).

  23. Similar concerns are raised by Markie (2005) and Tooley (2013).

  24. While phenomenal conservatism requires evidence or positive reasons for a belief in the form of an appearance, the views I am categorizing as epistemic credentialism require evidence or positive reasons beyond an appearance.

  25. Steup (2004) defends a related view of perceptual justification, which he refers to as internalist reliabilism.

  26. Reliability evidentialism is importantly distinct from more traditional theories of reliabilism in that it is an internalist rather than an externalist theory.

  27. There are a few competing views about what a priori justification entails. For example, Bonjour (1998) argues that an a priori justified belief is one that is justified by appeal to reason or pure thought alone. Kitcher (1984) adds that an a priori justified belief is one that cannot be defeated by experience.

  28. There are also several other more commonly cited issues with reliability evidentialism and similar views. Such issues include epistemic circularity and infinite regress worries. Alston (1993), Fumerton (1988), and Vogel (2000) highlight some of these issues. Others have claimed that reliability evidentialism is overly demanding. See e.g., Huemer (2013).

  29. Alternatively, some may be amenable to the idea that the version of phenomenal conservatism endorsed by Huemer (2007), or the version of strict doxastic conservatism endorsed by Bergmann (2005) are plausible candidates for middle ground theories. However, others may feel that these two theories still make justification too easy to come by in the first place.

  30. I am extremely grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful feedback on earlier versions of this paper.

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    Emily Slome M.A.

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Slome, E. Undermining versus rebutting: options for responding to evolutionary debunking arguments. Synthese 200, 253 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03723-w

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