Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Bodies and minds, heaps and syllables

  • Original Research
  • Published:
Synthese Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper the explanatory gap of the philosophy of mind is explored, and found to have a similar structure even in different framings of the mind–body problem (MBP). This leads to the consideration that the MBP may be a special case of the more general whole-part problem: how do properties of wholes arise from the particular assembly of isolated parts? The conclusion is argued that only an approach of mereological holism offers (some) solace from the explanatory gap problem, exchanging it for a reverse explanatory gap problem that has more promising prospects for future solution, possibly in the form of integrated information theory. These considerations, along with the problem of explaining qualia lead to a proposed solution to the MBP in holistic cosmopsychism.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. The fine distinctions between dual-aspect or multi-aspect monism vs. neutral monism (spelled out in more detail in Atmanspacher 2014) need not detain us here.

  2. The Binding Problem of neuroscience is an empirical variant of the Combination Problem.

  3. Holism does not require us to deny the existence of parts. It only requires that those parts be assumed to be ontologically posterior (i.e., derivative and not fundamental).

  4. This includes a discussion of the aforementioned split-brain and dissociative cases, as well as differentiations between conscious, paraconscious and unconscious brain activity, see Oizumi et al. (2014, p. 16).

  5. Recall that some thinkers combine physicalism and micropsychism, as in Strawson (2006).

  6. The theoretical approach outlined here is essentially the same as that outlined by Oizumi et al.: “these phenomenological properties should be considered as intrinsic properties of physical mechanisms arranged in a certain way, meaning that a complex of physical mechanisms in a certain state is necessarily associated with its quale.” (2014, p. 15). This approach implies multi-aspect monism, or Strawson-ian physicalism (2006), and requires holism to avoid explanatory gap problems.

  7. IIT also takes as axiomatic that any conscious system will also be compositional—i.e., (1) a whole composed of proper parts that it cannot be completely reduced to in isolation, (2) is an informational state that specifies causal differences between other states, and (3) is exclusionary, that is, a conscious state of a system is identical with the maximally integrated state of all the subsets of the system.

References

  • Appleby, M. (2014). Mind and matter: A critique of cartesian thinking. In H. Atmanspacher & C. A. Fuchs (Eds.), The Pauli-Jung conjecture and its impact today. (pp. 7–36). Ingram books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aristotle. (1984). The complete works of aristotle, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes (pp. 1552–1728).

  • Aristotle, M. (1960). Metaphysics. University of Michigan Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Atmanspacher, H. (2014). 20th century variants of dual-aspect thinking. Mind and Matter, 12(2), 245–288

    Google Scholar 

  • Baxter, D. (1998). Many-one identity. Philosophical Papers, 17, 193–216

    Google Scholar 

  • Bohm, D. (2010). A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter. Philosophical Psychology, 3(2), 217–286.

    Google Scholar 

  • Braude, S. E. (1995). First person plural. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers inc.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brentano, F. (1874). [1995] The distinction between mental and physical phenomena. In D. B. Terrell, A. C. Rancurello, & L. L. McAlister (Eds.), Psychology from an empirical standpoint.Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cardena, E. (2018). The experimental evidence for parapsychological phenomena: A review. The American Psychologist, 73(5), 663–677.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. J. (1996). The conscious mind. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. J. (2012). Consciousness and its place in nature. In D. J. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings.Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chalmers, D. J. (2016). The combination problem for panpsychism. In D. J. Chalmers (Ed.), Panpsychism. (pp. 179–215). Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chisolm, R. M. (1957). Perceiving. Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P. (1981). Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Churchland, P. (1996). The rediscovery of light. Journal of Philosophy, 93, 211–228.

    Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, D (Ed.). (2009). Berkeley: Philosophical writings. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Corcoran, K. (Ed.). (2001). Soul, body and survival. Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • D'Espagnat, B. (2006). On physics and philosophy. Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dempsey, L. (2013). The side left untouched: Panpsychism, embodiment, and the explanatory gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 20, 61–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1981). True believers. In A. F. Heath (Ed.), Scientific explanations.Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1988). Quining qualia. In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (Eds.), Consciousness in contemporary science.Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett, D. C. (1992). Consciousness explained. Back Bay Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Descartes, R. (1985). Meditations on first philosophy. Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feigl, H. (1958). The “mental” and the “physical.” In H. Feigl, M. Scriven, & G. Maxwell (Eds.), Concepts, theories and the mind-body problem. University of Minnesota Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freeman, W. (2000). How brains make up their minds. Columbia University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goff, P. (2017). Consciousness and fundamental reality. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horgan, T. (1993). From supervenience to superdupervenience. Mind, 102, 555–586.

    Google Scholar 

  • James, W. (1981). [1890] The principles of psychology. New York: Dover.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jung, C. G. (1985). [1954] The practice of psychotherapy. Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kelley Edward, F., Kelly Emily, W., Adam, C., Alan, G., Michael, G., & Bruce, G. (Eds.). (2010). Irreducible mind. Rowman and Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keppler, J. & Shani, I. (2020). Cosmopsychism and consciousness research: A fresh view on the causal mechanisms of underlying phenomenal states. Frontiers in Psychology, 11, 371. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00371.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J. (1992). Multiple realization and the metaphysics of reduction. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52, 1–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J. (2006). Emergence: Core ideas and issues. Synthese, 151, 547–559.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kim, J. (2010). Philosophy of mind. (3rd ed.). Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kong, J., Jiménez-Martinez, R., Troullinou, C., Lucivero, V., Tóth, G., & Mitchell, M. W. (2020). Measurement-induced, spatially-extended entanglement in a hot, strongly-interacting atomic system. Nature Communications, 11, 2415. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-15899-1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koons Robert, C., & George, B. (Eds.). (2010). The waning of materialism. Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and necessity. Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levine, J. (1983). Materialism and qualia. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings. (pp. 354–361). Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McGinn, C. (1989). Can we solve the mind-body problem? Mind, 98, 349–366.

    Google Scholar 

  • McLaughlin, B. P. (2008). The rise and fall of British emergentism. In M. A. Bedau & P. Humphreys (Eds.), Emergence: Contemporary readings in philosophy and science.A Bradford Book.

    Google Scholar 

  • Morgan, M. L., & Shirley, S. (Eds.). (2002). Spinoza: Complete works. Hackett Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? Philosophical review 83: 435–450, quote. In D. Chalmers (Ed.), Philosophy of mind: Classical and contemporary readings. (pp. 219–225). Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Oizumi, M., Albantakis, L., & Tonini, G. (2014). From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated information theory 3.0. PLoS Comput Biol, 10(5), e1003588. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peacocke, C. (1983). Sensation and the content of experience. In Sense and content. Oxford University Press.

  • Place, U. T. (1956). Is consciousness a brain process? British Journal of Psychology, 47, 44–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rauch, D., Handsteiner, J., Armin, H., Gallicchio, J., Friedman, A. S., Leung, C., Liu, B., Bulla, L., Ecker, S., Steinlechner, F., Ursin, R., Hu, B., Leon, D., Benn, C., Chedina, A., Cecconi, M., Guth, A., Kaiser, D. I., Scheidl, T., & Zeilinger, A. (2018). Cosmic bell test using random measurement settings from high-redshift quasars. Physical Review Letters. https://doi.org/10.1103/PhysRevLett.121.080403.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Russell, B. (1927). The analysis of matter. Martino Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ryle, G. (1949). Descartes myth. In Hutchinson (Ed.), The concept of mind.University of Oxford.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaffer, J. (2010). Monism: The priority of the whole. Philosophical Review, 119, 31–76.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schaffer, J. (2017). The ground between the gaps. Philosopher’s Imprint, 17(11), 1–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shani, I. (2015). Cosmopsychism: A holistic approach to the metaphysics of experience. Philosophical Papers, 44(3), 389–437.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and brain processes. Philosophical Review, 68, 141–156.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smit H., & Hacker, P. M. S. (2014). Seven misconceptions about the mereological fallacy: A compiliation for the perplexed. Erkenn, 79, 1077–1097.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stapp, H. (2011). Mindful universe: Quantum mechanics and the participating observer. Springer.

    Google Scholar 

  • Strawson, G. (2006). Realistic monism: Why physicalism entails panpsychism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 3–31.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tononi, G. (2008). Consciousness as integrated information: A provisional manifesto. Biological Bulletin, 215, 216–242.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tononi, G. (2012). Integrated information theory of consciousness: An updated account. Archives Italiennes De Biologie, 150, 56–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van der Hart, O., Nijenhuis, E., & Steel, K. (2006). The haunted self. New York: W. W. Norton and Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Inwagen, P. (1994). Composition as identity. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 207–220.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vazza, F. (2017). On the complexity and the information content of cosmic structures. Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society, 465(4), 4942–4855.

    Google Scholar 

  • Yablo, S. (1992). Mental causation. Philosophical Review, 101, 245–280.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to Jonathan Schaffer for his help and insightful critiques of the present work.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Director, Psychotherapy Training, Department of Psychiatry, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY, USA

    Erik Goodwyn

Authors
  1. Erik Goodwyn
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Erik Goodwyn.

Additional information

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Goodwyn, E. Bodies and minds, heaps and syllables. Synthese 199, 8831–8855 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03184-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03184-7

Keywords

Search

Navigation