Abstract
We explore two ways of distinguishing the semantic operation of kind terms. First, we focus on a distinction between terms with a flexible versus terms with an inflexible semantics. Flexibility depends on whether some changes in the domain of application are taken to be possible while being consistent with past usage and what is intuitively the same meaning. On the other hand we discuss terms whose mode of operation is tolerant, in that the cohabitation in the speakers’ community of more than one use or practice of use of the term in question is accepted. Those terms contrast with terms that operate in a strict way restricting severely the legitimacy of different uses that cut the domain of application in different ways. Among the latter we include terms with an ethical component and terms whose correct application involves high stakes. These distinctions are not new, since the phenomena that we identify as flexibility and tolerance have been observed, although in our view they have not been properly systematized and assessed. We argue that the two distinctions throw light on the bases of some disputes and on some legal disagreements.
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Notes
The principle is supposed to apply to singular and general terms. For the purposes of the discussion here we leave aside singular terms.
Of course, a change in meaning is always possible. For instance, the error may generalize and the community may end up applying ‘water’ to l and similar samples.
Secretariat was number 35 and there were two other non-humans in the ESPN list, both racing horses: Man o'War (number 84) and Citation (number 97).
We could say that flexibility or inflexibility as regards the use of a term t is an attribute of the community not of the semantics or the use of the term. But the phenomenon has immediate semantic consequences, for it translates into the semantic permissibility of alternative paths as regards what is included and what is excluded from the extension of t.
See https://www.olympic.org/news/communique-of-the-olympic-summit, Jenny et al. (2017) and Pérez Triviño (2017).
Unless of course one wishes to argue that any addition of a newly encountered or created thing or kind of thing, or any subtraction or a previously included item is a change in meaning. We do not think that such a strategy is well founded. As Perry (2011) has argued, the addition of the red-eared frog to the list of endangered species does not alter the meaning of ‘endangered species’.
This line of argument is not the one ultimately recommended by Mercier to be the basis for the judges’ decision. See Mercier (2007).
An interesting issue has to do with whether judges can establish meaning. See Epstein (2015) for an argument against judges’ semantic authority.
Although the authors do have, of course, their own sympathies, not entirely consonant with one another.
Again, as in the case of flexibility, it could be said that it is the community that is or is not tolerant in its usage. And, like in the case of flexibility the semantic impact of the attribution of tolerance or strictness should be clear, for the level of tolerance depends crucially, as we will see, on the intentions that bestow meaning on a term.
An interesting question has to do with what makes one or the other use of ‘fruit’ correct in different contexts. That, we contend depends on all kinds of non-semantic factors, having to do with the broad context of use. But the issue is rather complex as it affects also the correctness of a judicial ruling. In the 1893 case it seems quite clear that the focus on the culinary use was sound. Had the dispute been about scientific issues, the appeal to the culinary use of ‘fruit’ might have been incorrect. We are not espousing here a robust conception of legal correctness, in the sense of Dworkin’s (1977) right answer thesis. We keep neutral between that approach and an approach closer to Kelsen’s (2005, chapter 8), a view that appeals only to the culturally acceptable character of interpretations in legal contexts.
Some may argue that the phenomenon highlighted here is pragmatic, explained in terms of modulation or enrichment. Here we are taking a classical stance, and we regard the differences between different usages as semantic.
Tolerance, like flexibility, is a time sensitive phenomenon. More than one use may be acceptable at a given point and not at another. It is interesting to note also that the cohabitation of uses is not always peaceful, and often one use ends up prevailing while another one is abandoned. An illustration of this point is the case of the culinary use of ‘fish’, a usage that included cetaceans in the past and that definitely excludes them in the present.
This is not to say that they were legally at fault. They simply lacked the knowledge we possess now.
Surely there are other uses of ‘dead’ (‘dead battery’; ‘dead marriage’; ‘dead color’…). We are interested here in the core meaning from which all those other uses have sprung metaphorically. The latter are, excuse the pun, dead metaphors.
Could a group of people succeed in introducing an expression that separated some human beings from other human beings, and proceed to use it to discriminate against some groups? Unfortunately, yes, of course, they could. But (as we have argued in the case of ‘death’), it would not be our expression ‘human being’.
It is worth stressing also that the distinctions are entirely independent of whether the theory of meaning endorsed is descriptivist or anti-descriptivist. For a discussion of how different theories of meaning account for legal disagreements see Martí and Ramírez-Ludeña (2016).
We are very grateful to two anonymous referees for Synthese for their helpful comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to Carl Hoefer, Diego M. Papayannis, José Luís Pérez Triviño and Josep M. Vilajosana for comments and discussion. Versions of this paper were presented at the Conference Natural Kinds: Ontology and Semantics (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, March 2017), the Metaphysics in the Law Conference (Universitat de Barcelona, May 2017) and the Seminar in Metaphysics (Universitat de Barcelona, March 2018), and we are grateful to the audiences. We have also benefited from discussion with The Zoom Group. We acknowledge the support of the Spanish MINECO (DER2016-80471-C2-1R and FFI2015-70707-P), the AGAUR of the Generalitat de Catalunya, and the Diaphora Project (H2020-MSCA-ITN-2015-675415).
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Martí, G., Ramírez-Ludeña, L. Tolerance, flexibility and the application of kind terms. Synthese 198 (Suppl 12), 2973–2986 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01898-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01898-9