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Idealization and abstraction: refining the distinction

  • S.I. : Abstraction and Idealization in Scientific Modelling
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Abstract

Idealization and abstraction are central concepts in the philosophy of science and in science itself. My goal in this paper is suggest an account of these concepts, building on and refining an existing view due to Jones (in: Jones MR, Cartwright N (eds) Idealization XII: correcting the model. Idealization and abstraction in the sciences, vol 86. Rodopi, Amsterdam, pp 173–217, 2005) and Godfrey-Smith (in: Barberousse A, Morange M, Pradeu T (eds) Mapping the future of biology: evolving concepts and theories. Springer, Berlin, 2009). On this line of thought, abstraction—which I call, for reasons to be explained, abstractness—involves the omission of detail, whereas idealization consists in a deliberate mismatch between a description (or a model) and the world. I will suggest that while the core idea underlying these authors’ view is correct, they make several assumptions and stipulations that are best avoided. For one thing, they tie abstractness too close to truth. For another, they do not allow sufficient room to the difference between idealization and error. Taking these points into account leads to a refined account of the distinction, in which abstractness is seen in terms of relative richness of detail, and idealization is seen as closely connected with the knowledge and intentions of idealizers. I lay out these accounts in turn, and then discuss the relationship between the two concepts, and several other upshots of the present way of construing the distinction.

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Notes

  1. Others have expressed similar views—e.g. Cartwright (1999), Elliot-Greaves and Weisberg (2014), Frigg (2006), Nowak (1992), Strevens (2008) and Weisberg (2013). But since these authors do not provide extended, argued-for accounts of the distinction itself, I won't discuss their work in detail.

  2. Jones: "[A] given representation can contain an idealization, or an abstraction, or neither, but it cannot contain both." (2005, p. 176).

  3. Godfrey-Smith does note that “ignoring some features in a description of a system is inevitable to some extent in any description. The question is only how much is left out, and what is retained.” (p. 48) but does not construe the notion of abstraction in the comparative way I have. Jones devotes more space to degrees of abstraction (2005, §4), but explicitly regards that as derivative from the idea of abstraction as omission of detail.

  4. This requirement is explicit in Michael Strevens’ view of abstraction (2008, Ch. 3). A related claim is Cartwright’s requirement that an “satisfying the associated concrete description that applies on a particular occasion is what satisfying the abstract description consists in on that occasion” (1999, p. 39). For it follows from Cartwright’s claim that the abstract and concrete description have the same truth maker. On a natural understanding of subject matters, they should thereby have the same subject matter.

  5. Two comments: First, we could weaken (i), having it state that A's subject matter is either identical to, or contained within, B's subject matter. In that case we'll have defined "weak abstractness", i.e. a definition of when A is at least as abstract as B. Second, Strevens speaks in terms of causal models and requires that "all causal influences described by [A] are also described by [B]" (Ibid, 97). My account is not restricted to causal representations.

  6. I should note that here, and throughout, I am understanding the information (and/or detail) contained in a representation in objective terms. Or at least, in terms that do not pertain to any individual’s state of belief, knowledge etc. If two representations differ in their degree of detail than (all else equal) that should be so irrespective of who produces or consumes the representations.

  7. Jones explicitly denies that idealizations need be intentional. Godfrey-Smith states that idealization consists of “treating things as having features they clearly do not have” (2009, p. 47), which may suggest an intentional element. But he does not emphasize the contrast with error, which I take to be important.

  8. Either one or two, depending on whether one counts flexibility as separate from the assumption that the polymer is a jointed chain/long rod.

  9. Note that I am not claiming that the two models have similar explanatory or predictive power. They do not. I'm only highlighting the fact that while both are idealized, one is more abstract than the other.

  10. Specifically, Woodward thinks of “same-object” generality as important: the more information we get about what would happen to the system under consideration in alternate circumstances, the better. Here, counterfactual scope is at issue—scope as regards the number of “ways the world could have been”.

  11. Details of the ribosome's molecular structure, for instance, matter greatly for some purposes (Ramakrishnan 2014).

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  1. Philosophy Department, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus, 91905, Jerusalem, Israel

    Arnon Levy

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Levy, A. Idealization and abstraction: refining the distinction. Synthese 198 (Suppl 24), 5855–5872 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1721-z

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