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Kinds of process and the levels of selection

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Abstract

Most attempts to answer the question of whether populations of groups can undergo natural selection focus on properties of the groups themselves rather than the dynamics of the population of groups. Those approaches to group selection that do emphasize dynamics lack an account of the relevant notion of equivalent dynamics. I show that the theory of ‘dynamical kinds’ I proposed in Jantzen (Synthese 192(11):3617–3646, 2014) can be used as a framework for assessing dynamical equivalence. That theory is based upon the notion of a dynamical symmetry, a transformation of a system that commutes with its evolution through time. In the proposed framework, structured sets of dynamical symmetries are used to pick out equivalence classes of systems. These classes are large enough to encompass the range of phenomena we associate with natural selection, yet restrictive enough to guarantee a sort of causal homogeneity. By characterizing dynamical kinds via symmetry structures in this way, the question of levels of selection becomes a precise question about which populations respect the dynamical symmetries of Darwinian evolution. Standard population genetic models suggest that populations undergoing evolution by natural selection are partially characterized by a group of fitness-scaling symmetries. I demonstrate conditions under which these symmetries may be satisfied by populations of individuals, populations of groups of individuals, or both simultaneously.

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Notes

  1. See Okasha (2006b, 2011) for an overview of the historical arc of the debate, and Lloyd (2012) for a survey of some of the conceptual issues raised.

  2. Nor is it unorthodox. In his consideration of the evidence for or against selection at various levels of the structural hierarchy, Hull (1980, pp. 312–313) proposes “...to investigate the general characteristics of the evolutionary process at some length and then to discuss only briefly the particular entities that may or may not possess the characteristics necessary to function in this process” (emphasis added). More recently, Godfrey-Smith (2009, p. 109) dedicates a chapter to ‘...the idea that Darwinian processes occur at different “levels” (emphasis added).

  3. See also Godfrey-Smith (2007).

  4. I intend this not as a demand, but rather a plea to try out a heretofore unexplored perspective.

  5. Equations (3) and (4) represent what Damuth and Heisler (1988) refer to as multilevel selection (1) [MLS1 in Okasha (2006a)], while Eqs. (6)–(8) represent the multilevel selection (2) perspective [MLS2 in Okasha (2006a)].

  6. Wilson (2003) calls this position “model pluralism” (and argues against it).

  7. A related and more extensive argument for informational asymmetry can be found in Lloyd et al. (2008).

  8. Even this much may be impossible if not all particles join groups.

  9. The reason for this restriction is that asserting causal relations amongst variables is problematic when some of those variables are related by logical entailment. For illuminating discussions of the problem, see Spirtes (2009) and Woodward (2015). But if we stick to the scenarios in which group types and frequencies are independent of particle frequencies in the sense that it is possible to intervene on one while holding the other fixed, no such problems arise.

  10. This is not how I motivate the account in Jantzen (2014). Rather I argue for accepting dynamical kinds as a (partial) solution to what I call the epistemic question of natural kinds: what, if anything, do categories that sustain inductive generalization have in common? My examples in that paper are drawn from a wider range of scientific disciplines, including physics and chemistry.

  11. For an overview, see, e.g., May and McLean (2007). In all realistic circumstances, growth is stochastic.

  12. This really does happen: see Hamrin and Persson (1986).

  13. The model used to generate data for system A is a zero-growth model: \(\dot{x}_i=0\). For system B, it was assumed that the populations obey the two-species competitive Lotka–Volterra model in which \(\dot{x}_1 = r_1 x_1 (1 - (x_1 + \alpha _{1,2} x_2)/K1)\) and \(\dot{x}_2 = r_2 x_2 (1 - (x_2 + \alpha _{2,1} x_1)/K2)\).

  14. Specifically, \(r=\alpha _{i,j}=0\).

  15. This is what I call a ‘dynamical symmetry with respect to time’ in Jantzen (2014). The concept of a dynamical symmetry simpliciter is rather broader than this, and applies to atemporal causal systems.

  16. Elsewhere (Jantzen 2017b, p. 20), I have suggested that there is no reason a priori to rule out dynamical symmetries that have no inverse, and so it would be more accurate to say that symmetries form monoids.

  17. By ‘non-trivial’, I mean that it is not the case the all transformations are dynamical symmetries as would be so if none of the variables in the system are causally related to one another.

  18. The haploid version of the RME is taken from Page and Nowak (2002, p. 97). The diploid version was constructed by the author using the discrete analogues of terms appearing in the continuous time RME for sexual reproduction as presented in “Appendix” of the same paper.

  19. It is sufficient for being an instance of the RME that the two allele types have identical fitnesses. It is not necessary for each allele in a group to share a common fate for this to be the case. (I thank Peter Gildenhuys for pointing this out.) In this sense, the condition of “common fate” on which Sober and Wilson (1994) have insisted is too strong.

  20. Specifically, they are instances of the diploid RME for two distinct types for which \(Q_{000}=1,Q_{010}=Q_{100}=\frac{1}{4}, Q_{110}=0,Q_{001}=0,Q_{011}=Q_{101}=\frac{1}{4},Q_{111}=1\), and \(R_{00}=\alpha _2,R_{01}=R_{10}=\alpha _1+\beta _1=2\alpha _1,R_{11}=\beta _0\).

  21. Specifically, they are instances of the diploid RME for which \(Q_{000}=1, Q_{010}=\frac{1}{2}, Q_{011}=\frac{1}{2},Q_{021}=1,Q_{110}=\frac{1}{4},Q_{111}=\frac{1}{2},Q_{112}=\frac{1}{4}, Q_{121}=\frac{1}{2},Q_{122}=\frac{1}{4},Q_{222}=1\) (with the remaining unspecified values of \(Q_{ijk}=0\)), and \(R_{00}=\beta _0^2, R_{01}=\beta _0\beta _1, R_{02}=\alpha _2 \beta _0, R_{11}=\beta _1^2, R_{12}=\alpha _2 \beta _1,R_{22}=\alpha _2^2\). Note that the values of the \(Q_{ijk}\) are just the probabilities one would expect for Mendelian segregation.

  22. Determining the complete symmetry structure of a system of differential equations is generally quite difficult, though at least there are some standard tools (see, e.g., Oliveri 2010). Doing so for discrete recurrence relations is even harder, and so far as I am aware, there are no systematic methods for doing so. This is, at least in a practical sense, a weakness of my dynamical kinds account.

  23. This particular symmetry is emphasized by Wagner (2010) in the context of Wright’s selection equation (a special case of the RME). In that paper, Wagner suggests a new fitness concept built from pairwise competition tests between types, a concept that assumes nothing about population growth or structure (unlike the notions of fitness as expected number of offspring or intrinsic growth rate for a type that I’ve been using). He shows that, when certain conditions are met, the resulting concept is representable on a ratio scale. Consequently, those same conditions guarantee that fitness scaling (with respect to Wright’s model and fitness as the growth rate of a type) is a dynamical symmetry. In effect, the new notion of fitness proposed by Wagner is what remains when one equates states of an evolving population that are connected by this dynamical symmetry.

  24. The RME is really only a partial theory. Just like Newton’s Laws of Motion are empty without a specification of one or more force laws, the RME is empty without a further specification of the ways in which fitnesses can depend on time and population states.

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Acknowledgements

I am grateful to Peter Gildenhuys and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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Correspondence to Benjamin C. Jantzen.

Appendix: Violating the fitness-scaling symmetry

Appendix: Violating the fitness-scaling symmetry

It is straightforward to show that fitness scaling is not a symmetry of Eqs. (6)–(8) unless the fitnesses \(\alpha _1\) and \(\beta _1\) are directly proportional under all possible transformations of the system that scale group fitnesses. Each of the dynamical equations in this case is a difference equation, expressing a type frequency at time \(t+1\) in terms of type frequencies and fitnesses at time t. For ease of notation, let \(\mathbf {s}(t)=\langle f_0(t),f_1(t),f_2(t),\omega _0(t), \omega _1(t), \omega _2(t) \rangle \) stand for state of the system at a time t. The variables \(\omega _i\) are meant to represent the group type fitnesses. Group fitness \(\omega _i\) in the discrete-time case represents the expected total number of offspring produced by a group of type i. Group fitnesses do not appear explicitly in Eqs. (6)–(8), but there is a simple connection between them and the particle fitnesses \(\alpha _1, \alpha _2, \beta _0, \beta _1\). Since groups are assumed to be of fixed size, it must be the case that each \(\omega _i\) is proportional to \(\pi _i\) as defined by Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2002). Really, each group fitness is the average of the particle fitnesses weighted by the proportion of each particle type appearing in the group. In the two-particle case, this means that \(\omega _0 = \beta _0\), \(\omega _2=\alpha _2\), and \(\omega _1 = \frac{1}{2}(\alpha _1+\beta _1)\). It is this last fitness relation that is problematic.

To see why, we have to consider the relevant transformations. We are interested in fitness-scaling as a set of transformations of group-level variables. There is one fitness scaling transformation, \(\mathbf {\sigma }_k\) for every positive real-valued k. These transformations have the effect of multiplying all group fitnesses by a common factor:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf {\sigma }_k(\mathbf {s}(t)) = \langle f_0(t),f_1(t),f_2(t),k\omega _0(t), k\omega _1(t), k\omega _2(t) \rangle \end{aligned}$$

According to the definition of dynamical symmetry, \(\mathbf {\sigma }_k\) is a symmetry of the group dynamics just if the system state is the same whether we apply \(\mathbf {\sigma }_k\) and then use Eqs. (6)–(8) to evolve the system, or first evolve the system and then apply \(\mathbf {\sigma }_k\). Let \(\varLambda _i\) be the function mapping the state of the system at time t to the value of \(f_i\) at time \(t+1\). If \(\mathbf {\sigma }_k\) is a symmetry, then it must be that for \(i=0,1,2\):

$$\begin{aligned} f_i(t+1)=\varLambda _i(f_0(t),f_1(t), f_2(t), k \omega _0(t), k \omega _1(t),k \omega _2(t)) \end{aligned}$$
(15)

Consider just \(f_0(t+1)\). Dividing the numerator and denominator of the right-hand side of Eq. (6) by \(\frac{1}{2}\beta _1\) gives:

$$\begin{aligned} f_0(t+1) = \frac{(2 \frac{\beta _0}{\beta _1} f_0(t)+f_1(t))^2}{\left( 2\frac{\alpha _2}{\beta _1} f_2(t)+ 2\frac{\beta _0}{\beta _1}f_0(t)+\frac{(\alpha _1+\beta _1)}{\beta _1}f_1(t)\right) ^2} \end{aligned}$$
(16)

A transformation mapping \(\omega _0\) to \(k \omega _0\) is identical with one which maps \(\beta _0\) to \(k \beta _0\) at the particle level. The same scaling transformation must also take \(\alpha _2\) to \(k \alpha _2\). However, the mapping from \(\omega _1\) to \(k \omega _1\) does not correspond to a unique transformation of particle-fitnesses. In the most general case, we have two functions, g and h such that \(g(\alpha _1)+h(\beta _1)=k(\alpha _1+\beta _1)\). Any choice of functions satisfying this condition is equivalent to the single group fitness transformation—the transformation is infinitely degenerate from the particle perspective. However, if the transformation is to satisfy (15), then it must be the case that the coefficient of \(f_1(t)\) in the denominator is constant under the scaling transformation. In other words, it must be the case that:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{g(\alpha _1)+h(\beta _1)}{h(\beta _1)}=\frac{\alpha _1+\beta _1}{\beta _1} \end{aligned}$$
(17)

Since \(g(\alpha _1)+h(\beta _1)=k(\alpha _1+\beta _1)\), we have that \(\frac{k(\alpha _1+\beta _1)}{h(\beta _1)}=\frac{\alpha _1+\beta _1}{\beta _1}\), and thus \(h(\beta _1)=k\beta _1\). Likewise, since, \(\frac{g(\alpha _1)+k\beta _1}{k\beta _1}=\frac{\alpha _1+\beta _1}{\beta _1}\) it must be that \(g(\alpha _1)=k\alpha _1\). Thus, in order for the group fitness scaling transformation to be a symmetry, it must be the case that:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{g(\alpha _1)}{h(\beta _1)}=\frac{\alpha _1}{\beta _1} \end{aligned}$$
(18)

In plain language, the ratio of the particle fitnesses must remain fixed under all transformations of the group fitnesses. As a consequence, if the ratio of \(\alpha _1\) to \(\beta _1\) is not fixed under all group fitness scaling transformations, then fitness scaling is not a symmetry of the group-level dynamics, and the population of groups is not a Darwinian evolver.

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Jantzen, B.C. Kinds of process and the levels of selection. Synthese 196, 2407–2433 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1546-1

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