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Epistemology as Pragmatic Inquiry: Rorty, Haack, and Academic Relativism in Education

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Abstract

In a post-Trump, post-Covid-19 world, it is clear that truth is contested by fake news outlets and misinformation. Less clear is how to navigate the vicissitudes of intersectional discourse without devolving into a Richard Rortyan relativism that denies truth altogether. This paper considers the epistemic commitments of foundationalism and coherentism before turning to pragmatist Susan Haack to explore whether there are convergences between the two. The goal of this paper is three-fold: (1) to clarify how truth and fact feature in foundationalist and coherentist epistemic thinking; (2) to offer a pragmatist “foundherentist” intersection between foundationalism and coherentism; and (3) to use (1) and (2) to highlight the untenable position Rortyan relativism represents, specifically in relation to education formally understood.

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Notes

  1. Marriott (2023).

  2. Ibid.

  3. Postman (1993).

  4. Postman (2005).

  5. Marriott, “You Don’t Need to Share Your Views on Gaza.”

  6. See, for example, Newsmax, One America News Network, The Young Turks, The Daily Wire, Democracy Now, Jacobin, etc.; University of Michigan Library, “‘Fake News,’ Lies and Propaganda: How to Sort Fact from Fiction,” University of Michigan, https://guides.lib.umich.edu/c.php?g=637508&p=4462444; Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, Jocelyn Kiley, and Katerina Eva Matsa, “Media Sources: Distinct Favorites Emerge on the Left and Right,” Pew Research Center, https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2014/10/21/section-1-media-sources-distinct-favorites-emerge-on-the-left-and-right/.

  7. Alexandra Ulmer and Nathan Layne, “Trump Allies Breach U.S. Voting Systems in Search of 2020 Fraud ‘Evidence,” Reuters, April 28, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-election-breaches/.

  8. Mahita Gajanan, “Kellyanne Conway Defends White House’s Falsehoods as ‘Alternative Facts,” Time, January 22, 2017, https://time.com/4642689/kellyanne-conway-sean-spicer-donald-trump-alternative-facts/.

  9. Haack (1998).

  10. Michelle M. Espino and Natasha N. Croom, “Doing the Work: Curating Resistance and Solidarity among Black and Chicana Womyn Faculty,” International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education 35, no. 5 (2022): 510–524.

  11. See, for example, the International Baccalaureate curriculum that has a “Theory of Knowledge” course, but little to no epistemology: https://www.ibo.org/programmes/diploma-programme/curriculum/dp-core/theory-of-knowledge/what-is-tok/. See, also, Labbas (2013): https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/EJ1136017.pdf. Labbas’ article is representative of our concern that epistemology is overtaken by psycho-social relativism.

  12. Haack (2009).

  13. Rorty (1979).

  14. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 177.

  15. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 320.

  16. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 386.

  17. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, 51.

  18. Cleve et al. (2014).

  19. Haack calls this objection to coherentism the “drunken sailors argument.”

  20. Van Cleve, “Moderate Foundationalism,” 256.

  21. Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate, 106.

  22. Haack (1996).

  23. Haack, “Common-Sensist,” 361.

  24. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, 126.

  25. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, 126.

  26. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, 130.

  27. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 341.

  28. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 308.

  29. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 171.

  30. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 346.

  31. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 365.

  32. Irony intended.

  33. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 375.

  34. Irony once again intended.

  35. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, 125.

  36. Haack, Evidence and Inquiry, 130.

  37. Haack (1990).

  38. Haack (1997).

  39. Haack, Manifesto, 19.

  40. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 380–381.

  41. Haack, Manifesto, 145.

  42. Haack, Manifesto, 144.

  43. Haack, Manifesto, 145.

  44. With the crucial caveat that beliefs entail a truth condition.

  45. Peirce (1955).

  46. Haack (1993).

  47. Chingwe and Makuwira (2018).

  48. Nxumalo (2021).

  49. We acknowledge that Rorty himself is not advocating for multiple epistemologies, but rather the destruction of epistemology altogether. Our observation, however, is that the practical consequence of Rorty’s destruction, at least in the field of qualitative research in education, seems to be the multiplication of competing, incommensurable, and often hierarchical epistemologies.

  50. Haack (2019).

  51. Haack, “Feminist Methodology,” 185.

  52. Haack, “Feminist Methodology,” 185.

  53. Haack, Manifesto, 115.

  54. Haack, “Feminist Methodology,” 187.

  55. “Examples of Gender Stereotypes,” Gender Equality Law Center, https://www.genderequalitylaw.org/examples-of-gender-stereotypes.

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Driggers, K., Boyles, D. Epistemology as Pragmatic Inquiry: Rorty, Haack, and Academic Relativism in Education. Stud Philos Educ 43, 47–55 (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-023-09909-0

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