Conditional choice with a vacuous second tier
- 260 Downloads
This paper studies a generalization of rational choice theory. I briefly review the motivations that Helzner gives for his conditional choice construction (2013). Then, I focus on the important class of conditional choice functions with vacuous second tiers. This class is interesting for both formal and philosophical reasons. I argue that this class makes explicit one of conditional choice’s normative motivations in terms of an account of neutrality advocated within a certain tradition in decision theory. The observations recorded—several of which are generalizations of central results in the standard theory of rational choice—are intended to provide further insight into how conditional choice generalizes the standard account and are offered as additional evidence of the fruitfulness of the conditional choice framework.
KeywordsRational choice Decision theory Uncertainty Value conflict Conditional judgment
Thanks are due to John Collins, Jeff Helzner, Tobias Lessmeister, Isaac Levi, Yang Liu, Ignacio Ojea, Paul Pedersen, Hans Rott, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions.
- Arló-Costa, H., & Pedersen, A. P. (2011). Social norms, rational choice and belief change. Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science, 2011, 163–212.Google Scholar
- Fishburn, P. C. (1973). The theory of social choice (Vol. 264). Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
- Helzner, J. (2011). Uncertainty in the context of pragmatist philosophy and rational choice theory. In Center on capitalism and society. http://capitalism.columbia.edu/9th-annual-conference-philosophical-foundations-economics-and-good-economy-individual-values-human.
- Helzner, J. (MS) Admissibility in a logical framework, manuscript.Google Scholar
- Jeffrey, R. C. (1983). The logic of decision. Chicago: University of Chicago.Google Scholar
- Keynes, J. M. (1921). A treatise on probability. London: Courier Dover Publications.Google Scholar
- Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, uncertainty and profit. New York: Hart, Schaffner and Marx.Google Scholar
- Kyburg, H. E. (1968). Bets and beliefs. American Philosophical Quarterly, 5(1), 54–63.Google Scholar
- Luce, R. D., & Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and decisions: Introduction and critical survey. New York: Courier Dover Publications.Google Scholar
- Peirce, C. S. (1992). The essential Peirce: Selected philosophical writings (Vol. 1). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.Google Scholar
- Rott, H. (2001). Change, choice and inference: A study of belief revision and nonmonotonic reasoning (Vol. 42). Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Rubinstein, A. (2012). Lecture notes in microeconomic theory: The economic agent. Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
- Savage, L. (1972). originally published in 1954). The foundations of statistics. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar