Abstract
Explanations of biological phenomena such as cell division, protein synthesis or circadian rhythms commonly take the form of models of the responsible mechanisms. Recently philosophers of science have attempted to analyze this practice, presenting mechanisms as organized collections of parts performing operations that together produce the phenomenon. But in some cases what researchers seek to explain is not a general phenomenon, but a specific feature of a more fine-grained phenomenon. In some of these cases, it is not the model of the mechanism that performs the explanatory work. I consider a case in which the investigator offered an abstract representation of a fine-grained phenomenon to show why in had the feature in question. I consider a second case in which a researcher abstracted from the mechanism to identify a design principle that explains why the functioning mechanism exhibits a specific feature.
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Notes
In Levy and Bechtel (2013) we explore how abstracting from details of a mechanism can reveal the organization of the mechanism that is responsible for certain phenomena. In this paper I extend the focus on abstraction as a tool for developing explanations further.
Although the clock metaphor was actually introduced by Brown, who was one of the last holdouts for the view that circadian rhythms depended on environmental cues, Pittendrigh soon adopted it to characterize the endogenous mechanism he took to be responsible.
There has been substantial disagreement over whether computational models explain. Focusing on the mathematical model of the action potential advanced by Hodgkin and Huxley (1952), Weber (2008) defended it as explanatory while Craver (2008) argued that it did not explain since it did not describe the mechanism. Subsequently, Levy (2013) argued that Hodgkin and Huxley offered a deliberately abstract account but one that does explain the action potential in terms of component currents. The computational accounts discussed by Bechtel and Abrahamsen, Brigandt, and Baetu, in contrast, are tightly linked to mechanistic accounts—the differential equations in these models are drawn from the operations thought to constitute the mechanism. Although invoking mathematical derivations, these models are in the service of showing how mechanisms work and arguably in many cases one cannot show that the mechanism can produce the phenomenon except by using such models. At least in these cases, computational models seem to be critical to mechanistic explanation. Other mathematical models, such as those discussed by Chemero and Silberstein (2008), are models of phenomena, not mechanisms. The example from Winfree discussed below suggest a relatively clear way in which these models are explanatory as long as one is clear about what is being explained.
With the discovery that it was the concentrations of proteins such as PER that oscillated, the clock stopping can be understood as the concentration of these proteins reaching a constant level and no longer oscillating.
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Acknowledgements
I thank two anonymous referees for this journal for their very helpful comments and suggestions. I also thank John Norton and visiting fellows at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh in 2014–15 for their spirited discussion of an earlier draft of this paper. Likewise, I thank members of the audience at a workshop on Describing the Abstract and Representing the Real at the University of Cyprus, Nicosia, Cyprus in June, 2015.
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Bechtel, W. Explaining features of fine-grained phenomena using abstract analyses of phenomena and mechanisms: two examples from chronobiology. Synthese 198 (Suppl 24), 1–23 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1469-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1469-x