, Volume 193, Issue 1, pp 219–243 | Cite as

Conditional choice with a vacuous second tier

  • Rush T. Stewart


This paper studies a generalization of rational choice theory. I briefly review the motivations that Helzner gives for his conditional choice construction (2013). Then, I focus on the important class of conditional choice functions with vacuous second tiers. This class is interesting for both formal and philosophical reasons. I argue that this class makes explicit one of conditional choice’s normative motivations in terms of an account of neutrality advocated within a certain tradition in decision theory. The observations recorded—several of which are generalizations of central results in the standard theory of rational choice—are intended to provide further insight into how conditional choice generalizes the standard account and are offered as additional evidence of the fruitfulness of the conditional choice framework.


Rational choice Decision theory Uncertainty Value conflict Conditional judgment 



Thanks are due to John Collins, Jeff Helzner, Tobias Lessmeister, Isaac Levi, Yang Liu, Ignacio Ojea, Paul Pedersen, Hans Rott, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and discussions.


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© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyColumbia UniversityNew YorkUSA

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