Abstract
The paper attempts to give a solution to the Fitch’s paradox though the strategy of the reformulation of the paradox in temporal logic, and a notion of knowledge which is a kind of ceteris paribus modality. An analogous solution has been offered in a different context to solve the problem of metaphysical determinism.
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Proietti, C., Sandu, G. Fitch’s paradox and ceteris paribus modalities. Synthese 173, 75–87 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9677-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9677-7