Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Inappropriate emotions, marginalization, and feeling better

  • Original Research
  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

A growing body of work argues that we should reform problematic emotions like anxiety, anger, and shame: doing this will allow us to better harness the contributions that these emotions can make to our agency and wellbeing. But feminist philosophers worry that prescriptions to correct these inappropriate emotions will only further marginalize women, minorities, and other members of subordinated groups. While much in these debates turns on empirical questions about how we can change problematic emotion norms for the better, to date, little has been done by either side to assess how we might do this, much less in ways that are responsive to the feminists’ worries. Drawing on research in cognitive science, this paper argues that though the feminists’ worries are real, the leading proposals for remedying them are inadequate. It then develops an alternative strategy for reshaping problematic emotion norms—one that’s sensitive to the feminists’ concerns.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See, for instance, Shoemaker 2018; Kauppinen 2018; Kurth 2018a, 2018b; Nussbaum 2013; Bell 2013; Pettigrove 2012; Mason 2010; Manion 2002; and Kekes 1996. As will become clearer below, there is significant diversity in both the emotions that these advocates for emotional reform discuss and the corrections they call for.

  2. Some feminist see emotions as social constructions (e.g., Jaggar 1989; Fricker 1991), though not all do (e.g., Spelman 1989). Constructivism is a controversial theory of emotion and, for our purposes, assessing its merits is not a project we need to take up—for the marginalization worries that follow are largely independent of questions regarding the metaphysics of emotion. For concerns about constructivist accounts, see Kurth 2019.

  3. Witness Alison Jaggar: “Whatever our sex, we are likely to feel contempt for women” (1989: 165). Also, Cherry 2018.

  4. While the focus has been on negative emotions, Miranda Fricker’s discussion of humor (1991: 17) shows that this worry has broader scope.

  5. There’s a complication here that I will note, and then set aside. In these debates, the emotions in question are often presented as essentially moral emotions or as having distinctly moral forms (e.g., Srinivasan 2018, Shoemaker 2018, Kurth 2015, Manion 2002). In these cases, the distinction between fitting and morally appropriate emotions collapses—though the ambiguity, and so the need to distinguish between fitting/morally appropriate emotions and prudentially appropriate ones, remains. There are, of course, important questions about whether there are—in fact—essentially moral emotions and how to cleave the moral versions in a principled manner. But those are issues for another time.

  6. Ketes (1996) and Tangney (1995) recommend replacing shame with guilt; Kurth (2018a: 188) discusses the suggestion that anxiety be replaced with curiosity.

  7. See Calhoun 2004 and Thomason 2018 for versions of this worry that are substantiated by, e.g., the autobiographical accounts of individuals who have experienced this type of targeting. Also see Harbin 2016 for a similar discussion and defense of the targeting experienced when a marginalized individual experiences inappropriate anxiety.

  8. As we will see below (§ 4), these affronts to one’s epistemic standing (and the harms from prescriptions for reform more generally) can be magnified in situations where the targets of the prescriptions lack the conceptual resources to identify or understand the harm done. This is what Fricker (2007) calls hermeneutical injustice.

  9. The term “emotional fragility” comes from Liebow & Glazer 2019.

  10. Of course having narrow scope is not, in itself, a problem for the burden shifting proposal. Rather, the observation that it does not generalize is a reflection of the largely siloed manner in which discussions of marginalization worries have taken place in the literature. Thus, it points to the need for a comprehensive examination of the sort developed here.

  11. Advocates of the burden shifting approach acknowledge the intensity of fragility cases: Liebow and Glazer, for instance, note that “white fragility can trigger strong feelings of anger, frustration, disgust, guilt, aggression, loathing, or hostility” (Liebow & Glazer 2019: 3, emphasis added).

  12. Madva (2017: 157) is explicit about this. Also see Liebow & Glazer 2019 and Moskowitz 2010.

  13. It’s worth noting that neither Srinivasan nor Nussbaum’s main focus is on developing a strategy for correcting emotion norms—Srinivasan’s core aim is to articulate the harm done by certain prescriptions for reform; Nussbaum’s focus is on changing laws and legal practices. Given this, they (understandably) say comparatively little about their less costly proposals.

  14. Gibbard (1990: 69–70) introduces the example of conversational distance in the context of his discussion of differences in the ways that norms can be acquired (and so function to guide behavior). The discussion of fashion norms in Kurth 2013 offers another example. 

  15. Gibbard 1990 introduces the distinction between internalizing and avowing norms. See Kelly, forthcoming for an insightful elaboration as well as Davidson & Kelly 2020, Huebner 2016, and Crocket 2013.

  16. Our ability to pick up on norms governing behavior appears to start happening very early—and quickly—in our development. For instance, infants as young as 12 months demonstrate the ability to adopt a specific ‘role’ (e.g., the collector of the toys) after seeing another person play the role just once (Ross & Lollis 1987).

  17. For discussion of feelings of doing as one should and should not, see Sripada & Stich 2007; Theriault et al. 2021; Kurth 2015, 2016; and Kelly, forthcoming.

  18. Though the point in the text is a general one, the issue is likely to be particularly pronounced with regard to emotions. As Alison Jaggar (1989) notes, the prevailing (and so typically internalized, recall § 1 above) emotion norms counsel men to ignore their emotions, often with the result that they have a stunted understanding of what they feel and how these feelings affect their thoughts and actions. This opacity is also a central theme in Fricker’s (2008) discussion of hermeneutical injustice.

  19. By way of an illustrative analogy, consider implicit bias: multiple overlapping and internalized norms about how to interact with members of a particular minority can be engaged by the various associations salient in a given situation. The combined effect that having this set of norms engaged will have for one’s behavior will tend to be stronger than what we would have if just one of the norms was engaged (Blair et al. 2002); so, other things equal, these sets of overlapping internalized norms will tend to bring biased behavior and they will tend to do so even if the individual also avows a norm directing her to act in an unbiased way when interacting with members of that group (Huebner 2016; Kelly, forthcoming).

  20. Two points. First, though male anger is an undeniable driver of violence, VAW is a complex problem with multiple causes. See Htun & Weldon 2012: 549–550 for discussion. Second, one might worry that the norms at issue in VAW are too different from the problematic emotion norms we’ve been looking at to offer much insight—in particular, the former concern norms governing the anger of members of the dominant group, while the latter concern norms regarding (e.g.) the anger of subordinated individuals. While the relevance of the VAW norms will become apparent below, here we can note that in both cases we are looking at ways to change internalized norms that tend to bring harm and abuse (thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to be clearer on this point).

  21. We get further confirmation from a second large-scale meta-study looking at SEL programing in after-school settings (Durlak et al. 2010). Also see: Yeager 2017 and Allen et al. 2020.

  22. Of note, successful SEL programs have also been developed for adults, providing more evidence that the relevance of the curriculum is broader than just getting children and adolescents off on the right foot. See, e.g., Conley 2015; Espelage et al. 2020.

  23. The impetus for this paper lies in a set of worries that Anna Gotlib raised during the Author Meets Critics session held on my book, The Anxious Mind, at the 2020 APA Central Meeting. Many thanks to her for inspiring the paper and thanks as well to Dan Kelly (another Critic at the APA session) for some hints as to where a solution to these worries might be found. In writing this paper, I have benefited from a grant from the Faculty Research and Creative Activities Award at Western Michigan University, as well as the work of two graduate research assistants: Marshall Peterson and Olivia Moskot. Many thanks to them as well as to two anonymous referees for very valuable feedback and to Juliette Vazard, Heidi Maibom, and Maria Waggoner for their helpful input on the manuscript.

References

  • Akyüz, S., & Sayan-Cengiz, F. (2016). Overcome your anger if you are a man. Women’s Studies International Forum (pp. 1–10). Pergamon

  • Allen, J., Narr, R., Nagel, A., Costello, M., & Guskin, K. (2020). The connection project.Development and Psychopathology,1–11

  • Archer, A., & Mills, G. (2019). Anger, affective injustice, and emotion regulation. Philosophical Topics, 47(2), 75–94

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bell, M. (2013). Hard feelings: The moral psychology of contempt. Oxford University Press

  • Blair, I., Judd, M., Sadler, M., & Jenkins, C. (2002). The role of Afrocentric features in person perception. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 5–25

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Calhoun, C. (2004). An apology for shame. Journal of political philosophy, 12, 127–146

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cherry, M. (2018). The errors and limitations of our “anger-evaluating” ways. In M. Cherry, & O. Flanagan (Eds.), The moral psychology of anger (pp. 49–65). Roman & Littlefield

  • Christiansen, J., & Leigh, I. (2002). Cochlear implants in children: Ethics and choices. Gallaudet University Press

  • Collins, P. H. (1990). Black feminist thought: Knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment. Routledge

  • Conley, C. (2015). SEL in higher education. In Durlak et al. 2015

  • Crockett, M. (2013). Models of morality. Trends in cognitive sciences, 17(8), 363–366

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • D’Arms, J., & Jacobson, D. (2000). Sentiment and value. Ethics, 110(4), 722–748

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, L., & Kelly, D. (2020). Minding the gap. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 37(2), 190–210

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Debates in Parliament: Session 1833 on the resolutions and bill for the abolition of slavery in the British colonies

  • Dimitrov, R. (2008). Gender violence, fan activism and public relations in sport. Public Relations Review, 34(2), 90–98

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dobbin, F., & Kalev, A. (2018). Why doesn’t diversity training work? Anthropology Now, 10, 48–55

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Doris, J. (2021). Character trouble: Undisciplined essays on moral agency and personality. Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Durlak, J., Domitrovich, C., Weissberg, R., & Gullotta, T. (2015). Handbook of social and emotional learning: Research and practice. The Guilford Press

  • Durlak, J., Weissberg, R., Dymnicki, A., Taylor, R., & Schellinger, K. (2011). The impact of enhancing students’ social and emotional learning. Child development, 82(1), 405–432

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Durlak, J., Weissberg, R., & Pachan, M. (2010). A meta-analysis of after-school programs that seek to promote personal and social skills in children and adolescents. American journal of community psychology, 45(3), 294–309

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Espelage, D. L., Valido, A., Sheikh, E., Robinson, A. J., Ingram, L. E., Torgal, K. M. … Poekert, C. (2020). P. E. Pilot evaluation of K-12 school security professionals online training.School Mental Health,1–14

  • Eurobarometer (2010). Domestic violence against women. https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/search/women/surveyKy/816. Accessed 15 January 2021

  • M. (2002–2003). Engaging men: Strategies and dilemmas in violence prevention education among men. Women Against Violence: A Feminist Journal, 13: 25–32

  • Freeman, M., & Abou Jaoudé, P. (2007). Justifying surgery’s last taboo. Journal of medical ethics, 33(2), 76–81

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing. Oxford University Press

  • Fricker, M. (1991). Reason and emotion. argument, 1, 169

  • Gardiner, S. (2011). A perfect moral storm. Oxford University Press

  • Gibbard, A. (1990). Wise choices, apt feelings. Harvard University Press

  • Gotlib, A. (2020). Commentary on Charlie Kurth’s The Anxious Mind. Chicago, IL: Central Meeting of the American Philosophical Association

    Google Scholar 

  • Harbin, A. (2016). Disorientation and moral life. Oxford University Press

  • Htun, M., & Weldon, S. (2012). The civic origins of progressive policy change.American Political Science Review,548–569

  • Huebner, B. (2016). Implicit bias, reinforcement learning, and scaffolded moral cognition. Implicit Bias and Philosophy: Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology (47–79). Oxford University Press

  • Huys, Q., Eshel, N., O’Nions, E., Sheridan, L., Dayan, P., & Roiser, J. (2012). Bonsai trees in your head.PLoS Computational Biology, 8(3), e1002410

  • Jaggar, A. M. (1989). Love and knowledge. Inquiry, 32(2), 151–176

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kauppinen, A. (2018). Valuing Anger. In The moral psychology of anger, M. Cherry and O. Flanagan (Eds). Roman & Littlefield, pp. 31–48

  • Kekes, J. (1996). The morality of pluralism. Princeton University Press

  • Kelly, D. (forthcoming). Two ways to accept a norm. The Oxford handbook of moral psychology, M. Vargas & J. Doris (Eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press

  • Kurth, C. (2019). Are emotions psychological constructions? Philosophy of science, 86, 1227–1238

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kurth, C. (2018a). The anxious mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kurth, C. (2018b). Anxiety: A case study on the value of negative emotions. In C. Tappolet, F. Teroni, & A. Konzelmann Ziv (Eds.), Shadows of the Soul. New York: Routledge

    Google Scholar 

  • Kurth, C. (2016). Anxiety, normative uncertainty, and social regulation. Biology & Philosophy, 31(1), 1–21

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kurth, C. (2015). Moral anxiety and moral agency. In M. Timmons (Ed.), Oxford studies in normative ethics (5 vol., pp. 171–195). Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kurth, C. (2013). What do our critical practices say about the nature of morality? Philosophical studies, 166, 45–64

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Liebow, N., & Glazer, T. (2019). White tears: emotion regulation and white fragility.Inquiry,1–21

  • Lorde, A. (1997). The uses of anger. Women’s Studies Quarterly, 25, 278–285

    Google Scholar 

  • MacKinnon, C. A. (1982). Feminism, Marxism, method, and the state. Signs: Journal of women in culture and society, 7(3), 515–544

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Madva, A. (2017). Biased against Debiasing. Ergo, 4, 145–179

    Google Scholar 

  • Manion, J. C. (2002). The moral relevance of shame. American Philosophical Quarterly, 39(1), 73–90

    Google Scholar 

  • Mason, M. (2010). On shamelessness. Philosophical Papers, 39(3), 401–425

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mills, C. (2007). White ignorance. In S. Sullivan, & N. Tuana (Eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance (pp. 13–38). Albany, NY: SUNY Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Moskowitz, G. (2010). On the Control over Stereotype Activation and Stereotype Inhibition. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4(2), 140–158

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nussbaum, M. (2016). Anger and forgiveness. Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Nussbaum, M. (2013). Political emotions. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Nussbaum, M. (2004). Hiding from humanity. Princeton: Princeton University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Pettigrove, G. (2012). Meekness and ‘moral’anger. Ethics, 122(2), 341–370

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Raymond, L., Weldon, S., Kelly, D., Arriaga, X., & Clark, A. (2014). Making change. Political Research Quarterly, 67(1), 197–211

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ross, H., & Lollis, S. (1987). Communication within infant social games. Developmental Psychology, 23, 241–248

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schwabe, L., & Wolf, O. (2013). Stress and multiple memory systems: from ‘thinking’to ‘doing’. Trends in cognitive sciences

  • Sheppes, G., & Gross, J. (2012). Emotion regulation effectiveness: What works when. Handbook of Psychology, Second Edition

  • Sheppes, G., & Meiran, N. (2007). Better late than never? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 33, 1518–1532

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shoemaker, D. (2018). You oughta know better: Defending angry blame. In M. Cherry, & O. Flanagan (Eds.), The moral psychology of anger (pp. 67–88). Roman & Littlefield

  • Spelman, E. (2007). Managing ignorance. In S. Sullivan, & N. Tuana (Eds.), Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance (pp. 119–131). Albany, NY: SUNY Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Spelman, E. (1989). Anger and insubordination. Women, knowledge, and reality, 263–273

  • Srinivasan, A. (2018). The aptness of anger. Journal of Political Philosophy, 26(2), 123–144

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sripada, C. (2014).How is Willpower Possible? Noûs, 48(1),41–74

    Google Scholar 

  • Sripada, C., & Stich, S. (2007). A framework for the psychology of norms. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence, & S. Stich (Eds.), The Innate Mind (pp. 280–301). Oxford: Oxford University Press

    Google Scholar 

  • Tangney, J. (1995). Shame and guilt in interpersonal relations. In Self-conscious emotions, edited by J. Tangney and K. Fischer, 114– 142. New York: The Guilford Press

  • Thaler, R., & Sunstein, C. (2009). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness. Penguin

  • Theriault, J. E., Young, L., & Barrett, L. F. (2021). The sense of should. Physics of Life Reviews, 36, 100–136

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomason, K. (2018). Naked. Oxford University Press

  • Weissberg, R., Durlak, J., Domitrovich, C., & Gullotta, T. (2015). Social and emotional learning: Past, present, and future. In Durlak et al. 2015

  • Weldon, S. (2006). Inclusion, solidarity, and social movements. Perspectives on Politics, 4(1), 55–74

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yeager, D. (2017). Social and emotional learning programs for adolescents. Future of children, 27, 73–94

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, Michigan, USA

    Charlie Kurth

Authors
  1. Charlie Kurth
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Additional information

Publisher’s Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Kurth, C. Inappropriate emotions, marginalization, and feeling better. Synthese 200, 155 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03619-9

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-022-03619-9

Search

Navigation