Intrinsicality and counterpart theory
It is shown that counterpart theory and the duplication account of intrinsicality—two key pieces of the Lewisian package—are incompatible. In particular, the duplication account yields the result that certain intuitively extrinsic modal properties are intrinsic. Along the way I consider a potentially more general worry concerning certain existential closures of internal relations. One conclusion is that, unless the Lewisian provides an adequate alternative to the duplication account, the reductive nature of their total theory is in jeopardy.
KeywordsIntrinsicality Counterpart theory Modality Duplicate
I would like to thank the audiences at Utrecht University, SIFA 2012 (Italy), the Northern Institute of Philosophy, and the University of St Andrews. I would also like to thank, in particular, Ralph Bader, Julia Langkau, Thomas Müller, and Elia Zardini, for very helpful discussion. This research was funded by the European Research Council under the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013)/ERC Grant agreement nr 263227.
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Human and animal participants
The author hereby declares that the research carried out in the production of the submitted manuscript involved no human participants and no animals.
Conflict of interest
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